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Preface

Since 1973 the annual series of faculty lectures known as De Litteris
has been an important contribution to cross-disciplinary endeavor at
Connecticut College. The creativity and scholarly rigor of the papers
have rewarded the careful listener with insights into varied aspects of
the human condition. It is appropriate that the Library should spon
sor the publication of this selection from De Litteris for the Library
may be seen as a symbol of the diversity — and ultimate unity — of
knowledge. Its collections record not only man's achievement, but the
vast commentary upon that achievement and they provide a fund of
resource material without which teaching and learning could not oc
cur. In publishing these seven papers the Library is performing a
variation of its traditional responsibility to make ideas and informa
tion available in convenient form to those who seek them.
Brian Rogers
College Librarian

By Way of an Introduction

The circumstances surrounding De Litteris are minor; the whole an
nual series of lectures in the humanities, now in its seventh year, is a
minor event in the profusion of such events visited upon the par
ticipants in the nebulous rites of higher education. The concerns of the
contributors to this slim volume, however, constitute a significant cir
cumstance. It alone, I think, may explain why the essays taken as a
whole convey a hazy shape of a methodology; just as one of Conrad's
misty halos sometimes made visible by "the spectral illumination of
the moonshine" makes it possible to infer the central presence, a core.
I dare say everybody has had a dream in which a visitor from
another world gravely and with intimidating simplicity wishes to ob
tain an answer to a perfectly ordinary question regarding some essen
tial cause of the sleeper's vocation or profession. The sleeper in
variably stumbles through several progressively less coherent begin
nings and wrenching the right word from the blackness wakes up just
as the word is about to pass over his lips. The word slips away.
Unspoken? Unheard? Unremembered? The sleeper, now thoroughly
awake, is saturated with the certainty that he has given the visitor a
comprehensive, substantive answer, but the answer is enveloped by
the dream, irretrievable yet horribly urgent.
Fanciful? Yes. For nowadays, if we are at all honest, we know that

if we cannot give an answer we are not going to wake up. And the
visitor is not from another world, but our kinsman. And he wishes to
know why learning is important. And dogmatic answers will not
satisfy him for long. Nor will he find much comfort in the observation
that each culture is a Bastille unto itself, that it storms itself
periodically to proclaim its old newness. He wants an answer.
The purpose of learning is simple enough: it is "to recover what has
been lost and found and lost again and again," as Eliot says in East
Coker. And the task is always undertaken with imperfect tools,
against a ceaselessly shifting mindscape. Thus the disciplined doing
often appears to be the only stable, recognizable property of learning.
When that is the case, the doing becomes an insidious and irresistible
threat to learning. It is, therefore, imperative that what we do be sub
jected to regular and systematic theoretical scrutiny, lest our thought
becomes opaque to itself and we become unable to think that our
thought may be wrong.
De Litteris is a brief record of what happens when guardians try to
guard themselves.

M.D.

Some Philosophical Remarks About Poetry
Robert W. Jordan

Several years ago, in The Sewanee Review, I tried to defend the
thesis that poetry and philosophy are two modes of revelation and that
while they must, of course, be distinguished, they must not be
separated. To separate them, as I thought then and as I think now, is
to diminish our chances for a comprehensive vision of the human con
dition and, therefore, to insure that we shall fall far short of the best
that we might become. The thesis still has much to recommend it. In
deed, I now feel its significance with a much greater sense of urgency.
It entails a number of unresolved fundamental questions concerning
truth, sensibility and the nature of the interior life, the nature of
education and the goals which a liberal arts education should pursue,
and, above all, the question of non-conceptual knowledge which, I
think, is the most important issue in contemporary philosophy. At any
rate, it ought to be. I wish that I had something stunningly original
and crushingly true to say about even one of these questions. As it is, I
can only suggest why they are momentous and indicate the direction
one must take in seeking answers to them.
Consider the question of poetic truth. I do not mean "poetic
truth", nor the trivial matter of whether poetry sometimes contains
assertions which could be regarded as true. We do not usually think of
individual poems as bearers of truth although it would not be difficult
to find examples which do just that, among the many other things that
they do. But such poems are rightly understood only within the conPaper read on April 18, 1974
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text of the whole body of work by a single poet, or within the context
o writings by a group of poets who share a common vision such as,
or example, the English romantic poets. The questions, then, might
be put in the following way: does such a body of work reveal to us
aspects of the truth concerning Nature, Man and God, or does it merey,rePresent a spontaneity of impulse which finds some echo in us or
which, at least, sweetens our emotional life, thus yielding the illusion
of joy where no joy is? Whatever the answer to this question may be it
must be understood as having to do with poetic truth straight out,
W1n
quptation marks, double or single. I shall assume that what is
called poetic or artistic truth tells us something about the way things
are which we could not learn in any other way.
uch a forthright affirmation is difficult to accept. Poetry is, of
course, to e taken seriously, but literary fundamentalism is no more
attractive than the Biblical variety and we all know how absurd that is.
ere ore, qualifications are in order and are quickly forthcoming. In
Santayana says> "Art is action which transcending the
b^r\°
\r
1
body makes the world a more congenial stimulus to the soul. All art is
J"e ore ,use J1 anc* Practical, and the notable aesthetic value which
WOr S °. art Ppssess> for reasons flowing for the most part out
f t)f„
SI®
Icance, is itself one of the satisfactions which art
nffVrc'f
otters to human nature as a whole."
n

lf

a thin8 can

be practical and useful, like Ptolemaic astronomy,
rr
ug t™e. Santayana is an extremely seductive philosopher
cent h! 7f°
f hlS temperament and are therefore disposed to acK frequently escaPes their notice that in Santavlna the
Fal
lfe
18
8ubtly transformed into the aesthetic life. And
in the eoM T
J
has been rhmT T tWn ° .morning there comes the realization that one
his DO11 I HAVE admired Santayana, and I still do, as I admire
fhesrfientlemen thPart WallaCC StCVens' ~ excessively, i would pay
suPreme compliment [as Plato did to Homer] of
calling them H
0
t?mraVd in thifj' ?- 1 t3ke them Very>
seriously. But at this
fellow-poets say Se'Tom'^ QUeStion: is what they and thdr
e pomt of view the question is
outrageous as J™, I
T
OVe
r
etr
concerned with th.
. ° P° y would protest, but I am not here
n^Ts a PW osoDhieParmt °f ^ The QUestion 1 want to consider
qUestlon intimately related to questions of
literary criticism
ArlstotlVto A?prLemeethatntt a^°ng philosophers' from Plato and
ia a Property of propositions, and
that we enter the area of the /
C
falsC °nly when we speak at
the level of propositions W h*
that they are or Sthev
A T S3y that thin*s are true. We say
e, or that they exist. A dog is not true or false; a dog simply

exists. We may say that the dog before us now is a 'true' New
foundland or a 'true' Miniature Schnauzer, meaning that the dog has
the points required by the standards set for judging a genuine instance
of a given breed of dog. And that is all that we usually mean when we
use the word "true" in this way. Whether we could mean something
more than that I shall put aside for the moment. I shall also put aside
the question of whether the word "true" could appropriately be used
of the works of art other than poetry, such as painting, sculpture,
music, and so on. If we cannot make sense of "truth" as applied to
poetry, which uses words, it is not likely that we shall succeed with
painting or sculpture, and music presents enormous problems of a
special kind. To mention but one: is there a grammar or language of
music which corresponds in any way to the language of poetry? Let us
suppose that the answer to that question is Yes. In that case, would it
make any sense at all to speak of a musical composition as true? (If
one has a season of speculation). The non-verbal arts present special
difficulties, but I hope that if we can make a case for poetic truth it
might be possible to consider other arts in a similar way.
Statements made in propositional form can be true or false and we
distinguish them from non-propositional utterances such as exclama
tions, orders, questions, and so on. Poetry contains many proposi
tional statements, but when we look for useful examples we find that
they do not seem to fit our ordinary conception of a proposition, the
most obvious difference being that the poetic utterance does not raise
questions about truth or falsehood at all. On the contrary. Therefore,
to treat a poem as if it were a logical argument shows a want of sen
sitivity and discernment.
Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting
The Soul that rises with us, on life's Star
Had elsewhere its setting
And cometh from afar
Not in entire forgetfulness
And not in utter nakedness
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy.
True or false? If we choose to play the game I would be inclined to
accept these assertions. I might not express them in the same way and,
of course, not as well. But I would not call them false. Yet, that leaves
only "true", unless one chooses to say that these words are merely
saturated with emotion, that they are expressive of Wordswort s
mood at the time of composition and dependent for their effect on
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one's mood at the time of reading. In that case the question of truth or
a sehood does not arise, but such a position hardly does justice to
Wordsworth's affirmation, which surely goes beyond the expression
of a mood.
And yet, to say "true" does not seem quite right either. Many
would probably hold that Wordsworth is talking romantic nonsense.
would adow us to admire the passage as an apt expression of a
specific human feeling, but they would urge us not to spoil the
V3'Ue
t'1C Passa®e by worrying about whether it is true or
false
But why not? Here it will be helpful to take a long look backwards
to the classical philosophers of ancient Greece. Plato and Aristotle
passed on to us not only their specific views about the nature of
things; they also taught us what it means to think. The Greek under
standing of thinking was one of the greatest achievements in Western
civilization, and I intend no disparagement of it when I say that it still
has us in thrall, even in bondage. It established the standards for what
it means to think and, of course, we cannot do without it. But what we
learn from it is that thinking is conceptual. It moves through concepts
w,lc are
® bearers of meaning, and meanings are universals. Any
o er orm of thinking is either an illusion or an emotional substitute
for responsible thought.
To return to Wordsworth's lines. We can see that they are quite
as tbe'r meaning is concerned. Anyone can
nnHp8 / °HWfV,r
following linesV181

^

^

Said in them" What about the

Life, like a many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of eternity.
buHfT
°F fa!f? My resP°nse t0 th«se lines is quick and positive,
a critic o^srhnT
Z ^ ZUSt what they mean 1 sha11 have to appeal to
CSS * iS t0 ilUerpret difficult P°etry f°r
the common readen
Now consider two stanzas of one of Housman's poems:
Shot? So quick an ending?
Oh, that was right, lad, that was braveYours was not an ill for mending,
Twas best to take it to the grave.
Oh you had forethought, you could reason,
S,aw your road and where it led
A ^
And early wise and brave in season
"ut the pistol to your head
4

True or false? Surely, false. I think that Houseman at his best will be
read as long as English poetry is read; but this is Housman at his
worst. It is sloppily sentimental and altogether meretricious. It is
phoney. I cannot deny that someone who relishes the suicidal mood
and has a taste for self-pity might think that this particular poem is
one of the best things that he has ever read. But I think that if he
resists self-destruction long enough he could be persuaded to change
his mind.
At any rate, in answer to the question True or False? we have in the
first case "True", in the second "Who knows?", and in the third ex
ample, "False". The fact that these are my personal judgments
presents no problem. The answers I have given are possible answers
and they are not meaningless. I claim that the above poetic assertions
and others like them belong in the realm of the true and the false. The
examples also show that such claims can be made even when passages
are taken out of context, that is, in isolation from the work of which
they are parts. My claim is ambitious and I am now in trouble. But let
us consider the trouble I am in.
I have said that when philosophers talk about truth being propositional they are talking about conceptual knowledge and discursive
thought. Concepts are universals — such as man, justice, beauty, and
so on. The accounts of how universals are formed differ greatly, but I
think that there would be general agreement that propositions are
formed by the assertion of an agreement or disagreement between
concepts, or between singulars and concepts. The agreement can be a
priori, or it can be empirical. That is, some propositions are true by
virtue of the meanings which the concepts have.Tamiliar examples are
"All bachelors are unmarried," or "A square is not a circle. Other
propositions are empirical such as "The cat is on the mat, or
ere
is a gazelle in the courtyard." If a proposition is to be regarded as
true, it must be verifiable. This is a crucial point. A priori propositions
require no verification because what is said in the subject is identica
with what is said in the predicate. On the other hand, empirica pro
positions must be capable of verification, where verification means
that the statement in question is open to empirical observation y
anyone
normal
faculties
of sense perception.
1JV11V with
*» 1L11 the
lliv 11VZ1
111U1 l
«v w
»
10 rpl
what ,irr\niH it r»ninrp tn verifv anv of my three examples. The

vai^guiy liiiauuic 13 utmg,
discourse is being used in another universe of discourse w ere 1
rightful place and no accepted meaning. Thus mis-use
e 1 ^
verification is not only unhelpful: it stands in the way o un er
5

ding poetry. Second — and this is far more important — it will be said
at poetic utterances cannot be verified anyway, that they exist out
side ot the realm of verifiable statements. Unfortunately, we live
under a scientific imperialism as powerful as the philosophical imperia ism o t e ancient Greeks or the theological imperialism of the
mediaeval scholasUc philosophers. Everyone 'knows' that verification
er , e con*ro1
.n
experimental science in the sense that science
tells us what verification means. But to define verification is, in effect,
tLt
,ln a ance for what is to be called true or false. I realize
neF
hest ^ if wZ3tl°jS akout Sc^ence a°d its methods are hazardous at
ffa !uponwhich philosopher of science one reads and
u
. j U , ^ that it is safe to say that the whole question of
generalIy understood as finding an exnlanalSf f
f 1S u
p an^tion for somethmg by deducing it from a universal law or princiand historical Understanding.1'dCd ^ C°VCr ^

hiSt°riCal kn°W'edge

whkh questlon I,want to raise now »s this: is there anything in poetry
specificXS^S-t0tlhe f°rmal structure logical arguments? More
aware that 'the nh
* movement of the ™nd in each case? I am
3Se
m°V!ment of the mind" is a metaphor. I am
sTiesdnt that >
15
a
metaphor
we cann°t do without. I take it that
bofffn kfe?anH
What sort
Hk im P°etry WC are offered a disclosure of some kind.
of the mler1ST"*." V* h°W d°es k work? The standard view
nobod™id
™etaphor makCS poetry work- And I assume that
of the subtleties n/ & metaphor is crucial for the poetic rendering
quatdy express ButTs^ WhiCh u°rdinary language cannot ade"
themselves are HmPi
? me at most metaphors, taken by
ess and this is what they have in common with the valid fnSS °r
S
argument
that this is all that the * 1? ° .
i° logic. I would hasten to add
c°mmon with logically valid forms, but
I hope that this is enl
nope tnat this is enough for the comparison I want to make
As a beginning consider the following line"
Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet birds sang.
have read kmanytimefpart of^A Tr^ silentlj!or aloud- although I
line can affect me so stron 1
u am after is ttle reason why this
nCW reading- Just by the way, I
realize that many peonle ufho &
FC
this particular line But r v
P°ctry will not respond as I do to
tkat everyone will have had
an experience like mine in r<^ UrC l°
special meaning for them We^6 t0 Si?mC kne °r lines which have a
C l° talk sPecificaHy about
the same thing but only about the001
elementary level of
" ""

If we look now at the whole poem from which the line is taken,
Shakespeare's Sonnet 73, we find that the first twelve lines of the son
net develop three related metaphors.
That time of year thou may'st in me behold
When yellow leaves, or none, or few, do hang
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,
Bare ruined choirs where late the sweet birds sang.
In me thou seest the twilight of such day
As after sunset fadeth in the west,
Which by and by black night doth take away,
Death's second self that seals up all in rest.
In me thou seest the glowing of such fire
That on the ashes of his youth doth lie,
As the deathbed whereon it must expire,
Consumed with that which it was nourished by.
This though perceiv'st, which makes thy love more
strong,
To love that well which though must leave ere long.
Now, and in much of what follows, I shall borrow shamelessly from
several writers whose work I have found particularly helpful for the
kind of inquiry I am engaged in, and most of all from a book by
Winifred Nowottny, The Language Poets Use.2 In opening her
discussion of Sonnet 73, Ms. Nowottny quotes a comment on the son
net by Hallett Smith in which he says that "the richness of the sonnet
derives more from its metaphorical involutions than it does from the
clarity of its structure." Smith had said earlier,
Sonnet 73 is clear in its general design. The three
quatrains have a relationship to each other and a
natural development. They proceed from the declin
ing of the year to the declining of the day to a declin- ing of the fire, bringing the metaphorical point closer
to the subject as the poem progresses.3
The clarity in this general design or ground-plan is the clarity of
abstractions, a declining, a declining, and a declining. If we pay atten
tion to the general design we may come to think that the three sets of
particulars are intended to illustrate a common abstraction. But this is
palpably absurd. The general design leaves out the richness of the son
net, and it could not be otherwise. On this point Nowottny deserves to
be quoted at some length. She says,
I cannot think of a better way of putting the dif
ference between a poetic and a non-poetic structure
7

than to say that poetic structuring consists of more
. than a clear relation between clear abstractions, giv
ing a general continuity to an utterance. Though this
kind of clarity and continuity, obviously, is a marked
and carefully contrived feature of this sonnet, it is
equally obvious that to describe this clear and con
tinuous ground-plan does not throw any light on the
causes of the excitement we feel on reading the son
net; there is nothing exciting in merely being told that
the onset of winter and the coming of night and the
dwindling of a fire are all examples of decline and
that they metaphorically describe what the poet feels.
If that is all, who cares?4
Just so! But we do care! Why?
We care because of the way in which these examples
are particularized. The ground-plan, continuous and
clear, permits the particularizing but it does not of
itself effect it. What it does effect is some of the
relating of the particulars to one another. The
ground-plan relates the particulars to one another by
provoking us to abstract from them a common for
mula and so it makes us relate all three metaphors to
one another as examples of the same thing.5
Metaphors are examples of "the same thing'. In this sense they are
tenseless or static in themselves. But the particulars say something
else; that these examples are different. What is the same and yet dif
ferent is a simple definition of what philosophers call an analogous
term, one kind of which is the metaphor. In general, a metaphor
seems to contain a contradiction. Its form is "Such and such is the
case, but really it isn't." The lion is the king of beasts but, of course,
the lion is no such thing. Lions are not kings and kings are not lions,
although we can speak of a king as a lion of a man. At this point we
are inclined to adopt the expression "mere metaphor." Or, to be more
accurate, philosophers are inclined to make that mistake, or, to be
even more accurate, philosophers of a certain persuasion are inclined
to make that mistake. But we can be sure of one thing: it is a mistake.
6
Why?
Let us assume for the moment that it is a mistake and ask two
preliminary questions: What kind of mistake is it? and, is it an impor
tant mistake or a trivial one? I would suggest that it is both an
ontological and an epistemological mistake. That is to say, it is a
8

mistake about reality and about the nature of knowledge. And it is so
far from being trivial we must acknowledge it to be at the very heart of
the question about poetic or artistic truth. The phrase mere
metaphor" would refer to a figure of speech which is not to be taken
seriously, at least so far as its cognitive value is concerned. However,
we should distinguish between the poet's response to the charge of
employing "mere metaphor" and the critic's response to that
criticism.
,
.
First, the critic's response. Rene Wellek, in an essay entitled,
"Philosophy and Postwar American Criticism," points out that
from the late 20's to the early 60's (and I think we can extend this to
the present time) critics became "more clearly conscious of their
philosophical affiliations and assumptions." Elder Olson could say,
for example, that "criticism is a department of philosophy . Wellek
reminds us, further, that critics have been influenced by philosophers
of quite diverse persuasions, all the way from Plato and Aris o e o
Kant and Bergson. Since Wellek's essay was first published the
dialogue between philosophy and literary criticism as coninue
unabated. One might say the critics have learned from philosophy tha
many of the central problems of criticism, such as poetic truth and t
ontological status of works of art, are distinctive y p i' °®°P 1
blems. Philosophers, on the other hand, have learne (o
learned) from the critics that if philosophy is to support cr^ls
the arts and literature it must not reduce meaning tothe bare urn oc y
of formal logic, that, as Aristotle warned, we should^not
more precision in our inquiry than the subject ma er p
'
b
we expect, then, that the phrase "mere metaphor" would no longer be
tolerated? We used that phrase when we were comparing
p
with something better, such as a bald statemen
. 'no:ntjess
metaphor is not an instrument of knowledge in any
instru
to speak of "mere metaphor." On the other hand, if it 15
ment of knowledge (as I think it is) then to spea o
is not just pointless, — it is a serious mista e.
,
Unfortunately, we cannot conclude that the.ancient Quarrel between
poetry and philosophy has been, or 1S a'3°u
'
, jt name
problem confronts both the critic an^thep i osop^ ^ lgarn that
is paradox. If we consult the OED in
t
receiveci
"paradox" can mean or has meant a statemen
incredible
opinion, often with the implication that it1S mar
^ ^ helcl tQ
but it can also mean something that is discor
be established truth. It can also mean (and this is I take it he cur
rently received opinion, a statement or
of it seems self-contradictory, absurd, o
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sense, though when it is explained it may prove to be well-founded or
essentially true.
Philosophers have a standard response to paradox, one which is
understandable because it is often justifiable. They try to get rid of the
paradox by showing that it is, in fact, a contradiction. We can say
contradictory things, but we cannot mean contradictions. For this
reason I distrust the notion which critics express almost with satisfac
tion, that the poet (or painter, or composer) must deliberately strive
for paradox or ambiguity. This notion is unintelligible. If it were true
poetry would, in the final analysis, be undiscussable, even if critics,
for reasons known only to themselves, continued to discuss it. A re
cent example from the field of music is Leonard Bernstein's broadcast
talks at Harvard, published under the title The Unanswered Question.
But among literary critics it is Cleanth Brooks, in The Well Wrought
Urn and later writings, who has defended the view that for the poet
paradox is inevitable. The following passage from his analysis of
Donne's "The Canonization" is representative:
I submit that the only way by which the poet could say
what "The Canonization" says is by paradox. More
direct methods may be tempting, but all of them enfee
ble and distort what is to be said.7
But what, so far as I can see, goes largely unnoticed is that in this
analysis of Donne's poem and other poems in the same book. Brooks
shows that the paradox is not a contradiction. The paradox is not
eliminated or resolved by the translation of the poem into the univocity of a paraphrase, for the very good reason that the poem cannot be
paraphrased without being destroyed as a poem. I have a suggestion to
make to the defenders of a paradox and ambiguity, and it is this: We
do not have to say that the poet deliberately employs paradox in order
to say what he wants to say. We can say that the poet must risk the use
of paradox and therefore the possibility of being misunderstood or
regarded as 'difficult', because he must work not merely with abstrac
tions but with the complexity of the world and the richness of our ex
perience when we try to understand our world and ourselves. I have
always liked this passage from Austin Farrer's book A Rebirth of Im
ages,
There is a current and exceedingly stupid doctrine that
symbol evokes emotion, and exact prose states reality.
Nothing could be further from the truth: exact prose
abstracts from reality, symbol presents it. And for that
reason, symbols have some of the many-sidedness of
wild nature.8
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I turn now to the poet's response to the charge of employing "mere
metaphor", assuming that he thinks it worthwhile to respond at all. I
must make the qualification because we cannot complain if poets
simply ignore charges of this kind. Why should they not ignore them?
We want, I take it, poets to write poetry, painters to paint pictures,
composers to write music, and so on through all of the arts. How
helpful would it be to an artist if he were told that he is making an ob
ject of knowledge sui generis which has a special ontological status? If
he spends a significant amount of time worrying about the ontological
status of what he is making, he will not get anything made at all. He
would probably be inclined to settle for W.H. Auden's suggestion that
we can expect two things from a poem. One is that it be well con
structed as befits the work of a good craftsman, and the other is that it
should present to us some aspect of reality about which we already
possess some knowledge, but in a new way or from an entirely new
perspective. Ordinarily, in the role of common reader, I should be
quite happy to accept Auden's account and go on reading. In fact,
that is just what I do, and what I shall continue to do. But with respect
to the theme I am discussing, poetic truth, I must say that things are
not so simple.
No artist is pure artist. No poet is pure poet. There is a limit to the
artist's autonomy, which is in any case, largely a matter of skill. He
cannot escape from the prevailing winds of doctrine any more than
any of us can. There is a claim, implicit in any artist's work, that the
thing he creates reveals to us new dimensions of reality and of truth.
The common reader, again, is not inclined to challenge that claim,
unless some critic or philosopher puts him up to it. But when the claim
is challenged, the artist may find himself unequipped to answer the
charge. An artist qua artist is not under any obligation to justify his ac
tion. But one of the things I am trying to show is that if nobody can
justify it, we are all in trouble. We are naturally disposed to think that
the creator of a work of art or literature knows more about it than
anyone else could possibly know. And so he does, if we are thinking of
the artist as the maker of a work. But neither his skill as a craftsman
nor his intention in producing it are decisive where the question of
truth is concerned.
Now, when the poet does choose to answer the charge that he is,
after all, using merely figures of speech which are no more than ex
pressive or emotive, his response seems to take one of two forms.
C. Day Lewis's analysis in The Poet's Way of Knowledge is typical.
The first response is the suggestion that there are remarkable affinities
between the method of science and the method of poetry. An interest
ing parallel strategy is to be found in the writings of some apologists
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for religion, who point out that an unbiased mind perceives an ele
ment of "faith" in all human efforts to gain knowledge, and that re
ligion and science are not so far apart after all. The trick will not work
with religion and it will not work with poetry either. These won
derful romantic terms such as "force," "power" or "energy" which
lend themselves so readily to metaphorical interpretation yield very
quickly to technical terms, that is, to concepts univocally defined and
expressed in the austere notation of mathematics. One will never dis
cern in that language "the force that through the green fuse drives the
flower".
The second response, the kind C. Day Lewis seems to prefer, is that
the function of a poem is to "communicate a unique state of mind." I
cannot see that a poem "communicates" anything, but anyone other
wise minded would do well to read Chapter Four of The Well
Wrought Urn. Consider the following passage from Lewis:
. . . i f p o e t s a r e n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e exploration o f 'life,
naked living', at its most intense, and with giving us the
feeling of it, then I do not know what they are up to. The
initial stage of making a poem is often a kind of groping in
the dark . . . The clue, the donnee, whatever it be, may
have a self-evident bearing on what happens to be preoccu
pying the poet at the time; or it may seem to have none at
all. The poet fixes this clue as bait on the end of his line,
casts it into the sea of his experience, and in a watchful
passivity waits for whatever may attach itself to the bait.9
I find it extremely difficult to believe that this is what poets are up
to, or that this is more than a very small part of what they are up to.
Their work-sheets seem to show something quite different. But I do
not want to press the matter. I am, however, certain that this is not
what philosophers and scientists are up to, even though I think that
there is a visionary element in both philosophy and science. The
passage wonderfully confirms the positivist contention that the
language of poetry, like all emotive language, is an expression of feel
ings and consequently neither true nor false. The poet, accordingly,
has no access to knowledge. As poet he may cast his bait, but even if
he happens to make a true statement it is not as poet that he makes it
but as something else, perhaps as part-time philosopher.
Let us return to our sonnet. Branches are choirs, but of course they
are not choirs at all. Birds sing as choristers sing, but they do nothing
of the sort. If anyone thinks that all that Shakespeare is doing is play
ing with words to produce an ingenious paradox, I simply do not
understand what that could mean. I would expect any reflective reader
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to perceive intuitively that no adequate substitute for line four could
be produced which was free from paradox, assuming what we really
cannot assume, that an adequate substitute could be produced at all.
The univocal mind will always respond to a metaphor in the same
way: p and not-p, and therefore, a contradiction. But it is possible, as
the work of Cleanth Brooks illustrates so clearly, that the apparent
contradiction is just that, apparent, and that the paradox is not a con
tradiction. It is not always easy to show this because of the complexity
of interlocking metaphors in a particular poem, or because the poet
writes obscurely. Dylan Thomas's poetry is a good example of how
difficult the task of interpretation can be. But in the example under
consideration the task is not difficult. I would interpret line four as
asserting the following:
empty choirs
absence of human song

as

bare branches
absence of bird song

Where is the contradiction? The proportion does not assert that
bare branches are empty choirs, and we know that they are not. This is
a comparison not of one thing to another but of one relationship to
another. In the traditional discussion of analogous terms this state
ment would be called a proportionality. Using that language for con
venience, I think we can now bring forward the dominant figure in the
whole sonnet and say that what we have in the sonnet is a propor
tionality in the mode of "declining." Read in this way, we can grasp
at once the dynamic power of line four. Stated in it is a proportiona
lity stateable, we might have thought, only in a prosaic assertion or
paraphrase. And it is stated in such a way that the word "inevitably
comes to mind at once. Shakespeare's incredible ability to do this kind
of thing over and over again (Keats called it Negative Capability), is a
practical, poetical solution of one of the most fundamental and peren
nial problems of philosophy — the problem of the one and the many
or, more accurately, the problem of the one in the many. If there is
anything 'inevitably' built into poetic utterance, it is the analogous
term. I said earlier that a metaphor always says p but not-p. But this is
to reckon without analogy — because analogy means sameness
within difference" but without contradiction.
I can see the thing working and I fancy that anyone can see it work
ing. Well then, may I simply rest my case and await congratulations
Of course not. I said earlier that our Greek heritage is not an unmixe
blessing. But we cannot abandon it. If we do, there can be no intel
ligible discourse whatever. For that reason confident and robust asser
tion that poetic truth is sui generis and therefore transcends the
sphere of logic and consistency altogether is sheer nonsense.
ere is
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no hope of defending poetic truth (and theological truth) by making
this desperate move.
On the other hand, it is obvious that poetic utterance will never fit
the pattern of conceptual knowledge. When we talk about poety, we
engage in conceptual analysis. Critical commentary and evaluation are
necessarily conceptual. Otherwise, the critic could only produce
another poem, leaving to us the task he was supposed to perform, viz.,
the evaluation of the poem in question. All that this comes to,
however, is that if there is such a thing as non-conceptual knowledge
we cannot make sense of it by somehow switching off our conceptual
knowledge while we experience a non-conceptual mode of knowing.
The only problem here is whether there is, in fact, what must be
described as non-conceptual knowledge. But let us assume that much,
for the sake of the argument. Our troubles are far from over.
One of those prevailing winds of doctrine tells us that a propositional statement which is not a tautology must be open to verification.
What stands in the way of the acceptance, of a general acceptance, of
poetic truth (and also of theological or religious truth) is the princi
ple of verifiability. If poetic assertions claim to be true, or if anyone
claims truth for them, all the polite concessions from philosophers
and scientists will be withdrawn. Do you, by chance, remember C.P.
Snpw's Two Cultures? And do you remember that there never were
two cultures, really. There was only one, and that was the scientific
culture. The pattern is typical, I think: the appearance of a concession
which as soon as the discussion becomes serious turns out to be only
that, an apparent concession but not a real one.
Let us return once more to Sonnet 73. Consider this question: how
would one go about verifying Sonnet 73? I acknowledge, once again,
that the question sounds idiotic. It sounds like a question which could
be asked only by someone who lacks any imagination and who
possesses an uncommonly literal mind. To the literal mind verifica
tion means taking a look or getting a pointer reading, and nothing
more. In that event, there is no parallel between the language of
poetry and the language of science. There is a parallel, and an impor, tant one, but it is between poetic utterances and assertions which are
made in the context of interpersonal relationships. For example, a
man tells his wife that he loves her. We cannot get a pointer reading on
that one. We cannot verify that statement by taking a look, not even
a c,l°ser look. I think that statements of this kind can be
^
verified and, in fact, we confirm or disconfirm them all the time. Such
assertions are also at the very heart of religious language and the
anguage of moral discourse, but that is another story altogether.
1 shall assume that the language of Sonnet 73 embodies a truth of
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some kind, that it illuminates at least one aspect of our human condi
tion, and that it does so in such a way that we respond to it af
firmatively. The form of the sonnet is static, of course, as tenseless
and timeless as a logical form. It must be particularized in order to
mean anything. However, as soon as particularization begins we are
no longer concerned with abstract or static forms. The particulariza
tion introduces action. A poem moves, and its movement is reflected
in the activity of the mind — our activity in trying to assimilate what
the language of the poem offers us. (In what follows I shall regard
knowledge as the assimilation of reality — a reality which is indepen
dent of the knowing agent.)
In one of his essays, Louis Mackey makes this observation:
In the course of teaching mediaeval philosophy I have
observed that the doctrinal affirmations of the Augustinian tradition, though supported by careful and rigorous
proofs, tend to bounce lightly and ineffectually off the
tympana of modern students. But the poetry of that tradi
tion, its pervasive argumentum ad imaginem, induces
reverence. St. Bernard's extravaganza on the love of God
speaks more persuasively than the ontological argument;
the former enthralls the imagination, the latter (with some
notable exceptions) inspires refutation.10
I have had the same experience in teaching. Perhaps the response
was not quite reverence, but it expressed the conviction that the struc
ture of images was more important than the formal argument. In con
firming Mackey's observation I am not putting poetry on a eve
lower. Here is another passage from Mackey, this one from t e
preface to his book, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet:
a "poetic" reading is the best reading of any philosophy
that still professes to love wisdom . . • Philosophy is not
only dialectic, producing conviction. It is also rhetorica ,
aimed at persuading. All actual philosophical discourse is
addressed, not to a putative pure rational anyone
u o
a particular "someone" in a particular context.
If anyone wants to disagree with this assessment of philosophy, he will
have to refute Plato and Plato's teacher as well. And anyone who
wants the job can have it for the asking. Mackey adds another com
ment which, I think, is squarely on target:
Nothing, of course, could be less poetic —- nor' J
less philosophical — than those philosophies that prefer
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the mechanical clatter of logical symbols, the abstemious
one-upmanship of language analysis, or the jejune solemn
ities of the epoche, to the untidy and rather dangerous
mysteries of the philosophia perennis. But every
philosopher worthy of this birth-right is also "a kind of
poet".
I have now reached the point of no return. So, I may as well keep
going. We should, indeed, revive the argumentum ad imaginem. But,
is there any way of showing the possibility, not to mention the desira
bility, of such a project? One of the more interesting things in Nowottny's The Language Poets Use is her refusal to go along with the
veneration of the metaphor as the sole repository of poetic power and
energy. Her discussion of this point is too detailed even to be sum
marized here. It is designed to show that syntax is in many ways more
important for understanding a poem and how the poem 'works' than
metaphor is, but that we shall never appreciate the role of syntax as
long as we continue to make metaphor the center of attention. If we
follow this suggestion we shall see at once that the syntactical structure
of a poem, a particularly clear example of which is Sonnet 73, requires
that the mind move through the structure of images, often metaphors
of course, in such a way as to enact or act out the meaning of the
poem. I realize that the phrase "movement of the mind" is yet
another metaphor but in the nature of the case nothing less than a
metaphor will do. The movement of the mind, then, can be regarded
as an analogue of an argument expressed in conceptual terms. It has a
beginning (an initial premise), intermediate steps (additional premise),
and a conclusion (what the poem finally affirms). Clearly, the domi
nant role here is played by the imagination. Discursive reasoning is
secondary, although it is still operating. Otherwise — that is, if reason
were not acting simultaneously with the imagination, — there would
be no meaning of any kind. We should frequently remind ourselves,
especially if we are philosophers, that words which in ordinary
language stand for concepts become symbols or signs when they are
used in poems. Even the simplest words do this. Juliet says of Romeo:
".. .and when he shall die,
Take him and cut him out in little stars,
And he will make the face of heaven so fine,
That all the world will be in love with night,
And pay no worship to the garish sun."
These are quite ordinary words, but the language is quite extraorinary. hat I am suggesting is that we must substitute extraordinary
anguage analysis for ordinary language analysis.
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William Poteat has written very perceptively about the symbolic
transformation of words made to become elements of experience
which is being acted out. "These symbolic associations," he says,
"are elements in the structure or shape of each one's own way of liv
ing in the world. Our way of feeling in the world, the rhythms of ourbeing at home here have some kind of order, and therefore may be
thought of as having a kind of syntax." He suggests further that
reflective people are inclined to think all intellectual encounters are
essentially arguments, and all arguments are of one sort, that is,
arguments in which the assumptions are quite clear and held in com
mon, where the problem is clearly understood and the rules of in
ference are clear and well defined. But how many times in our lives
have we been in that situation? We do not live in the antiseptic at
mosphere of purely formal inference. I suggested earlier that the
language we use in interpersonal relationship is closer to the language
of poetry than to the language of discursive reasoning, although it
rarely, if ever, rises to the level of poetic utterance. But we have a
right to call it argument even if the imagination plays a central role in
what is said and in the way in which it is received. If that is so, there
seems to be no reason why the movement of the mind as it follows a
syntactic pattern of controlled images should not also be described as
a kind of argument.
But what are arguments of this kind worth? Do they disclose the
truth of things in any way at all? I said at the beginning of these
remarks that it would be absurd to scrutinize poems in order to find
statements which are true. If that is so, it indicates that the answer to
my question cannot be a simple Yes or No. The question is phrased in
such a way that it demands a simple affirmative or a simple negative
answer. The question must be asked in another way. Can poetry
generally, can the work of individual poets, can a particular poem in
some cases, — be understood as falling within the domain of the true
and the false? The answer to that question is an unqualified Yes.
Someone is sure to ask whether Wordsworth's poetry is true and if so
whether it is truer than Donne's poetry or whether Shakespeare comes
closer to the truth than Ben Jonson. Or, we might beget questions like
these: I like Blake but I do not fancy Coleridge. Does that mean that
Blake's poetry is true and Coleridge's poetry is false? And aren t these
questions just plain silly?
I would counsel patience. Suppose we shift our attention to
philosophical arguments and raise similar questions. A good argument in philosophy does not have to reach a conclusion which all
philosophers would accept as true. Consider, for example, Plato s
argument for the immortality of the soul, Aristotle s argument for t e
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Unmoved Mover, or Hume's argument on causality. These are
famous arguments and all philosophers must study them and decide
for themselves whether the conclusions of the arguments are true or
false. But there is no consensus among philosophers with respect to
any of them. Indeed, many philosophers would reject all of them so
far as truth is concerned. The point is that the arguments make in
telligible truth claims, which is to say that there are capable of being
true or false. They are not expressions of emotive preference.
Very well, can we find analogues in poetry? We can: "Paradise
Lost", "King Lear", "Oedipus Rex", but we need not appeal to the
most famous names. We might choose the poetry of T.S. Eliot, or
Wallace Stevens, or Robert Frost. If we ignore or reject the implicit,
or in Eliot's case the explicit, truth claims which these poets make, we
shall trivialize their whole work and reduce it to a literary game, —
and any number can play. Perhaps, but what about verification? In
the first place, good poetry is never didactic. If it instructs or in
forms, it does so by indirection, which is one of the reasons why it is
otiose to examine poetry for bits of wisdom or home truths. I do not
have in mind isolated statements, however edifying, but the total
vision of a whole body of work. In the second place, the claims made
in poetry, implicit or otherwise, cannot be verified by an empirical
observation (or series of observations) as this is understood in science
or in philosophical empiricism. Instruments of measurement are
useless because the data in question cannot be quantified. Taking
another look will not get us anywhere either. At any given moment
there may be nothing in particular to look at.
The language of morality and religion provides a clue to the solu
tion of the problem of verification, although in both cases the prob
lem is, if anything, more difficult than it is in the case of poetry.
Nevertheless, I think we can see that there is something common to all
three cases — the conception of truth as enactment. We are concerned
not with notions but with motions, not with concepts and propositions
but with the manifestation of truth in the concrete and the particular.
The language of ethics and religion does not operate in exactly the
S
aS t'1C 'an8ua8e °f peotry, but there is nothing mysterious or
odd about the idea of enactment as applying to all three of these
languages. We are so accustomed to thinking of truth as something we
te1, that we miss altogether the more important aspect of truth as
what we do. In some contexts doing the truth, standing in the truth,
enacting the truth, are the only adequate expressions for saying what
we really mean. For example, how are we to describe the integrity of a
S"hoseL who!e life publishes and illustrates his character. His
e 1 e is the verification of the statements we can make about him.
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Similar examples are easy to find, the relation of love between hus
band and wife, the loyalty between friends, or the steadfastness of the
faithful man in his relation to God. Examples abound. Poetic
language does not function in quite the same way. Of course not. Even
when poetry contains convictional language it does not demand that
we should immediately alter our behavior, as if the poet were prescrib
ing a rule of life. Enactment in poetry is carried out by the imagination
controlled by the figuration of the poem, which can be simple or com
plex but is surely more than an aesthetic thrill.
Suppose, however, that someone says "You have claimed that
propositional truth, conceptual truth, is somehow transcended in
poetry, that poetry yields non-conceptual knowledge and truth. But
isn't poetry made up largely of propositions?" Yes, but we must
remember that when words become parts of poetic language they no
longer function as general concepts. They become parts of a structure
of images. To understand them we depend upon the imagination
rather than our discursive reason. If we want our ideas always to be
perfectly clear so that we can avoid inconsistency and ambiguity we
must be sure that our concepts are univocal and that they remain so,
that, in other words, they mean exactly the same thing every time they
are used. If our concepts do become ambiguous or equivocal, and they
tend to do so, we may find that the same term has radically different
meanings. It may become rather tiresome to keep explaining what we
mean by the term, but it presents no serious problem. We can never be
accused of saying Yes and No at the same time. In other words we will
never be guilty of speaking paradoxically. Unfortunately, it will then
be extremely difficult for us to say anything interesting. The language
of poetry is the language of analogy, the very heart of all metaphor. It
is there that we can say "p but not-p", and without contradiction.
Rather than say that paradox is inevitable in poetry I would prefer to
say that what is built into poetic utterance is the analogous term. To
understand this fundamental principle is to be able to see poetic
language working, and also to see that what is at work is the
analogical imagination. To understand poetic truth we must learn to
understand what I shall call the epistemology of the image.
But, does it make any difference whether there is such a thing as
Poetic truth? What difference could it make. Might we not say — the
difference between spiritual life and death? I don't want to be solemn,
I only want to be serious. We have heard a great deal, in recent years,
about creativity in the arts and literature. Poetry is always creative in
the sense of making things which did not exist before. But as Erich
Heller says so justly,
. . . it is creative also in a profounder and more elusive
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sense. Poetry heightens and cultivates the creative element
at is in experience itself. For experience is not the impres
sions we receive; it is a making sense. And poetry is the
tore-most sense-maker of experience. It renders actual ever
new sectors of the apparently inexhaustible field of poten
tial experience.12
th?telnnpllen0Hgh^ °ffC[ °ne SmaI1 amendment, so that we can saj
oer ence AnH
Ph!lofPhy are the fore-most sense-makers of ex
perience. And each is first among equals. There's paradox for you.
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Linguistics and Rhetoric

Eugene P. Cognon

I should like to consider rhetoric in its relation to modern
linguistics, a science of language radically different from traditional
grammar and traditional philology in that it approaches language as a
purely operational system. I have chosen the subject for several
reasons. In the first place, it seems to me that the present decline and
loss of prestige of the "humanities" reveals a deep sense of frustra
tion, and that this frustration may well be the result of the fact that we
have expected and led others to expect too much from literary studies.
What we can reasonably expect from literary studies obviously
depends on what we think literature is, and in that determination we
cannot afford to ignore the assistance proferred by modern descrip
tions of language. Secondly, if literature is still with us its meaning
seems to have changed, just as its function has changed along with the
whole panorama of the cultural scene. In the past literature was con
sidered a suitable vehicle for all kinds of things, a multi-dimensional
jnedium without a dimension of its own, capable of conveying factual,
ideational and imaginative information. The appearance of new forms
of communication and of art forms derived from technical discoveries
has obliged critics to redefine the proper function of literature. Just as
photography freed painting from the representation of "reality' and
from the obsession with the model, the prodigious development of
new means of information has freed, or deprived in this instance,
literature of some of its traditional resources. Who amongst us will
paper
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write a letter when he can use the telephone? How many will prefer a
good novel to a good movie, now that movies are better than novels?
We must approve of their taste. It may not be ours but its dispersion
among the educated is clearly indicative of the gradual erosion of what
was traditionally considered as the impregnable territory of literature.
By literature I mean the narrative and descriptive power of words to
tell a story convincingly, or to acquaint us with the thousand faces of
the world. This is not to say that words themselves are becoming ob
solete, certain uses of words are, perhaps, becoming obsolete as new
instruments are invented which can better serve the same needs. It
might be time to ask ourselves whether our idea of literature is in keep
ing with the development of our techniques, and in particular with our
understanding.
There is yet another reason why I chose this subject for my talk. At
a time when so many specialists in the field of ethnology, sociology,
economics, psychology, biology, etc., are searching for a new ideal of
intelligibility directly adapted to their different studies from structural
inguistics (which has come to play the part of mathematics in the con
stitution of the "science of man"), it is paradoxical that students of
literature remain impervious to modern theories of language. "A
linguist deaf to the poetic function," says R. Jakobson, "or a
specialist of literature unaware of the problems and ignorant of the
e o s o inguistics are both flagrant anachronisms in our time."
1 he reluctance of scholars to adopt new techniques can be easily ac
counted for by the fact that they have been forced to undertake a
revi,sion of a11 they h°ld dear and sacred. As humanism
of old turns into "anthropology" not only the "values" of the past,
ut also our very concepts of knowledge, thought, and reason, appear
d^fereat llght: the explanation utilized by historians to
ar a ,,m1Cf
CU tu
trrnu/th
. Phenomena, with its insistence on genesis,
the Hne oftime (diachrony), is gradually
replaced hv°in
oncern for comprehension based on the analysis of sur.
r
narHenlaf1 n arrangements' synchrony. Instead of understanding a
becSnJ tT,°n.35 thC reSult of an ev°lution, the term of a
cont^nnnrarv
wnans StrOVe t0 describe its spatial shape,
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> T^' vocabulary of "origin," "precedent,"
concerned the T' "hectics." As far as literary studies are
concerned the weakness of "literary history" is that it is a contradic-
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tory proposition: it can hardly be "history" and "literary" at the
same time. It can only be one at the expense of the other. Stressing
erudition, biography, sources, influences and the like, only cir
cumvents the problem by telling us what is not literary in literature. If
we believe that literature is primarily the art of language there seems to
be no other way but to forget as irrelevant all that generations of
historians have told us about literature as the product of other forces.
Our contention in this paper is that literary scholarship has a subject
of its own, and that it runs the risk of losing itself in futility if it con
tinues to ignore the only instrument that can best help delineate its
scope with any degree of precision.
Even the least experienced student of a foreign language, whether
ancient or modern, becomes aware when he tries to translate a passage
that to understand the text correctly it is not enough to resort to the
old procedure of parsing, or grammatical analysis. He senses that the
text is inseparable from a larger context which he as yet does not
possess, and that he will not be able to "make sense" of the passage
unless he knows more about the circumstances in which it was written.
He needs to know who utters the message, to whom the message is ad
dressed, and, paradoxically enough, he also wants to know more or
less what the message is about. Modern linguistics accounts for this: it
explains how a word is never only a sign but also a symbol. If we ac
cept the definitions given by de Saussure in his famous Course, "the
linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a
sound-image," and is further determined by the intersection of the
coordinates within an organic whole. A symbol, on the other hand, is
defined by its relation to a reality which is, by its very nature, alien to
it. To put it more simply, the word behaves exactly like a monetary
unit whose value, as we know only too well, does not necessarily
guarantee its buying power. There is inflation and deflation in
language as in all value-systems; the meaning of a word as given in the
dictionary may differ considerably from the meaning it is assigned in a
Particular sentence. This ambiguity is by no means accidental. It is
fundamental. It ensues from the hiatus which separates the two levels
°f speech: the level of signification, related to the word as sign, and
e 'evel of designation, related to the word symbol. In the first in
stance, (signification), we are dealing with arbitrary and unconscious
units, since we receive our language ready-made, so to speak, and
since there are many different languages. In the second instance
, Agnation), we are dealing with motivated and conscious discourse,
since we are always free to choose the words we think are best to com
municate our meaning. Those familiar with Saussure recognize the
umous dichotomy between "langue et parole," (language and
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speech). But Saussure, who followed the ideas of his time and was
strongly influenced by Durkheim's sociology, believed that language
r a?i J S£Cia!
speech
an individual datum, a description we
rind difficult to accept if only because of "idiolects," speech patterns
developing within the limits of individual speech, mannerisms of ex
pression which prove that a process of sedimentation, settling, takes
place at the personal level as it does at the level of institutionalized
anguage. n fact, the difference lies elsewhere; while language is
structured, speech is the structuring (or constitutive) activity. When I
1 6 W°r S ' Ufe const'tute 3 structure modeled after the patterns
extran^ngU+agv' .and the reality which I inform in the process although
my worc*s' Par3digms, and syntagms (i.e. to
the wim|US °+ 1 fn<?S
Syem)
e
determi
meJ J ,
'
nation which presides over the arrangeianm,a°
a s5?tence- This reciprocal structuring of reality by
ficflt n8C at
° ia"gU,age hy reality is probably one of the most difWhieh re!, il°fS ° tue nguistic theory. It raises all sorts of difficulties
However tt, r°T
absolute separation between words and things,
danee with th'" eractl?n between language and the world, in accorconmJi th ! an3lyS1S °f contemporary linguistics, eventually acof""sem!nt!le»0rmat!?n °f concePts'. of "elds and contexts, in short,
ln 'he similarities and solidarities of things,
We are th" i 1j00
C
lieht ofwhat^ - t° examine the central question of meaning in the
I would have HS fUS !feD Sa'd' because of philosophical implications
Which I could HPretf^edht0 aVOid the question' but there is no way in
0 changlng my subject. In our perspective
meaning fa! f
h®
T
mg
tion will he °vt f '
*S generally thought, a simple operaal
g
Hne
Saussure and w
°"
°f the Sign/Symbol dichotomy.
SUCCessors distinguish two poles, for they observe
that lan a vP
says "SVS\SyTJ? °f differences. "In language," Saussure
generally imnliec m v 1fferences. Even more important: a difference
terms between which the difference is set up;
but in language !h S1
Wither wet!L•M%0?y differences without positive terms,
ideas nor sounds tue,Slgn ie, or the signifier, language has neither
conceptual and nhn 3
before the linguistic system, but only
"This differential
/
Pf5 that have issued from the system."
to Saussure's descrint^P 103
Anguage imparts a negative character
tinuous proces^ o"self^ndnc^1 Hlng * SpeeCh iS the rCSuIt of a C°n'
ucing disjunctions, separations, delimitations One could aim
in this vL of l-

-

wTth®6^ i§

3 diakCtiCS

°f

PUre

°PP°sitions

°0 third term" With

for

stance, Smhesis
Hegel, for inpurely scientific annm ePno?1ent ?f hope; there is no such thing in the
the by-product of frat ° f°Ur Iinguisticians- They view meaning as
y product of fragmentation, and they claim that "thought,

24

chaotic in nature" becomes ordered only through "the process of its
decomposition."
In the division of meaning we find yet another example of the
binary structure underlying the development of language. Meaning
can always be broken up into two different, though closely related
realms: the realm of what language means in me, and the realm of
what I mean in it, the two being necessary to each other as well as in
evitably inadequate to each other. Hence the ambiguities of our
speech. Polysemia is unavoidable, and it is useless to recommend the
use of the "proper" word since there is obviously no proper word, no
right word. There would be one if language were only a process of
naming, "a list of words, each corresponding to the thing it names."
But that would presuppose that ideas exist before words, and that
things exist before ideas, a state of affairs which is linguistically unac
ceptable, although commonly held to be true. Strictly speaking, the
pure meaning of a word is confined to the silence of dictionaries. It is
lost in the act of designation, or, if you prefer, in the application of
living speech. Since things have no names polysemia (the multiplicity
of meanings attaching to a given word or expression) is simply a fact
of linguistic life; for all the reluctance of a certain pedagogy there is
nothing scandalous to it. It is the result not of any deficiency in either
of the two opposite poles of meaning, but of the conflict between
them. In fact, if we avoid the confusion between words and sememes,
meaning is always one and simple at the level of signification; con
versely, a word supported by a given context has never more than one
meaning at a time. But ambiguity will appear when we attempt to
force things into a framework of relations which deprives them of
their singularity and imposes on them limitations and classifications
fundamentally alien to their nature. In other words, polysemia is the
outcome of our effort to think the world of things by means of the
world of language, whereas, we maintain, the two are incompatible.
But, vain as this claim might be, the practical necessity of expressing
reality through language will confer upon our thought, which in itself
is pure logic, the coherence and unity of meaning demanded by the
situation.
It also follows that the validity of a message can never be definitely
established by language alone. This is the easiest part o t e
demonstration, because it is borne out by everyday observation. Even
in a simple expression like "a brown leather shoe," nothing in the
words suggests and only experience will tell whether brown ;ye eTS
lo "leather," or to "shoe." In a sentence like "this coat is light, only
verification determines whether we mean "light" as weight, or light as
eolour, and when I say that, "I knew him as a student, we canno
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know which of us was the student at the time. This may sound too evi
dent, but it leads to the conclusion (itself perhaps less evident) that
language as such is not interested in the "truth" or "untruth" of the
statement. Just as the linguistic sign, according to Saussure, is arltrary, we must infer that the whole system of language is arbitrary in
its relation to the world of "things," that is to say that it is based on
norms completely autonomous from the norms of reality.
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grammar. Normal speech, of course, is halfway between these two ex
tremes which are not just two aspects but, as we have seen, two poles
of the system. On the one hand, words tend to become void of content
under the magnetic attraction of grammar (analysis), though they can
never be completely transparent or cease to retain some allusiveness to
reality. On the other hand, they can never exhaust the fullness of
representation, although they tend to grasp as much of reality as they
can by means of metaphor and metonymy. Of this dual tendency, the
source of so many controversies, I will consider only the second in the
rest of this paper: the one that has to do with the operation of
reinvesting "reality" in the forms of speech. Rhetoric, then, will be
understood as the process by which we try, without ever succeeding
completely, to reduce as far as possible the arbitrariness of signs in
herent in the system by conferring "meaning," namely an intentional
direction, upon our messages.
Dealing with rhetoric, as I see it, is not to abandon the sphere of
linguistics, but rather to explore the side of it which is less visible and
almost totally unknown, the dark side of linguistics. We need hardly
point out at this stage that rhetoric cannot be reduced, as it used to be,
to a normative discipline, providing recipes for good writing, listing
figures of speech, and teaching the rules of invention, argumentation,
and composition. All this would be harmless and a good subject for
scholars if it did not have the drawback of resting on a false concep
tion of language. Today rhetoric should be considered cybernetics of
message transmission rather than a normative science. We are no
longer dealing with codes but with programs, and the task is to get the
message across as efficiently as possible. Needless to say, this runs
counter to the traditional precepts of rhetoric. While the old rhetoric
insisted on standards of "correctness" it now seems to us that the best
construction is not necessarily the most "correct" one, but the con
struction which works best. To take an instance, rhetoricians of the
old school used to ban repetitions as pleonastic. (Pleonasms and
repetitiousness are still synonymous with dull and untidy writing.) But
a blanket condemnation of the practice is untenable because there are
cases when it is necessary to repeat a word, an expression, or a turn of
phrase, in order to render meaning more explicit or more expressive.
Repetition can be highly meaningful. Peguy, for example, Claudel,
and many of the new novelists in France and elsewhere have
deliberately used recurrent patterns of expression as incantatory forms
designed to induce specific mental states. Repetition cannot be con
demned when it helps the artist achieve certain deliberately sought
symmetries or echoing effects. "Conclusion" of the sentence, on the
°ther hand, or "explanation" of an allusion for the sake of clarity or
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good grammar can certainly impair the effectiveness of the message.
Among people of the same age, cultural heritage, and education, a
mere hint can convey more than a long disquisition. A scientific or
technical term addressed to an insufficiently informed public can be
an obstacle to communication because of its precision, and the least
precise word will be the only appropriate one.
Obviously it is difficult to appreciate the intention of a message, or
measure its cost and economy, if the situation enveloping it is not
taken into account. The manifest weakness of the old rhetoric and the
pedagogy derived from it was that it studied language in the abstract,
cut off, as it were, from the circumstances of real life. A message is
never produced in a vacuum. It is conditioned by the factors of its
situation: its content always refers to a particular discipline or a par
ticular field of experience; the speaker, or the writer, present even
when apparently hidden behind the message, reveals his presence more
or less directly by his personal "touch," akin to a signature tune, or a
trade mark; the recipient of the message, who looms behind the com
munication — the public, an audience, the posterity for whom the
message is eventually destined and which helps to shape it in return;
and, lastly, the vector which assigns to the message a determined
amount of time and space. One can hardly hope to satisfy all condi
tions at one time but none of them can be completely ignored, and on
ly the occasion eventually suggests the factor which is to be preferred.
There is no such thing as perfect communication: when the
speaker/writer chooses the most suitable emphasis he rejects other
solicitations, other promptings, and choice always entails frustration.
One feels that something important has been omitted. Robbe-Grillet is
certainly right when he eliminates metaphor on grounds of principle,
but he is obviously wrong when he claims that the kind of impartial
description he recommends is less anthropomorphic than the compla
cent humanism of old. The impersonal writer remains distinctly pre
sent in his impersonality: trying to reduce his vision, for instance, to a
universe of pure "objects" he grants undue privilege to one factor of
the situation at the expense of all the others and in so doing he con
demns himself to the outmoded aesthetic of the "right word." In
short, there is no solution. Each factor of the situation tends to
precipitate out" the totality of the message. Whether stable or not,
the various crystallizations contained in the process of the production
of a message make up the "content" of the message. A message
oriented toward the "content" is esentially a pragma, the result of an
activity which does not find its end in itself. Most of our messages
c early belong to this category: when we speak or write to impart a
piece ot news or information, to express a wish or give an order, we
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use language as the vehicle for conveyance of a certain "content."
And all we demand of the instrument is its immediate and faithful
response to our intentions. If at the very dawn of civilization prose re
mained generally anonymous, it was only because it claimed no other
reality than the reality of what it said. There was no signature, because
there was no author; there was no author because there was no work
in the modern sense of the word, since the message tended to
evaporate spontaneously behind the "things" it conveyed. Its value
lay in its transparency.
No wonder that we are sometimes confused when it comes to the
choice of "models"! In the classroom we have been trained to admire
a particular type of message which does not correspond to the actual
practice of living speech. Anthologies purport to teach language by
encouraging imitation of selected passages from the work of the
"best" writers. Yet we know that it is impossible to learn to play the
violin by just listening to the recordings of the greatest violinists.
Besides, the selections are most of the time closed passages, isolated
from the context, full of historical allusions, names of unknown peo
ple, forgotten habits, mysterious intents, which leave the unfortunate
child with the feeling of confronting an absolute, whereas his language
is to him a natural activity which can be put to any use, at any time,
and which does not seem to deserve so much attention or respect. At a
later stage, the study of masterpieces will reinforce in the student the
impression that there exists a substantive, generic difference between
the language of the famous writers and his own. But this is a delusion,
for everybody is a rhetorician!
What I am trying to say is that pedagogy should be based on
transformation rather than on imitation, since the child already
speaks. We should try not to teach, but train through an intelligent
variation of parameters a faculty which already exists. The job of the
teacher is, nonetheless, essential. It is to help the child observe
himself, and to study the child rather than teach the lesson. Such prac
tice, based on the actual mechanisms of language, might still incur the
old accusation of sophistry leveled at rhetoric since the time of the an
cient Greeks (but which training is not sophistry?). It is, however, at
least an a posteriori practice, and since it rests on the stu y o
transformations it offers the advantage of preparing the student tor a
better understanding of law, government, advertising, computer
science, in a word of an immense field of possible applications, o
know one's language is one thing; to know how to use it is another.
The two trainings go together and it is a fallacy to believe that one
should know one's language before attempting to use it.
If this is so, it is no less of a delusion to believe that the development
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of one's proficiency is the business of the "humanities." There are, of
course, differences between our use of language and the use found in
the writings we are given to admire when we go to college. But, as 1
have already indicated, the difference is not fundamental: it is only a
difference of degree, by which I mean that most works of literature
are amplifications, variations, embellishments of what we all do spon
taneously when we speak. They refer us to the rhetoric of pragma. The
dazzling and complex organizations of literary devices are still intend
ed to communicate a particular content, and therefore to become
eclipsed by what they disclose to us. As a consequence, the
hermeneutics appropriate to what the "best" have written does not
have to differ essentially from the hermeneutics appropriate to the
messages of "ordinary people." When "ordinary" people discuss an
idea, tell a story, report an incident, make a request, or whatever, they
aim at something which has its "meaning" outside of the message.
This imparting of knowledge makes artisans, craftsmen of them.
Hence the traditional scholarship which has obfuscated and
sometimes buried masterpieces of the past in order to reconstruct the
situation which holds the secret of their meaning. Indeed, from this
vantage point the historical approach seems to be not only legitimate
but inescapable, since the reference is part and parcel of the message.
At the same time the new criticism has done well to remind scholars of
the symbolic value of language, even in its most mediatory function,
and to insist on the necessity of opening up new avenues of interpreta
tion, starting from the work itself and leading in all the directions in
dicated by the development of what is now called the "human
sciences."
As far as the study of content is concerned there is no reason why
each student, each specialist, should not be at liberty to choose his
point of observation. This is no sheer relativism but rather a sensible
division of intellectual labour. Not that we condone some of their in
terpretations: under the guise of "science" too many recent critics
return to the fold of impressionism, showing arrogance and com
placency the better to conceal their ignorance of facts. But if a number
of specialists study individual works of literature in the light of their
particular disciplines, and if the points of view are sufficiently diverse
one can hope that, in the end, the truth of the work (if there is such a
thing) will emerge at the point where the different perspectives con
verge (if they do). Should this kind of collaboration become
wi espread, however, and even under the most favorable of c'r"
cumstances, it is uncertain whether the results would be commenttip nnorroi L effort- A g°od example of what I mean can be found in
re etween Picard and Barthes, some ten years ago, a quarrel

30

which put criticism in the forefront of literature by boldly reexamining
the central question of interpretation. For all their talents neither of
the contenders rose above the level of the rhetoric of pragma,
although they took radically opposite positions on the problems of
truth, reality, etc. One might presume that they would have settled
their differences easily if they had considered the problem not, as they
did, from the perspective of praxis, where literature gets bogged down
in the contradictions and obscurities this world is heir to, but from the
viewpoint of poiesis, where literature comes into its own, so to speak,
in the world of Forms.
Poiesis is not poetry. I use the term for the sake of convenience
because it connotes, like praxis, a specific kind of activity, another
dimension of rhetoric. Poiesis is praxis inverted, turned upside
down, a rhetoric of pragma. Instead of being directed toward the
world of "things" the message becomes apoiema, a moment directed
toward itself, a structure unto itself, carrying its own motivation and
finding, as if spontaneously, its own form. All this does not mean, of
course, that there is no "content" left in the poiema, but the content
has assumed a totally different nature: the message ceases to be a "for
something"; it now has no other end but to be "for itself" as so many
poets have said, from Poe to Baudelaire, from Valery to T.S. Eliot. In
the words of MacLeish "a poem should not mean but be." We have
heard the statement so often that it has become a commonplace of
literary criticism, and I am afraid some of you may wonder why I had
to take such pains to arrive at this trite remark. The reason is, as I
have by now said several times, that even the most familiar idea is not
really perceived and it certainly is not understood until it has been re
placed in the whole perspective of the subject. And the subject here is
how language works. Besides, although we "know" that "a poem
should not mean but be" we usually do not draw all the consequences
from this assertion. It implies, among other things, that poetry cannot
be "narrative" or "descriptive," or as we say nowadays "representa
tional" or "engagee," "revolutionary" or "conservative," much less
"lyrical" or "dramatic." These are qualities of the pragma; it makes
no sense to ascribe them to the poiema; it makes hardly more sense to
ascribe them to literature, if we understand literature as a form of
language in which the "contents" is a means for the work to exist
rather than the ultimate justification for its existence.
^
/
This view of things compels us to revise a number of "cliches.
Style, for instance, in spite of what Buffon declared, is not man
himself" but, on the contrary, a quality of writing. And when we
come to "inspiration" we must also reverse our belief that it comes to
us as a gift from the gods. The relation of the author to his message at
31

the level of poiesis, poetic experience, is exactly the reverse of the rela
tion between the speaker and his message at the level of praxis, every
day communication. Since the poet cannot find the source of his
words outside of words themselves he is naturally inclined to believe
that he owes them to a spell of divine origin. For it is true that his
freedom is, in a way, compromised: the artist is a slave to his act.
While the craftsman or the artisan acquires freedom in the realization
of his intent, the artist is ever more obedient to the rules of his
medium: dancing may lead nowhere but it is nonetheless far more
strictly controlled than walking. Furthermore, the poem, independent
of the idea that the poet may have of it and not bound by the impres
sion it may produce in the reader, does not communicate in the usual
manner but offers itself as a self-contained universe. In this universe a
different notion of propriety is at work: the poetic word does not cor
respond to itself in the connotational mode but to a previous enuncia
tion of itself, the power of which event calls it into being in this very
place, at this very time, by virtue of an inner determinism or necessity,
which, in each instance, renders the recurrence manifest. The sign is
no longer a symbol, it has become a "motif." The variations of the
motif within the rigid pattern created by the rhythmic divisions of the
message reveal to the eye or to the ear, as well as to the mind, a form
which makes it impossible, for instance, to imagine oneself "A Paris
sur un cheval gris" without immediately imagining oneself "d Nevers
sur un cheval vert." In the strictest logic of experience the poetic
message of Max Jacob's lines does not make sense: there are no green
horses in this world, not even in Nevers; we all know that. But in the
logic of the poem the message makes sense, it even makes the only
possible sense since no other word could be substituted for "vert"
without causing immediate decomposition of the message itself.
This example should be enough to illustrate what "meaning"
represents in the rhetoric of poiesis. If, according to structural
linguistics, meaning is the reduction of the arbitrariness inherent in the
world of signs, or to put more simply, if meaning is an expectation, an
anticipation of a harmony, rejection of what is contingent or subject
to chance, then it should be clear that rhythm is meaning. We must
not think of poetry, not even of literature, as the superimposition of
verbal ornaments on what would constitute reference in the rhetoric of
pragma. Although Max Jacob's green horse denies experience it
reveals a form of knowledge. It has been pointed out that we can
spea o poetry as truth. But the relation between the utterance and
e.wor °J things has been inverted: poetry is to experience what
fr»r!nTatf^i!S t0
continue to associate these two contrary
orms of knowledge" because the dual nature of the linguistic sign
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encourages confusion. A great deal of what we read as poetry is poetry
solely from the standpoint of sound. It retains its allegiance to the
universe of "things" and tries, under the veil of music, to fulfill some
useful purpose . . . That is why it is so easy to read a confession, a sur
render in trust, a philosophy, into poems of this kind.The confession
is there, and the surrender, and the philosophical musings: the ques
tion for the poet is to force into the narrow straight jacket of a given
rhythm a message which emanates not from itself, but from actual
life. The same confusion accounts for the popular superstition that it
is enough to be in love to become a poet, when it should be obvious
that strong emotions tend to make one less articulate, rather than
more. In fact — neither the emotions, nor the ideas, nor the ex
perience of a man can make a poet out of him unless he has a special
sense, a unique talent to hear the suggestions of language itself, or to
quote Mallarm^, "to leave the initiative to the words."
Such a conception would certainly invite us to revise many of our
judgments about literature. What we have just said of poetry is valid
beyond the traditional "genre" divisions and it would be easy, for in
stance, to show how it applies to the literature of fiction. To take only
the example of a writer like Robbe-Grillet, the way his narrative
becomes description and his description narrative in La Jalousie, or
Le Labyrinthe, clearly shows that the time and the space of these
works have nothing to do with time and space of the world. The cons
tant flashback, the kind of musical "da capo," which we also find in
Marienbad, are, in my view, devices of a structural nature, analogous
to the refrain in popular ballads and folk songs. But, unlike other
redundancies, the refrain is a departure from natural speech, an
obstacle to normal communication. We can find similar devices in the
echoing dialogues of Beckett and Ionesco. Critics have been too eager
to recognize in them modern proponents of the absurd: they may
break up the logic of experience in their novels and in their plays, but
the pieces they pick up regain a higher meaning, so to speak, revealed
in the manner of their insertion in the arrangement of a work of art.
Far from being philosophers of despair or social critics with a message
for our time, they are in the vanguard of modern poets.
The close solidarity between the structure inherent in our linguistic
behaviour and the two types of structures we try to impose either on
things or on our own messages leads us to offer an irreverent sugges
tion: literature is perhaps nothing more than a ready-made idea. It in
cludes artists, naturally, but not all of them since folk literature is ex
cluded, as well as minor works. But it also includes "craftsmen, job
bers bent on producing works for high consumption, meant to in
form, to amuse, to educate and edify, whose subjects are genera y
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confined to the picture of love, the expression of "personal"
philosophies, or the invention of fictions. Finally it includes, today,
those who, like Ionesco and Vian, use literature to carry out serious
and sustained inquiry into the nature of language. All this is called
' 'literature'' only because literature presents no clear-cut boundaries,
and it has no boundaries because it remains coextensive with the unsurveyable field of pragma. Only if we are willing and prepared to
draw the line between the two sides of rhetoric, i.e. between the two
opposite ways in which language can be put to use, can we hope to
separate the chaff from the grain. For there is just no way to avoid the
dilemma: either we are dealing with things — and that is not our pro
vince — or we are dealing with the way in which we tell things.
In grammar and in the two kinds of rehetoric we have tried to
distinguish, we sense the same ambition. Whether exploring an
etymology, discovering an intention, or experimenting with forms and
patterns, all three are in search of "meaning" (by which we should
understand some form of necessity), although in different ways. In the
last analysis, literature, through the poetic function inherent in all
language, is a perfectly demonstrable entity. We feel that it will be
cleared of the accusations leveled against it and saved from its present
disrepute if it can be recognized for what it is.
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Literary Problems in Interpreting Paul's Letters

Gordon P. Wiles

It is a strange fact, when you think of it, that a large proportion of
early Christian writings belongs to the literary genre known as letters.
This is true not only of writings selected for the New Testament
canon, but also of the wider range of early Christian literature.
Because of this it has been recognized for decades that an understan
ding of much of the New Testament requires a serious study of ancient
letter style. This involves a literary rather than a theological analysis,
even though it goes without saying that the primary reason for study
ing the New Testament letters has been, and still is, their theological
and religious content. In this connection a group of scholars in
America has recently been at work re-examining Paul as letter writer
rather than Paul as theologian or missionary.1 Their joint progress to
date, and my own special interest in the prayer passages in Paul s let
ters, will be reflected in the first part of this talk. The second part will
take up a recent debate about one letter, the lengthy epistle that he
sent to Rome.
Within the New Testament canon four main literary types are
represented. The first is a strange genre which we call gospels , in
many ways a unique kind of document. Besides the four gospels we
find a book of church history (The Acts of the Apostles), an apocalyp
tic visionary writing (The Book of Revelation), and finally the letters,
twenty-one in all. Of the letters, seven at least are by Paul himself (I
Thessalonians, I and II Corinthians, Galatians, Romans, Philemon,
Paper
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Philippians; six others (the "deutero-Paulines") are ascribed to Paul
— somewhat in the Pauline manner, but probably written by his
followers (Ephesians, Colossians, II Thessalonians, I and II Timothy,
Titus). The remaining eight documents in letter form stand apart from
Paul and his direct influence (Hebrews, James, I and II Peter, I, II,
and III John, Jude). In addition, several other short letters are incor
porated within Acts and Revelation. It is noteworthy, then, that "the
dominant literary form found within the Christian canon is the let
ter,"2 and that this form continued in subsequent centuries to be used
extensively by the apostolic fathers as a vehicle for theology and
ethical teaching. In striking contrast, the Hebrew canon (Old
Testament) and the succeeding Jewish writings preferred entirely dif
ferent literary forms.
Of course, the publishing of letters was by no means uncommon in
the ancient world. We may recall that a century before Paul over nine
hundred Latin letters of Cicero had been published posthumously.'
This large group of lively and interesting letters must have contributed
to a growing habit of making collections of letters. But Cicero was a
famous man, not unaware that his Latin letters would be preserved for
posterity. Paul, by contrast, was an unknown figure, who wrote some
obscure non-literary letters in everyday koine Greek, to some scattered
little groups of his undistinguished fellow religionists — letters cer
tainly not originally intended for publication, whatever their im
mediate use might be. It was only later, through a variety of unfore
seen circumstances, that they were collected and published and finally
ecame an important part of the sacred writings of the growing Chris
tian movement. Eventually they became the most influential and wide
ly published letters ever written. Why did this come about? Perhaps a
general answer may be found in the ethos of the Christian movement
and tins may help us to interpret the letters themselves.
ristianity was a rapidly spreading missionary movement,
centered around the believers' memories and growing adoration of
Jesus of Nazareth, whom they believed to be alive and present with
m- To adapt an aphorism of Professor Robert Funk, "What the
gospel stones set in motion, the letters kept in motion." They supplied
t^r^X1 C VC
.on&°ing communication between widely scatPS
thp J/r
^ Christians. Unforeseen crises and dissensions required
i
° ^tters °f "paraenesis" (advice), to re-apply the basic
fetter, thof^fo8 Pr°blems- Certainly in the first extant Christian
U1
mse^> there was a mood of unexpectedness,
creativitv ,r °
WaS °nly the subseQuent post-Pauline letters in
the canon'
the canon that tended to lose this spontaneity.
range y enough, Paul seems to have written letters unwillingly'
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unlike the prolific Cicero. It is true that his enemies taunted him with
sheltering behind his letters. "His letters are weighty and strong,"
they said, "but his bodily presence is weak and his speech of no ac
count" (II Corinthians 10:10). Naturally Paul objected! Didn't they
realize that he preferred to confront them in person? "Let such peo
ple understand that what we say by letter when absent, we do when
present." This is underlined repeatedly in the well known "travel
passages", emphasising that for him letters were but a poor substitute
for his apostolic presence or "parousia".4 For example, in I Thessalonians 2:17-3:2 we read, "But since we were bereft of you, brethren,
for a short time.. .we endeavored the more eagerly and with great
desire to see you face to face; because we wanted to come to you I,
Paul, again and again—but Satan hindered us. . . "5 Indeed, his letters
were not even meant to be complete in themselves. Usually they were
mere outlines; much of the development of their message was pur
posely left to the trusted bearer of the letter to deliver orally. In this
capacity such messengers as Timothy, Titus, or Epaphroditus would
represent Paul himself. They would be expected to fill out the details
and elucidate whatever seemed cryptic (e.g., II Corinthians 8:16-24).
So it was only the later deutero-Pauline and Pastoral letters that
tended to become self-contained treatises in letter form
a kind of
"letter-essay".6 His epistle to the Romans, however, seems to be on
the borderline, as we shall see.
From the first there must have been many other letters than Pau s
passing between the scattered Christian communities. But it was Paul,
with his intense concern for his churches, who made the letter come
alive. It was his genius that took several of the current letter styles and
transmuted them into something new in literature, the so-called
"apostolic epistle". To understand this requires us to study the letters
of the ancient world so as to place Paul's in their proper iterary
milieu.
..
We know for example that there was a vast amount of letter writing
of all kinds in the Hellenistic world, not only in Greek and Latin but
also Semitic letters among the scattered Jews of t e la p
•
Thousands of Greek papyrus letter fragments have been uncovered in
the past century from the dry sands of Egypt, emanating most y ro
lower social strata and dealing with day-to-day personal, family, a
business affairs. Letters in Aramaic, on skin, papyrus, and ostracaare
Presently under close scholarly scrutiny. Besides these, there have long
been available to us the more literary letters such as those ascnbed
Plato, Demosthenes, Isocrates, Epicurus, Cicero, Seneca an
*
The various letters of the Hellenistic world may be classified a
ding to their place in a private, public, official, commercial, political,
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literary, philosphical, ethical, religious, or some other contest. A se
cond classification, often bisecting the first, would be as to the various
kinds of messages they convey, whether apology, rebuke, advice,
commendation, or other.
Under our first classification we may begin with private letters,
especially those written on papyrus in Greek. These everyday letters
were surprisingly stereotyped and impersonal, limited in range and
confined for the most part to a small number of stock phrases and
concepts, with none of our modern chattiness. The following is a
typical example of their restricted level of communication.7
Serapion to his brothers Ptolemaeus and Apollonius
greeting. If you are well, it would be excellent. I myself am
We,ri •
3Vf made a contract with the daughter of Hesperus
^and intend to marry her in the month of Mesore. Please
sen me half a chous of oil. I have written to you to let you
now. oodbye. Year 28, Epeiph 21. Come for the wed
ding day, Apollonius.
private letters was the common business letter, including
wills and inventories in letter form, usually on papyrus
y stereotyped- In complete contrast was the expressive
must h
fPnvate letters of a cultivated man such as Cicero, but this
must have been comparatively rare.
sensed'al government or royal letters appeared to carry with them the
message tr,e^C ua Presence ("parousia") of the ruler, as he sent his
Ject community. For this reason they were often
eiven annrr, ^ ^
3
C
permanence
ment Weii^"
by being engraved on a stone monuHeUenishc l",nna°Wl! examples of th®se are the official letters of
Cir? t0 ^exander> sent to various cities after 300
B.C 8 Pnhlir n
proDasanda cr ?pen ^tters were sometimes used to spread political
3S
(86-35 B C )'
°f Isocrates (446-338 B.C.) and Sallust
,

in8s as

or discursive le'tt!^^ 1° open fetters were the various kinds of literary
tended letters often & rfatlse in letter form or a letter-essay. These exdidactic letters! snrh°n a'ned ethical or religious advice (paraeneticor
3S,
neca's voluminous Epistolae Morales, addressed to Lucilii
7
Epic"™s' 8'™8 hiS^
tifS and ethS "cachins^ir
also, to write nseuHrm,
summary form. It was not u n c o m m o n ,
the illustrious name
l
> often with didactic intent, using
of false pretences o°r of whT^ w7ter" Far from havin8 any ta'nt
practice was considered
I a. .we today would call plagiarism,.this
&
work. For instance the t eglt*mate extension of the earlier writer's
or instance, the twenty four letters ascribed to the great physiymous

f
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cian Hippocrates (460-377 B.C.) and forming a sort of biographical
account of his life, were probably composed pseudonymously in the
first century A.D., during the time of Paul.
Less studied and literary than the letter-essay were the semi-official
letters of Hellenistic religious leaders, preachers, or philosophers to
their disciples. The ninety seven letters ascribed (somewhat doubt
fully) to Apollonius of Tyana, a travelling wonder-worker of the first
century A.D., were addressed to his followers and others. Their style
lay half way between the elevated language of the literary letter-essay
and the plain idiom of the papyrus letters. Somewhat akin were the socalled "Responsa" letters from Rabbinical teachers, sent apparently
in answer to questions from Jews scattered about the Roman Empire
in the Jewish diaspora.9
Where, if anywhere, do Paul's letters belong? In what kind of
sociological or religious context did they function and how did he use
the Hellenistic and Jewish epistolary models already available to him?
We have suggested that he adapted several of these letter types for
Christian purposes, often mixing them, and thereby fashioning a new
sub-genre, the "apostolic epistle", which in turn became the model
amongst Christians for ecclesiastical and theological letters. We shall
try to see how and why this came about.
At the turn of this century a pioneer in the field of ancient letters,
Adolf Deissmann, was so impressed by the similarities between the
newly discovered papyrus letters and Paul's epistles that he came to
regard the latter somewhat romantically as spontaneous unliterary
letters" rather than as studied "literary epistles." For his day this was
a. liberating insight. He rescued Paul's letters from the traditional view
that they were literary theological treatises, a pious misconception that
had distorted the understanding of Paul for centuries. But since
Deissmann's day there has been a move away from his too simple
dichotomy between unliterary and literary letters. The pendulum of
scholarly opinion has swung back somewhat and it has been argue
that Paul did prepare his letters carefully, not for publication, it is
true, but for reading aloud in a church community assembled for wor
ship. We may, for instance, note the solemn injunction that his letter
to the Thessalonians should be read to the whole community (1
Thessalonians 5:27). Each of his epistles is addressed not to an in
dividual but to one or more churches. They are, then, at least on^t e
way to becoming literary texts with a kind of official character.
Yet few would go so far as to turn Paul's letters once again into
theological treatises in letter form. A balance seems to have been
struck that compares them with those letters already mentioned, trom
Hellenistic religious leaders to their adherents, or with the Respon-
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sa letters of Jewish Rabbis to their distant questioneers," or even
with that Jewish letter referred to in a contempoary work, the
Apocalypse of Baruch. Here instructions are given about the com
munal reading of a religious letter: ''When therefore ye receive this my
epistle, read it in your congregations with care. And meditate thereon,
above all on the days of your fasts.'"2
Even so, to try to fit all of Paul's letters neatly into some previously
evo ve epistolary type may not be entirely illuminating. It is to ignore
e spontaneous freedom of the man. As he threw himself creatively
mto t e new dimensions of his apostolic mission, so he discovered new
possi 1 lties for the form of his letters. In the same way that he brokeu o the theological and ethical norms of his previous Jewish
Heritage, while not completely rejecting them, so he used the letter
models available to him, while somehow transcending them. Under
critical analysis, his apostolic letters have been found to go beyond
or formal stereotypes, both in their general
ctrnr?,r,eV10U^
r detailed components. One instance of the latter
is hi?,
t«? T„ K I CJUSt°mary prayer forms often found in Hellenistic letse routine phrases become weighted with new
mpaninn 1S ,ai}
in
nSlty
modified ???
?
''3 °ther epistolary conventions, too, are
Snc ion li" ? SUch a way as to adaPt the letters for their special
munitv a«
f aS an integrai Part of the liturgy of a church com
munity assembled
for worship.14
thi^v^ofT',^11611' Lh,at he comPosed "apostolic epistles"; and that
models must he?' ,
deriving from previous and contemporary
It has 'its s?e delineated in its own particular but flexible terms.15
minority sronn^P S?tlng .wi,thin the subculture of a vital religious
worked i the doubly stimulating context of an
intensely liherati
n
r.eligious experience and a dynamic corpersonal
porate religions
reflects this as i
creative use of the ancient letter types
renects this, as I shall try to illustrate.
one itSS second sort of typology of Hellenistic letters,
gUide thdr le"er Writi"g'
This classification was bSi? tVhe
employed and om
•
,
Particular mode of communication
hMdl">oto like tha, of Demetrius,
art PrZ^Cn^T' EPf3Uk0i' be,wce" '«> B-C. and 300 A D.)
Characteros,' fourth cen'tur'v A rff Th" Ty"" <Peri EP'sl°limai,0°
large number of hack i +,
A-D.). They give school examples of a
advice (parainetikos or? erK )es; ^he letfer of friendship (philikos),
tion (sustatikos) ironic y™doule.utikPs)> introduction or commendaseparate types!16' Such * " 6 ^eironikos)> up to a total of forty one
help in interpreting New^esSm6*?"0^ ,models offer us additional
g ew Testament epistles. Where do Paul's letters
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fit in this second classification?
It is fascinating to try to discover how he selects from several of
these types, according to the situation. But because he follows no fix
ed letter mode, it is a complex matter to decide exactly what styles he is
using in any letter. Let me illustrate from several of his epistles.
The tiny little letter to Philemon was written towards the end of the
apostle's life. It contains no overt theology, is in no sense a letteressay, but an ad hoc real letter. But its very simplicity is deceptive.
Paul is pleading on behalf of a converted and reformed runaway
slave, Onesimus, who had attached himself to Paul in prison. The let
ter commends the slave and begs his master Philemon to accept him
back with the forgiveness due from one Christian to another. Clearly
this is an example of the letter of commendation (epistole sustatike).
We find a textbook model in Demetrius:
So-and-so, who is conveying this letter to you, is a'man we
have proven and whom we love because of his faithfulness.
Please be hospitable to him both for my sake and his, and
indeed for your own sake also! You will not be sorry if you
trust him . . . When you have learned how useful he can be
in everything, you will even praise him yourself to others.18
Compare Paul to Philemon:
I Paul . . . appeal to you for my child, Onesimus . . .
Formerly he was useless to you, but now he is indeed useful
to you and to me ... no longer a slave, but more than a
slave, as a beloved brother especially to me but how much
more to you [then Paul puts it into the Christian context]
both in the flesh and in the Lord.
But this is not the whole story. Cleverly interwoven into the ex
pected language of a letter of commendation are a number of stock
commercial terms that half playfully transmute it into a kind of
business letter." For example, "If he has wronged you at all, or owes
you anything, charge that to my account. I, Paul, write this with my
own hand, I will repay it" (vv. 18f.). It is from prison that Paul offers
this symbolic kind of commercial guarantee on behalf of the reforme
Onesimus. Yet there is still more in the style of this little document.
Besides being a letter of commendation with business overtones, it
manifests also many of the marks of a quasi-official apostolic letter,
|tot a merely private one. For instance, it is addressed not simply to t e
individual Philemon, but "To Philemon, Apphia, Archippus, and the
church in your house." In its general structure it contains the full ad
dress and blessing, the thanksgiving and intercession, and the lormai
hturgical conclusion that characterize his more extended epistles.
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our first classification it functions as an ecclesiastical apostolic epistle,
letter^ °Vert°ne* from the world °f commerce. In our second it is a
COmmendatlon> Pressed '"to the service of a Christian request.
WC tUm t0 a much longer one - a letter of
rebukeaddrefrpH^
if In Galatianc p° Ghnstians in Galatia. But what kind of rebuke is
seems to heh
J* Wntmg aS an authoritative apostle, in what
h°tly chastising the readers for slippiSck from
i
as we are
" freedom into legalistic bondage. Yet, bound
consciously mis * ffentl®fb century use of language, we may be unample of a verv^ mg 1 C mood °f tbe letter. For here we have an exas the "tunos Jir
if10" tj?e °f ancient letter, described by Proclus
this is that after th" °S ' 6 'etter °f ironic rebuke.21 One mark of
Paul omits his usua! oneSS^ adc?ress and greeting at the beginning,
launches into an
?8 amenities (thanksgiving and prayer) and
apparen1tly
abrasive attack: "I am astonished that
(thaumazo hotn
the grace of Christ ° ff6 S° duic^ly deserting him who called you in
1:6) Yet surnri Lw ^u8 t0 3 different gosPel • • •" (Gabtians
enough, the readers would not take it as a
violent attack hut a
S
irony that the writp u ge e one. They would be well aware of the
afonished at all> but disappointed. We
may compare this with fS
as
°f Slmilar Greek and Latin letters, such

was certainly surprised fadm?"? Attlcfs: "When I read your letter I
terly changed your opinion ^w
h v ?6™ SUm) that y0U had S° Ut"
bey°nd
was that you should use the woTds
eS.-

LT

lr°nic Phraseology was frequently used where goo^relations11131
of a rebuke Such * ? •! WCre exPected to be maintained in spite
''Pbilophronetic language T eWOulj signal this by the use of
keeping with rhetnHeoi
' ?
endearing terms and phrases. In
clear the benign intention^?hT' *biS apProPriate sty'e would make
ears so angry and hnct-i
if w.nter- In the Galatian letter, to our
astonished" would he f 1 fil
Ironic use of the phrase "I am
"Brethren, I beseech v^r GF f^ar'f'ed by such gentle sentences as
1
1 fommand you"] become as I am
• • • though my condition
W&S
3
tn&1 t0 you' you did not scorn °r
despise me, but received m
plucked out your eves anH f 3S 3f ange^ °f God . . . you would have
enemy be telling von the t^If o, m to me' Have I then become your
<4:12"16)- As •»**"«• P""1
rebukes the cK meeh.
ln Su.ch a recognizable style that
readers of that day would h*'
t0
ma'ntain friendly relations with
him. Because of this sid r if !f
estimate of the heated
It 1 from ancient letter style, our usual
° of the Galatian letter is modified in im-
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portant ways and our estimate of Paul and his relations with his
churches needs to be altered.
Next we glance at I Thessalonians. It has recently been argued by
Professor Malherbe of Yale that the whole letter should be seen as a
typical "paraenetic" letter of advice (tupos paraienetikos).23
Malherbe has shown a striking number of parallels of idiom and style
between Paul's letter and many Hellenistic letters of paraenesis like
those of Seneca, or certain discourses of Isocrates. One stylistic
parallel among many is Paul's exhortation that the readers imitate
himself (1:6). This view of the letter will most likely change our
understanding of its basic intention and tone.
Each of the three letters so far mentioned may be seen as a genuine
letter of a quasi-official nature, each dealing with a different kind of
historical situation, each using different letter styles. It has now
become untenable to talk too simply about "the Pauline letter struc
ture or style." We have at least as many styles as there are letters and
the basic structure itself is subject to some fluctuation.24 Each of these
variations, however, seems to be pressed into the service of Paul's
"apostolic epistle."
The last letter that we have time to consider, however, seems to be
of a widely different character. It is an extended and complex
theological writing addressed by Paul to the Christian community at
Rome. Exactly what species of document may this one be? Of course,
we could ask more substantial questions about such a profound work
as Romans — about its theology, about its dialectical or contrapun
tal texture, about where, if anywhere, its central theological thrust is
to be found. But the prior literary question as to what type of letter
Romans is, is also a basic question of interpretation. It has a direct
bearing on all the questions of substance. For instance, our under
standing of its epistolary type will affect and be affected by our
estimate of what is central in the letter and what only peripheral.
The literary question is confusing and much debated,25 but the
answer seems (perhaps over optimistically) to resolve itself into three
principal options: that Romans, like Paul's other letters, is a genuine
letter, i.e. shaped for and directed to a specific group of readers in a
concrete situation at Rome (the so-called "historical" view); that it is
a letter-essay or treatise, concerned with some important generalized
theological problems, while assuming the guise of a letter (the "nonhistorical" view); or, third, that Romans is a more complex kind of
letter, used by Paul in an unprecedented apostolic situation.
First, the "historical" view. Several explanations are offered as to
how such a treatise could be a genuine letter. The most straightfor
ward, propounded by Professor Minear of Yale,26 is that Paul writes
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in response to a particular crisis in Rome, a crisis that the letter is
specially designed to alleviate. The apostle treats of dissensions at
Rome between liberal Gentile Christians (the "strong in faith") and
Jewish Christians of a more conservative cast (the "weak in faith").
According to this view the whole thrust of the letter centers in a prac
tical section near the close (14:1-15:3): "As for the man who is weak in
faith, welcome him, but not for disputes over opinions. . . One man
esteems one day as better than another, while another esteems all days
alike . . . Why do you pass judgment on your brother? . . . Welcome
one another, therefore, as Christ has welcomed you, for the glory of
God." So the letter is directed to an actual situation at Rome. We will
return to this view later.
The next explanation of the historical view centers the letter in the
apostle s own plans. It points to both opening and closing passages for
a clue (in chapters 1 and 15). In these passages Paul seems to show that
his basic purpose in writing is to inform the Roman church about his
own missionary program and enlist their aid, rather than to deal with
t eir problems at Rome. He hopes to visit them and gain their support
or his further work in the Western half of the Roman empire. Early
in t e letter he writes, "So I am eager to preach the gospel to you also
w o are in Rome" (1:15). Near the close of the letter he says, "I hope
th see you 'n Passing as I go to Spain, and to be sped on my journey
Th^H r y°U' once * have enjoyed your company for a little" (15:24).
delicacy of the circumstances and the eager impatience of the
apost e are shown by his restrained tone at the beginning, as he
esitates to take too much for granted (1:10-12). He postpones his real
near the end, when he comes out openly to appeal for
th»,UeS^
SS
tanCe
matLr vf(15:22-25).27 In addition, according to this view of the
to work through friends and acquaintances on
thp tnn't -S Strfegy
adds r,'
° er to introduce himself in an uncertain situation. So he
thocp h U1 f CO?trary to his usual practice, a long list of greetings to
mose he already knows in Rome (16:3-16)."
bodv n/tv,10 t^lis. exPlanation is a third one that interprets the whole
e as showing that Romans is a genuine letter. Pauls
main nurr,6 ep
self-introH,°Sf- 1S exphcative and apologetic. He is writing a letter o
readers' c, C 1-°-n' t0 exp'a'n his controversial gospel and disarm the
church thafSh1C1^"S' He must en8age the sympathy of a strategic
partly distmstf }mse^ has not founded and which he knows to e
understandino rV-u ^ ^m." Furthermore, by defending his own
st'araty he is attempting to substantiate his rig
to be accented °
letter he Sal *8 3 tFUe apostle" At the beginning and the end of the
apostle to the r-OPe? claims to being specially commissioned as an
the Gentiles, thus establishing a right to minister to the
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Roman Christians (1:1-7 and 15:14-24). The long and complex bulk of
this weighty letter would serve a double purpose: defending his gospel
and establishing his own authority.
A fourth indication that Romans was written as a genuine letter is
found in its various liturgical elements, especially those that form a
recognizable liturgical pattern at the close of the letter. I have tried
elsewhere to demonstrate that Paul shaped even this difficult epistle to
be read as an integral part of its worship by the church that received
it." It was tailored for this specific use. Each of these four explana
tions on how Romans may be seen as a genuine letter has merit; each
has ardent support among some scholars.
We turn to our second principal option: that Romans was a letteressay, edited to look like a real letter, but actually a treatise about
general theological problems — a "non-historical" document. Again,
there are several explanations put forward in support. The first points
to textual signs that we have here a circular or encyclical letter, sent to
several churches of which Rome was only one. One hint of this is that
in some manuscripts the word "Rome" is omitted from the address at
the head of the letter (1:7). Another hint is that the document, as it has
reached us in various manuscripts, appears in at least three recensions.
This is thought to suggest that Paul used slightly different versions for
different groups of churches. The basic letter was adapted in only ex
ternal and superficial ways for reading at Rome. In further support of
this is the theory that chapter sixteen, with its surprisingly long list of
persons purporting to be already known to Paul at Rome, where he
had never been, must in fact be a separate letter of recommendation
and a covering note added to the copy sent to Ephesus. Had not Paul
recently worked at Ephesus for three years, and would he not know a
Jarge number of people there?30 All this would show that Romans is a
™d of letter-essay, only tenuously related to the actual situation at

Rome.

A second explanation, offered recently by Bornkamm,31 sees
Romans as Paul's "last will and testament", a summary of his
theology occasioned by his sense of the impending extreme danger
t at would attend his proposed trip to Jerusalem. Or perhaps it is a
raft of what he would say in his defense in Jerusalem, with a copy
sent to Christians in Rome for their information.32
A third explanation sees Romans as a general treatise written for the
Purpose of introducing his views to Rome, but with no signs that it
Was sPecially adapted to the Roman situation.
oo there is no lack of plausible theories, each mustering some supPort from the text of Romans, each taking some account of the
istorical situation surrounding the letter, each aware of the epistolary
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and other models available to Paul, but each weighing the available
evidence differently. My purpose in the time remaining is to concen
trate further upon one phase of the current debate between the
genuine letter and the letter-essay proponents.
The former may be represented, as we have noted, by Paul
Minear.33 In addition, Wolfgang Wiefel has done careful research,
using a wide variety of classical sources, into the historical situation in
Roman synagogues after the Emperor Claudius' expulsion of the Jews
from Rome in A.D. 49 and their subsequent return.34 The strong and
slanderous anti-Semitic sentiment in Rome would form an obvious
matrix for the Gentile and Jewish tensions to which Paul seemed to
address himself. It would, for example, account for the positive proJewish coloring of chapters nine to eleven, as contrasted with his
t0ne in 1 Thessalonians (2:15ff.):
. . the Jews, who
killed both the Lord Jesus and the prophets, and drove us out. . . so
as always to fill up the measure of their sins. But God's wrath has
come upon them at last!" In the Thessalonian situation it had been the
Jews who ^were doing the persecuting. Contrast his later cry in
omans. ... I have great sorrow and unceasing anguish in my
ea"°r could wish that I myself were accursed . . . for the sake of
my brethren, my kinsmen by race" (Romans 9:2f.). So now the situalon may e reversed, with Paul trying to counteract the fierce antiSemitism especially virulent in Rome at this juncture.
inear s approach complements Wiefel's background research by
concentrating on the text of Romans itself and analysing the striking
anH r^ £°)^r"-hrust °f the devel°ping argument between Gentile
ansmmpTi,
ristians. As the letter progresses, each position is
S" 7oa counterposition from either the Gentile or Jewish point
advanta8e has the Jew? . . . Much every
wav " i q ™,u
^
?
Are
we Jews any better off? No, not at
all " 1111'
T
I.am peaking to you Gentiles ... Do not boast
fV, ? '
tion Ohan^nC m el"C* Jews)"
this is leading up to a climactic secdelineate thJV "
uw^ere Pau* w'b bring to a head and clearly
vative Jewish rhP-U ^ f)etween liberal Gentile Christian and conserso-called "strong" and "weak" in faith,
He will nlpaH f
f°'
a tolerant acceptance of each group by the other, in a
recinrolai
dSewhere in his liters (15:1-13).
Various Teh3: 2°f
ary natUre are offered to show that PaU'
is after all not aHH ° 3
& definite situation at Rome. We have time
o glance at onL ?
st' as early as 1910 Rudolf Bultmann argued
in a doctoral di« ^'
by the diatrihe ,tvi
f°n °n Romans that paul was heavily influenced
their rhetorical thr C t° c?ntemP°rary cynic and stoic preachers, with
thrust and counter-thrust between fictitious opponents
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conjured up for the occasion. In Romans Paul is using this rhetorical
device rather than facing a real situation among his readers.35 But
more recently Bultmann's whole analysis has been indirectly called in
to question by the work of some classical scholars.36 The elements of
diatribe style are found to be so widespread in classical liaterature,
that Paul might have used this kind of rhetoric quite naturally, with its
generalized positions, even when dealing with a specific situation.
Here Donfried draws attention to a passage in Quintillian:37
Further, in questions in which have reference to a par
ticular person, although it is not sufficient merely to han
dle the general question, we cannot arrive at any conclu
sion on the special point until we have first discussed the
general question . . . But Cicero has relieved me of any
feeling of shame . . . since he . . . instructs us to abstract
such discussions from particular persons and occasions,
"because we can speak more fully on general than on
special themes, and because what is proved of the whole
must also be proved of the part."
This is is precisely the progress used by Paul in Romans, from the
general argument (chapters 1-11), through a narrowing application
(chapters 12-13), to the particular application for the specific situation
at Rome (chapters 14-15). Evidently the diatribe style would not
preclude a specific situation for which the letter was intended.
A second rebuttal of the genuine letter view concerns itself especial
ly with the paraenetic (exhortation) section of the letter (chapters
12-15). This argument claims that on stylistic grounds Paul's moral
teachings appear to be a patchwork of well-known maxims garnered
from popular stoic preaching and popular Hellenistic Jewish
teaching.38 But against this it is pointed out once again that Paul uses a
purposeful progression from the general to the specific. He is carefully
arranging and shaping older ethical material for the particular intent
of the letter, leading up to the special problems at Rome.39 We are
warned by this fact "not to be led astray in thinking that traditional
formulations cannot serve specific situations,"40 and are reminded
that one of Paul's contemporaries, Seneca, "although he has a high
regard for traditional wisdom, nevertheless realizes that the task of
selection, adaptation and application always remains.
I have long since overtaxed your patience and must draw this con
tested matter to a close42 by moving briefly into our third principal op
tion: that Romans must be a more complex kind of letter, improvise
by Paul for an unprecedented and complex apostolic situation.
It would seem that in Romans we have a document both like and
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unlike the Hellenistic letter-essay. In writing it, Paul may well have
made use of his previous notebooks and jottings. This is not at all im
probable, as Stirewalt has pointed out in connection with the letteressays of Epicurus, Dionysius and Plutarch. He sees these as outlines
or summaries of other work by the same author, or as substitutes for a
work projected for the future.43 Plutarch, for instance, writes in his
De Tranquilitate Animi, "I gathered together from my notebooks
those observations on tranquility of mind which I happened to have
made for my own use . .
Elsewhere he writes, "I have therefore
drawn up a compendium . . . putting it in the form for brief com
parisons that it may be more easily remembered."45 May we say that
Paul, too, is drawing together from his notebooks46 a summary of
arguments already thrashed out in his debates with the Corinthian and
Galatian churches, but also adapting them carefully for the situation
in the worshipping Christian communities at Rome and for his own
J"™nary pla.ns- Then we have an apostolic epistle that is both a
r>nr- CSSay rT f genuine letter with a specific address and purpose.
n"afr Paul "ses; but g°es beyond, conventional norms.
from such bterary analysis of Romans, and from
„nrrp
^.We
analysis of Paul's other letters? Experience shows that
these docZ'pnfc ^6- PC' m?re authentic insights into the nature of
whn vtwT
meaning, weight and intention. Those
S,UC writings as sacred scripture, should,
I believe^ trt to
terms '
speak in their own way and on their own

1'

DahlTha? thC F°rni and Functi-on of the Pauline Letters, N.A
I iteratnr^ iman;
auspices of the Society of Biblict
be arhitmrth reP°rt!ng on their unfinished work I shall have t
presentlv w/ sejective and more conclusive than the debat
presently warrants.
wor^vTr Usefu' survey °t this area of research, includin
LTL UPwLv em^rS.°f the Paul Seminar, see W.G. Doty

2.
3.
4.

5.

Letters in Primitive Christianity, Philadelphia, 1973
Doty, p. 19.
Doty, p. 2.
See
Funic *tTVia
,
Significance
J
apostolic 'Parousia': Form am
W.R. Farmer «
Interpretation, ed

See G.P. Wiles, Paul's Intercessory Prayers: The Significanceo.
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6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.
21.

the Intercessory Prayer Passages in the Letters of Paul, Cam
bridge, 1974, p. 48, n. 2.
M. Luther Stirewalt, Jr., "The Form and Function of the Greek
Letter-Essay," privately distributed to the Paul Seminar in 1971.
Doty, p. 13.
C.B.Wells, Royal Correspondence of the Hellenistic Period,
New Haven, 1934.
M. Luther Stirewalt, Jr., "A Survey of the Uses of LetterWriting in Hellenistic and Jewish Communities through the New
Testament Period," privately distributed to the Paul Seminar in
1971.
Wiles, p. 9.
C.f. Acts 28:21, where local Jewish representatives in Rome
speak of letters from Judea instructing them about Paul: "We
have received no letters from Judea about you."
Syrian Baruch 86:1-3; c.f. Baruch 1:14.
I have tried to examine this fully in Paul's Intercessory Prayers,
See p. 293 and passim.
Wiles, p. 10, n. 2, etc.
So as not to overburden this talk, I am omitting all discussion of
the general structure of the Pauline letter. See J.L. White, The
Form and Function of the Body of the Greek Letter, S.B.L.
Dissertation Series, Missoula, 1972.
See Chan-Hie Kim and J.L. White, Letters from The Papyri: A
Study Collection, Society of Biblical Literature, 1974, pp. 15-30;
A.J. Malherbe, "Ancient Epistolary Theorists," Ohio Journal
of Religious Studies, V (1977) pp. 3-77.
I have had to bracket out the complication of how far each letter
has been edited or conflated, before reaching the form in which
we now have it.
Kim and White, p. 16; translated in Doty* p. 10. Compare
Cicero's numerous "Litterae Commendaticiae", included in his
Epistolae ad Familiares, XIII.
For details see Wiles, p. 216, n. 7.
See Wiles, p. 217.
N.A. Dahl, "Paul's Letter to the Galatians: Epistolary Genre>
Content and Structure," privately distributed to the Pau
Seminar, 1973 and available at Yale University Divinity School
Library. See pp. 12ff.
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22.

Att. XVI, 7, quoted in Dahl, p. 19.

23.

A.J. Malherbe, "I Thessalonians as a Paraenetic Letter,"
privately distributed to the Paul Seminar, 1972; forthcoming in
Aujsteig und Niedergang der romischen Welt, II, ed. Wolfgang
Haase (1978?).
See above, n. 15.

24.
25.

Here I make use of K. Donfried's recent article, "False PresupK™ StU,dZ°f Romans>" Catholic Biblical Quarterly,
XXVI (1974), pp 332-55, in which he draws together the com
plex debate in a thorough way.

26'

27.
28.

LSFMiwea"' T]le °bedience °f Faith- The Purposes of Paul in
the Epistle to the Romans, London, 1971; Wiles, pp. 72-76.
For details see Wiles, pp. 191-93, 263-70.
Wiles, p. 92.

29.

Wiles, pp. 95-97, 263ff., 301f.

30'

n,r;„"aST,. "St; ?aul's Letter 10 the R°°>ans - and
„.s '
"f ,he Jo,m Wands Library, Manchester,
1948, pp. 3-10. But see above for a contrary opinion.
G. Bornkamm, Paul, New York, 1971, pp. 88-96.

31.

197^CIpp''61 73^
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Studia Theologica,

Minear, Obedience of Faith.
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Br'C^

88n8e

^^.ju.^sc^e Gemeinschaft im antiken Rom und die
r0mischen Christentums," Judaica, 1970,"pp.

S

A few examples of diatribe style in Romans:
L '
erefore you have no excuse, O man, whoever you
are,
y
when you judge another ...
D°U Sfuppose' ° man' that when you judge . . .
:
Ca" yourself a Jew a"d rely on the law . . .
3 1 ThVn h
3.1 Then what advantage has the Jew?.
what shall

MrVeS to show ,he

iustice °f

S^'LTatt^ B/no ™ansArc ",0 C°n""Ue
answer tackToS°me,he"
36'

'''

"

Bl" Wh°areyou' aman'

j48' Cit,mg H' Cancik *"<1 especially H. Rahn.
Morphologie der antiken Literatur, Darmstadt, 1969.
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37. Quintillian, Institutio Oratoria. III. V. 13ff. (Loeb). See Donfried, p. 33.
38. C.H. Talbert, "Tradition and Redaction in Romans XII. 9-21,"
New Testament Studies, 16, 81-93.
39. V.P. Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul, Nashville, 1968, pp.
lOOff.
40. Donfried, p. 341.
41. Malherbe, p. 19, n. 6. Seneca wrote, "But even if the old
masters have discovered everything, one thing will always be
new — the application ... of the discoveries made by others
. . . Prescriptions must be adapted to the particular disease and
to the particular stage of the disease." Ad Lucilium Epistulae
Morales. LXIV. 8 (Loeb).
42. One more important omission from this talk has been reference
to the continuing study by W. Wuellner, R. Scroggs and others,
concerning Paul as rhetorician, influenced by both Jewish and
Hellenistic rhetorical and forensic customs.
43. "The Form and Function of the Greek Letter-Essay," p. 2.
44. Moralia. VI. 464 (Loeb).
45. Moralia. II. 138 (Loeb).
46. Cf. II Tim. 4:13, "When you come bring . . . the books" (ta
biblia), "and above all the parchments" (tas membranas). Membrana meant a leaf-book made of parchment, widely used from
the first century B.C. for note-books, memoranda, first drafts
of literary work. Donfried, p. 352.
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Iris Sacred and Profane: Iris Murdoch as
Philosopher and Novelist

Susan Minot Woody

Iris
^ a PbdosoPher; she is also a novelist. Hence our title
e' Hence also our task: to seek out the rela
tion betwepn h™ 7°
quest oie mav^il" phllosopby and her literature, hoping that in the
to the wavs i
uUmv!"ate
°ther and in the process enlighten us as
literarv Mns^nf
utemtUre Can be Phil°sophical and philosophy,
possible- the!* i. "S ac^nowledge' however dimly, that both things are
n° diSpUt6' for example' that Plat0 ™te
literature nor fhat <5h
most of us arlcnn baspeare Philosophized supremely well. And yet
both undertakino W 6 ,1^' p®rbaPs also dimly, the hazardousness of
for the sin of writ'
.Murdoch herself scolds Jean Paul Sartre
ror rne sin of writing didactic drama.1
dse^ Pr°Poses an answer to the question
posed- Hris^sacrpH^ ^
fane to novelist ^ uT !° COrrespond *> 'philosopher,' 'Iris prolhe title then tendentious: do I
mean to sav that nh'i C ™citure.
1 °®°Ph12mg is a sacred activity, while making
novels is somehow
merely profane? This question, too, needs to be illuminated.

assumptfon^haU^r^ic ndertau-Cn under the guidance of the minimal
which requires to S is something here - a puzzle and a problem tivities of the philosopher^hmdd h*™ l° be demandin8 that the acbear uP°n, illumine the activities of
the novelist and mn™
i °
1
W
seem that any of the folTn ^
- u y? Abstractly considered, it would
any of the following might be the case. First, Iris Murdoch's

Paper read on April 17, 1975
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philosophy and her literature have nothing to do with one another:
they are perfectly unrelated. In this case, the philosopher and the
novelist just happen to inhabit the same skin. But, secondly, it might
be the case that one enterprise is thoroughly subordinate to the other;
for instance, maybe her novels are nothing but literary illustrations of
her philosophy; or her philosophy is perhaps only a sustained apology
for, or conceptual transcription of, her literature. But finally, maybe
none of these accounts is correct. Perhaps while thoroughly indepen
dent activities and productions, there may be both a species of consis
tency and of mutuality between her philosophy and her literary output
such as to make them reciprocally illuminating while not negating the
complexity and obscurity of their interrelations. In fact, it is this third
situation, I believe and hope to show, which we actually face with Iris
Murdoch's diverse and heterogeneous opera. Like her namesake, the
rainbow, Iris Murdoch is in no one place: hers is a spirit of genuinely
broad yet curiously unified reach. I shall try to prove, at any rate, that
this is so, in a discussion divided between her recent novel, The Sacred
and Profane Love Machine and her book of important philosophical
essays, The Sovereignty of Good. As between the title of her latest
novel, The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, and its narrative line,
there is a deceptively simple, even transparent correspondence. Its
main character (certainly not its hero), Blaise Gavender, an educated,
upper middle-class and middle-aged psychotherapist, is living a dou
ble life, pivoting on two loves — one sacred, licit, public; the other,
profane, illicit, hidden. The first life is that with his wife, the other
with his South London mistress of nine years' standing. His wife and
holy love is Harriet: luminous, curved, quiet, loving. His profane love
is Emily: dark, angular, condemnatory, passionate. Harriet, whom
Blaise originally loved and married in recognition of her ability to
redeem him from the dark and potentially ominous aspects of his
chaotically appetitive consciousness, remains even as his wife curious
ly apart. She never, for example, becomes for him a woman with
whom he could have impetuous, instinctive, insatiable sex. Emily, in
exhaustibly sexual, poised passionately for whatever a wild and lusting
mood might demand, is almost more himself than he is, Blaise knows.
Only with Emily is he fully himself, only with her does he genuinely
exist. She is his key to authenticity. She is his soul.
Both women have borne him sons. Each child is, both physically
and spiritually, iconic of the love which called him into being. David,
Harriet's son, is blond, cool, chaste, beautiful. Even the anguishes of
adolescence, through which he is living as the novel unfolds, do not
seriously compromise his luminous, attractive, altogether sweetly ac
ceptable being. Emily's child, Luca, is in every aspect of his being an
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embarrassment: a bastard, of course — but also solitary, dark, largely
speechless, endlessly watching. His motives and perceptions remain
throughout inscrutable and mildly repulsive to his father. For Blaise,
and indeed, for Harriet, Luca will prove an instrument of fate from
the moment when he invades the other world his father inhabits — the
world of his father's licit life with Harriet and David, lived in their en
chanting, flower-ringed home, Hood House. Indeed, it is Luca who
signals the beginning of the end of Blaise's double life. After one of
Blaise s regular weekly sessions at Emily's slum flat, Luca secrets
lmself under the floor carpet of his father's automobile and is unwit
tingly transported by Blaise from Emily's South London tenement to
the enchanted, garden-ringed home he shares with his sacred and licit
love, Harriet. On the evening of the day Blaise's life begins to unravel,
Luca, standing like a spy at the foot of the garden, in the luminous
late night air of midsummer's eve, gazes uncomprehendingly yet
, , ITer s. other house' as he does so he is seen, uncomi
v-Hyi11® y' y.,^arnet i° turn- Before the gods have had their last
31' Harriet wdl have come to know and love this mysterious, dark
S Indeed more: she will finally demand and seize motherly
possession of Luca (as her price for releasing Blaise), and she will die
weTnheedetorna°therimP^r!fnt characters in the book, not all of whom
He Hve! n ? Vl v!
J.®™®** There is' for one> Montague Small.
the far end nf th
?® °S®r h°USe which stands on the property, at
Cn' 1
recently I°st his wife to cancer (well,
the full stow
curiouslv diVna m0r! macabre> and is almost totally absorbed in a
Montv knowfh
^ YGt anguished Process of mourning her.
^itherin^ effect hnth
^ °Ving> dinkal Precision which has a
In an almoiu ondr^- °n
1 and those who come within his orbit.
JLractos nd^J^nTr11^ h® tFe"Ches uP°n the lives of all the main
porarv British nhil
n° ®m 3 yet manipulative. (Is he contem
porary British philosophy personified? There is good reason to think
maTs?eTofhanrOxSforddcnn

DeN?oraay- A

classicist, about to become

wife, Sophie. He drinks too much'ctreTtoomuc? M°nty'S
full of need and love. Although hi's word!
'
P
'
ones spoken by anyone through
i T™8 th® °nly healing
e1' he 1S not exempt from
the workings of the sacred and nrnfl i
l0V
machine
ap in its workings
®
" k wi" catch him
15 com

assionate

Well, perhaps-enough has been said to suggest that th* tu
r
Sacred and Profane Love Machine is nofhe e n
'i
superficial survey of ,„e narra,iv. suggesls.
^
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the novel, whether major or minor, oscillates in a measure of anguish
or blindness between sacred and profane loves, and neither we nor
they are perfectly sure whether any particular erotic episode to which
they give themselves is sacred and saving, or the opposite. To be more
accurate, we do not know what a sacred and saving love would be.
The novel poses the question — indeed, poses it repeatedly and in
every light — without providing an answer. To add to our difficulties
Iris Murdoch delights in causing things to turn into their opposites,
with the result that we have not merely the, so to speak, normal am
biguities of experience to deal with, but more exotic uncertainties as
well. For instance, we are made aware through most of the novel
that Emily and Blaise's illicit love is a sunless, violent, driven, cor
rosive passion. Yet at least at the beginning, it had seemed to Blaise
salvational, the key to his true being:
"A philosopher said that the spiritualization of sensuality
is called love. Blaise had certainly felt his early love for
'Emily to be all sense, all spirit.' The absolute interpenetration of the two gave him, together with experiences of
pleasure which he never previously knew existed, a sort of
certainty about the whole thing which seemed to create its
own truth and its own morality. In the light of this truth,
his relations with Harriet seemed hopelessly insincere, not
only in this situation now, but fundamentally and always.
Emily told him that he had married Harriet for snobbish
social reasons, and he did not deny this, because although
it was not true, something rather like it, it then seemed to
him, was. He had loved Harriet. But he had married her in
a muddled, compromising, impure, deliberately blinded
state, thinking this to be the best possible. He had com
mitted the sin against the Holy Ghost ... by wilfully exluding the possibility of perfection.
All this he saw in the illumination of the dark rays of his
glinting girl. Could one doubt the absolute incarnate truth
when confronted by it, as by God? He felt like a disciple in
the presence of Christ."5
Could so true, so redemptive a love ever go bad? . . . ever turn into
its opposite? Murdoch's emphatic answer is, Yes! Under the pressure
of guilt, inward shame and Emily's ceaseless condemnations, his
secret life begins to become poisonous to him:
"Blaise felt shame before Emily, before David, before
Luca. Where Harriet was concerned, something much
stronger had been happening which was now his chief and
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most awful preoccupation. As one mystery wound its way
into deeper defile of horror, the other mystery, though
without thereby bringing him any hope or release, had
emerged into a new brightness. At one time Blaise had
scarcely recalled Harriet when he was with Emily. Now he
scarcely recalled Emily when he was with Harriet. Once
Emily had seemed real and Harriet a dream. Now Harriet
seemed real and Emily a dream. He had told Emily that he
had no sexual relations with Harriet. This had been true. It
was true no longer. Harriet had, of course, silently,
perfectly, waited. How much, if only it were not for the
devils, he would have enjoyed, and somehow in spite of
them did enjoy, being once more with his chaste, modest,
virginal dear wife. How much more satisfying this was
than doing things with Emily. Harriet had once seemed to
lack what Emily possessed in such abundance, "seductive
vitality." But now his wife drew him with quiet power,
rousing in him mixed intensities of reverence and desire.
He had never felt any such emotion in his life before, and
he regarded himself with awe."4
The sacred and profane love machine indeed! A loom that unravels as
much as it weaves!
Blaise's crucifying oscillations cease, of course, with Harriet's
g astly and unforeseeable death in an airport massacre. In the wake of
5ar"etS death> Emily becomes Blaise's legitimate wife, moves in to
Hood House and begins its transformation into her home, her doma£" . ,y and Blaise together engage in a real and ritual expunging
ot Harriet s recent existence there.
f

• „he .and Emily worked silently, surreptitiously,
everishly, like people trying to conceal a crime, to erase all
traces of Harriet's existence from Hood House. A
perpe ual bonfire burnt in the garden, onto which the
nnpHSfh' ^Uady av°iding each other in this chore, quietly
u,, e Harriet's more dispensable belongings, the poor
u
?.!° Harriet's finished life: the contents of her desk,
hnAt f
mementoes, the water colours of Wales, her
/eapes' her newspaper cuttings about her father's
rp -*
ea ' Plcture postcards from her father and brother,
j
er
u s °f cosmetics and combs and ribbons and old
, ,
rnnti'im'j" underwear. The strange funeral pyre gradually
_• . e ^m all. Harriet's clothes and her few inexpenewe s had gone to Oxfam. Only a silver-gilt bracelet
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engraved with roses had been coveted by Emily, who had
prompted Blaise to urge her to keep it. She had never worn
it, however."5
At a certain moment, Emily and Blaise know that their task is done:
every last hairpin and handkerchief has been turned to ash. Hood
House harbors not a thread which would lead back in any way to Har
riet. And now at last the once-guilty pair sink comfortably back into
the bland, unexciting and undemanding business of being a married
couple. Blaise anticipates their future in the following way:
"They would have money, comfort, a pleasant house, a
pleasant easy life. They had suffered together, and would
now enjoy worldly consolations and rest at last. How or
dinary we shall become, he thought without much regret;
and he felt in himself a sort of achieved moral mediocrity,
a resignation to being unambitious and selfish and failed
which gave him a secret wry delight."6
For the moment, at least, no mementoes of their guilt are in
evidence. David, mourning and outraged, has moved temporarily into
Locketts with Monty. Luca, whom the distraught and fleeing Harriet
had taken away with her on her impulsive departure for her brother s
home in Germany, is mercifully out of sight. He had survived the air
port massacre physically but not emotionally or spiritually (they had
found him under Harriet's bullet-riddled body). He has been placed in
a psychiatric home for severly disturbed children. He may or may not
ever be restored to them. David assuredly will not be. He will make the
geographically innocuous but personally decisive journey up to Ox
ford at summer's end, and the strong implication is that he will never
return, at least not spiritually. One of Blaise's patients, Dr. Ainsley,
inadvertently became a blood-sacrifice. In a state of acute suicidal
depression he had left a telephone message for Blaise with Emily. But
Blaise, deeply preoccupied with his need to retain Harriet s dying °ve,
had put off responding to the call until it was too late. The novel ends
in a way that provides the story with closure and yet manages to sug
gest vistas into the future: while on the one hand, Blaise and Emily are
tucked snugly into Hood House to anticipate the child of their newly
legitimized love, and their tale, in a sense, thus ends, David, bound
for Oxford, will be sought out there, at Monty's insistence, by Edgar.
Meanwhile, at least three strong, erotically charged women are
descending on Edgar! Each of these women has been suddenly treed
from a variety of constraints as a collateral effect of Emily and
Blaise's regularized union. One almost hears the "whirligig cranking
up again: the love machine preparing for yet another go-aroun .
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Frankly, whenever I finish an Iris Murdoch novel I vow to myself
that it will be the last. . . not because she is a bad novelist, but on the
contrary, because she is a good one — because she does what she does
so well. And what is that? She causes us to dwell for a season in the
almost palpable presence of her characters, and that we do not willing
ly do — not because her characters are human and flawed; after all, so
are Shakespeare's, and so are we. But they know only one song and
the song is me. Ego. Ego sum. Ego sum. Ergo Ego. The living love
machine of which they are the unwitting gears and cogs moves
through time and history fueled by the most polluting distillate
known: self-love; an absolutely powerful but blind energy source.
Thus, our unwillingness to spend time with the people Iris Murdoch
creates has to do with the fact that however disparate and differently
situated they may be, their souls are all importantly similar in at least
one way: each moves exclusively on the terrain of self-love; that is,
each is either a confirmed lover of self, or has recently been victimized
by such a one. None seems to know how to move from that terrain to
any other; on the contrary, the victims usually show excellent promise
of becoming the victimizers — at least when they are not simply
sacrificed. Such a landscape, with such denizens, is profoundly
disheartening, all the more so because Iris Murdoch delineates it with
unflagging fidelity. In this respect, Henry James, her primary literary
inspiration, taught her well indeed.
And what says Iris the philosopher of this novelist's world?
Nothing, of course, directly; but indirectly and obliquely, she says a
great deal. What she says we may begin to gather by reflecting on the
fact that Iris Murdoch embraces and affirms Plato's greatest
metaphor, that of the Cave, as pointing to fundamental and perennial
truths. You 11 remember that the cave contains prisoners in chains
who watch the flickering shadows cast on the cave wall by twodimensional cut-out figures carried in front of the fire, which burns
behmd them at the far end of the cave. Beyond the cave, of course, is
the sun-lit world of real, three-dimensional existents, but it would take
courage to make the long, arduous climb out of the cave to get to that
sun-drenched world, and supreme courage to bring oneself to gaze
squarely at the sun. For Socrates, telling this parable of the cave, the
sun, the source of all light and illumination, stands for the Good.
Murdoch preserves that sense.
It is inevitable that a myth so fundamental as that of Plato's, even
w,he" affirmed without reservation as Murdoch affirms it, will be
a ap e
y succeeding generations of philosophers to their special
r^Sf ^ tu°PijS
1 jS
at Murdoch's special adaptation of
the great myth. Having done so, we will have the materials for a
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somewhat systematic overview of her position.

"Plato has given us an image of this deluded worship (of
false suns) in his great allegory. The prisoners in the cave at
first face the back wall. Behind them a fire is burning in the
light of which they see upon the wall the shadows of pup
pets which are carried between them and the fire and they
take these shadows to be the whole of reality. When they
turn around they can see the fire, which they have to pass
in order to get out of the cave. The fire, I take it, represents
the self, the old unregenerate psyche, that great source of
energy and warmth. The prisoners in the second stage of
enlightenment have gained a kind of self-awareness which
is nowadays a matter of so much interest to us. They can
see in themselves the sources of what was formerly blind
selfish instinct. They see the flames which threw the
shadows which they used to think were real, and they can
see the puppets, imitations of things in the real world,
whose shadows they used to recognize. They do not yet
dream that there is anything else to see. What is more likely
than that they should settle down beside the fire, which
though its form is flickering and unclear is quite easy to
look at and cosy to sit by.
.
This powerful thing (the empirical psyche) is indeed an
object of a fascination, and those who study its power to
cast shadows are studying something which is real. A
recognition of its power may be a step towards escape trom
the cave; but it may equally be taken for an end-point. T e
fire may be mistaken for the sun, and self-scrutiny ta en
for goodness."7
This long but important passage from her paper, "The Sovereignty
of Good," in which Murdoch discloses her peculiar use of The Great
Cave Myth, also and at the same time places us close to the heart

her philosophical position. Indeed, the passage just above is replete
with sign-posts pointing us in the direction of The ur 00
•
First, there is the rueful sense of the terrible, consuming en gy
and of its hypnotic power over us, so m u c h stranger and less

se!f

resistible than the hypnotic fascination of a leaping fire, w
n°t bring ourselves to stop gazing into dreamily,
gam,, 1
Passage, Murdoch expresses her awareness of t eeas

Qf

going astray - of venerating, not God and no the Good but onlya
cunningly disguised version of the self agar11- ( e
f our
of Kant's sage warning not to be too confident of the moral y
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motives; if we take a more seeing look, we may find "the dear self.")
Finally the passage expresses the sense characteristic of all
Platonists that the real is not disclosed — or at least not unambiguous
ly disclosed — through the appearances, but lies elsewhere — beneath
or beyond — and must be made the goal of conscious striving by
anyone who hopes to escape illusion and fantasy. — Together, these
three themes nearly triangulate the core of Murdoch's position.
Needless to say, much thought of importance, developing out of this
core of concerns, moves beyond it, but time is too limited for us to
trace these many areas of development. Suffice it to say that the uses
to which she puts these themes and insights is determined by the fact
that her primary concern is to explore and elucidate moral life. For
this purpose, she confesses to having found much of twentieth century
philosophy, both British and Continental-existentialist, emphatically
inadequate, and while I don't want to dwell on the polemical dimen
sion of her philosophy, a telling passage from "On God and Good"
may help us to understand why the dominant themes of much twen
tieth century thought are ones which she finds not only alien but also
unpalatable.
"Much of contemporary moral philosophy appears both
unambitious and optimistic. Unambitious optimism is of
course part of the Anglo-Saxon tradition; it is also not
quite surprising that a philosophy which analyses moral
concepts on the basis of ordinary language should present
a relaxed picture of a mediocre achievement. I think the
charge is also true, though contrary to some appearances,
of existentialism. An authentic mode of existence is
presented as attainable by intelligence and force of will.
The atmosphere is invigorating and tends to produce selfsatisfaction in the reader, who feels himself to be a
member of the elite addressed by another one. Contempt
for the ordinary human condition, together with the con
viction of personal salvation, saves the writer from real
pessimism. His gloom is superficial and conceals elation. (I
think this to be true in different ways of both Sartre and
Heidegger, though I am never too sure of having
understood the latter.) Such attitudes contrast with the
vanishing images of Christian theology which represented
goodness as almost impossibly difficult, and sin as almost
insuperable and certainly as a universal condition."8
Thus, from both sides so to speak, contemporary moral
p 1 osophy, following Kant's lead, depicts the moral agent in these
terms:
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"How recognizable, how familiar to us, is the man so
beautifully portrayed in the Grundlegung, who confronted
even with Christ turns away to consider the judgment of
his own conscience and to hear the voice of his own reason.
Stripped of the exiguous metaphysical background which
Kant was prepared to allow him, this man is with us still,
free, independent, lonely, powerful, rational, responsible,
brave, the hero of so many novels and books of moral
philosophy. The raison d'etre of this attractive but
misleading creature is not far to seek. He is the offspring
of the age of science, confidently rational and yet increas
ingly aware of his alienation from the material universe
which his discoveries reveal; and since he is not a Hegelian
(Kant, not Hegel, has provided Western ethics with its
dominating image) his alienation is without cure. He is the
ideal citizen of the liberal state, a warning held up to
tyrants. He has the virtue which the age requires and ad
mires, courage. It is not such a very long step from Kant to
Nietzsche, and from Nietzsche to existentialism and the
Anglo-Saxon ethical doctrines which in some ways closely
resemble it. In fact Kant's man had already received a
glorious incarnation nearly a century earlier in the work of
Milton: his proper name is Lucifer.'"
This emphasis upon the free, lonely, self-determining ego has
become characteristic of both Anglo-Saxon and Continental
philosophical attention. Both brands of contemporary moral thought
are preoccupied with this lonely individual's making leap-like choices
and acting in a public space-time world in such wise that finally we
come to say, with Hare or Hampshire, that the moral agent simply is
the sum-total of his chosen acts. Meanwhile, Iris Murdoch complains,
neither Continental existentialism nor its British counterpart has faced
UP to the challenge of Marx or Freud. Concerning the latter's view of
man she says the following:
" • . . it seems clear that Freud made an important
discovery about the human mind and that he remains still
the greatest scientist in the field which he opened. One may
say that what he presents us with is a realistic and detai e
picture of the fallen man. If we take the general outline ol
this picture seriously, and at the same time wish to o
moral philosophy, we shall have to revise the current con
ceptions of will and motive very considerably. What seems
to me, for these purposes, true and important in Freudian
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theory is as follows. Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic
view of human nature. He sees the psyche as an egocentric
system of quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined by
its own individual history, whose natural attachments are
sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand
or control. Introspection reveals only the deep tissue of
ambivalent motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than
reason. Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to
human beings."10
To revert to her dissatisfaction with much twentieth century moral
philosophy, Iris Murdoch finds the dominant perspectives both in the
Anglo-Saxon and Continental worlds both alien and misleading. The
onely agent with his transparently clear choices and his fully con
scious will not only fails to encapsulate the moral experience of
t oughtful lay persons, but as an image of moral life it altogether
ai s to appreciate the fact that the central task of moral life is and has
a ways een to love. To be more accurate, it is her conviction that we
are ca ed upon to love well; so demanding is this task and so
numerous the obstacles to our achieving it that it is literally an ageong a or which goes forward ceaselessly as the central activity of the
ora y serious life. But before going further, we must ask what it
tT?c . m^n' aCCOrding to Murdoch, to love well. (Some might think
ni^t. J? ° ti, 9aestlon to pose 'n an age such as ours, so plenteously furPlin V t?/ lllustnded> low-cost sex manuals.) Murdoch's reply is like
W
lnvahlp' a° ^
^rst Place> to love only what is genuinely
1S
won't s'nrr. •
Good. Secondly, we must love it selflessly. It
ins th t y05,6 anyone to kuow that she amplifies this answer by sayBeauM?'. > "a"1' °°0d is like seein8 ~
«*•» - the
Beautiful, as we do m the contemplation of nature or great art:

f

n a t n r p a n C ! e x p e i sel/» t o contemplate and delineate
ar eye>.ls not easy and demands moral
disHnUnp1 a 3
Cat
ardst is' 1° respect of his work, a good
man anH • iu
m
6
tFUe
sense' a free nian. The consumer of
art h«L
1
ennnah t 3na °gous task to its producer: to be disciplined
reality in the work as the artist has
sucreprUH ^ &S
m
putting
nto
art or n
'
'I- The appreciation of beauty in
easiest avaTw
°nly ~ for a11 its difficulties - the
adeonatp t 6 sPlntual exercise; it is also a completely
good life> since it is the checking of
selfishnp«en I11"0
selfishness in the interest of seeing the real."11

Again, on the same theme she says:
m not simply saying that suppression of self is required
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before accurate vision can be obtained. The great artist
sees his objects (and this is true whether they are sad, ab
surd, repulsive or even evil) in the light of justice and mer
cy. The direction of attention is, contrary to nature, out
ward away from the self which reduces all to a false unity,
toward the great surprising variety of the world. The abili
ty so to direct attention is love.'"2
The vision of her teacher, Simone Weil, shines forth here. (Weil sug
gests in many places that praying ought to be understood in the first
place as a concentrated and devout attending to God.)
Here, then, is the bridge from Murdoch's sense of the Beautiful to
the Good; the bridge is love, understood as a just and selfless atten
ding to what is there. But how can paying attention, even in this rather
exalted sense, be an account of the moral life, we may be tempted to
ask in irritation. Part of her answer is as follows:
"Realism — the ability to attend with fidelity to the real
— I treat as a moral achievement, and in so doing, I make
another assumption in the field of morals: that true vision
occasions right conduct.'"3
Thus Murdoch's view of the task of moral life suggests that only
through the exercise of such vision, just and merciful, can the moral
universe, properly speaking, come into being because only then will I
see the other as distinct, separate and yet with needs and hopes as real
as mine.
In her essay, "Against Dryness," Murdoch praises the great
novelists of the 19th century. — Scott, Austin, Tolstoy — for their
depiction of other persons as "eccentric, opaque, messy, contingent,
different and real.'"* That is the beginning of moral consciousness:
to see that others are three-dimensional, real. The just and loving gaze
through which this recognition comes is in itself a moral triumph over
e8o, which knows the other only as a tool of its purposes, as an item
within its landscape. (I am haunted here by those appalling lines from
Husserl's Cartesian Meditations: the transcendence of the other is
wholly immanent within my consciousness.) Beyond ego, indeed, lies
®y self to whom I am also called to be morally just and merciful, but
that, of course, is a very late achievement if it ever comes. We nee
0n'y add that moral life, with its inner struggle, its vision, its refusal of
consolatory "magic" is good for nothing else in the world; it is
autotelic - it is its own end — and constitutes a realm of grace. Orinarily human love fails of this ideal.
"If one is going to speak of great art as evidence , is not
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ordinary human love an even more striking evidence of a
transcendent principle of good? Plato was prepared to take
it as a starting-point. (There are several starting-points.)
One cannot but agree that in some sense this is the most
important thing of all; and yet human love is normally too
profoundly possessive and also too 'mechanical' to be a
place of vision. There is a paradox here about the nature of
love itself. That the highest love is in some sense imper
sonal is something which we can indeed see in art, but
which I think we cannot see clearly, except in a very
piecemeal manner, in the relationships of human beings.
Once again the place of art is unique. The image of the
Good as a transcendent magnetic centre seems to me the
least corruptible and most realistic picture for us to use in
our reflections upon the moral life. Here the philosophical
'proof', if there is one, is the same as the moral 'proof'. I
would rely especially upon arguments from experience
concerned with the realism which we perceive to be con
nected with goodness, and with the love and detachment
which is exhibited in great art."15
When the prisoner, who has escaped from the cave and dwelt in the
sun-lit world for a while goes back into the cave, he finds he is almost
completely blind, and must grope. Similarly, when we leave Mur
doch s philosophical discourse on love to return for a last glance at the
and of the love-machine, we stumble: someone has turned off all the
lg ts and only the palest and most distant glimmer of philosophical ilumination remains with us, like the flashings of an underground
phosphorescent river. But its light is sufficient for us to see now more
certainly the law that rules this land.
Specifically it is clear that the machine of self grinds out 'sacred'
n fu e ?ves ^differently. Everything is grist for its mill. Blaise
ca e
arnet his sacred love, Emily his profane one. But, we may
now as , as he ever really seen either woman, with that truly seeing,
unsentimental, just and merciful gaze which is love? And David: is he
no a ove a in love with his own pain, rather than genuinely engaged
t^lat the philosopher however, has
said-°Urmn^ 'S mot^er^
tVp

v.^n sufffring itself can play a demonic role here, and
e 1 eas of guilt and punishment can be the most subtle
tools of the ingenious self."16

knowlerW ^4^ ^6SF!.e»Ct

.

t0ai7^ Monty, with his poisonous selfur och s philosophical text provides the following com-
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ment: "One's self is interesting, so are one's motives interesting, even
the unworthiness of one's motives is interesting; one's pain, unless it is
very intense indeed, is far too interesting.'"7 Thus, all the characters
in The Sacred and Profane Love Machine are deeply caught in its toilings; and for nothing and no one will it stop. To attempt to alter its
workings is dangerous in the extreme, for, like the juggernaut, it will
crush anything in its path. It is frightful because its perpetual motion
is combined with perfect sightlessness. It does not and never will see its
victims — those whom it has maimed, destroyed and sacrificed. And
contrary to the laws of merely physical machines, the longer it runs,
the more fuel is available to it. Some who watch it, or manage to ride
it, are delighted but that is because, like the deluded prisoners in the
cave, they do not know or even suspect that beyond the land of the
machine, lies a land of freedom and grace, and that it is worth every
attempt to get to.

NOTES
1. See Iris Murdoch's Sartre: Romantic Rationalist, pp. 70-71, and
the whole of Section X, in which she discusses Sartre's theory of
'La Litterature Engagee.'
2- At any rate, Monty's fictional detective-hero, Milo Fane, is
strongly reminiscent of some personification of contemporary
British philosophy. Consider the following passage:
"(Monty) was "rescued" by a seemingly felicitous per
sonification of his "demonism" combined with his mtellectualism in the person of Milo Fane, the ironical, disillusioned,
diminished man of power. Milo was, at first, almost t erapy.
With the help of this scornful, sceptical homunculus, Monty
could criticize his earlier yearnings while at the same time quie y
gratifying them." Sacred and Profane Love Machine, p.
2- Sacred and Profane Love Machine, pp. 76-77.
4'

Ibid.,

pp. 80-81.
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Ibid., p. 346.
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"The Sovereignty of Good over Other Concepts" in
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Toward An American Epic: Four Poets

James R. Baird

We have no national epic in our literature; we are not likely to have
one. But the questions rising from aspirations toward epic expression
are insistent. The major ones take these shapes. Why should American
culture, among the major modern cultures of the planet, have unique
ly, without even remote likenesses abroad, expended so much literary
energy toward epic statement? What urgencies in American national
being have prompted so much poetic will to define an American
typicality, an essential Americanness, past and present, as though to
establish a monument for human beings in our area of this continen .
What may be said of divergences within epic intent since the c ose o
the eighteenth century and the American reflection o
e
Enlightenment? Of these divergences why is it that the first thrust,
coming upon the close of the Revolution and the federation of the
States, is of so superficial a character, and the second, springing rom
romantic individualism in the mid-nineteenth century, o so eep a
teach in our literary currents?
.
,
h
We should begin with some broad assertions. American culturehas
been, and it continues to be, essentially amorphous, res^tent to defi
Eon. Since the end of the colonial era, there has been no R eenter
of American being. American spokesmen began with Emerson and the
Ttanscendentalists to attempt specifications of American
.
Present years of the twentieth century the effort continues, some of U
expatriate and frequently denunciatory, for examp e,

Paper read on May 12, 1977
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measurements of Gore Vidal. I am thinking here of free-standing
observers who seek to address us with a self-elected oracular power.
On the academic front we have intensified our efforts to get at the
character of American being, efforts marked by near-anxiety, as our
broad-spread curricula in American studies have proliferated over the
last thirty years. In this academic venture we are as amazing as we are
peculiar, remembering, as we should, that there are no such com
parable native studies in Britain, Scandinavia, France, Germany,
Italy, or, for that matter, in the major cultures of the Far East. No
doubt we bear gratitude toward foreign universities, certainly spurred
to action by Fulbright grants, where a new discipline in American
studies has been introduced. This foreign modishness aside, we grant
that foreign scholars illuminate the work of individual American
creators in the arts, and that they offer interesting addenda to our
now e ge of American history. But I have not seen evidence that they
are any nearer than we are to specifications of Americanness, the
essentiality of our national being.
American culture is amorphous. Our brief history is essentially a
history of emergence and mutation. National identity becomes in
creasingly elusive of definition. The image of New England is said by
rlutf °- ^VC
thtc!
f 1St-

*tS

giver of intellectual posture,
Paradigm of our future. What do
They mean nothing more than that American

authority as a

y some to be the
meanl

exPress aPeculiarly American rage for definition.
A ni
0nS
an American epic come of the source which
urf>ecthic^ f ovv
Inuin® Quest for definition. If one had to choose a single
Ameriran
1S C^C wbbout ePic intent, he should indeed be
untrnnhlerl
Twain frnm °h- a ,ernatlves- That one is Mark Twain, the real Mark
Hucklehprrv p- 1S uerary beg'nn'nSs through the publication of
1S refP°nse to American culture was unintentionallv enir T-r""
Ut
y faithful to American amorphousness, to
the constancv
American heino R mergence and mutation as the essentiality of
an archetvnal mle
i,W6 proP°s.e to talk of Americans who followed
S
definitivelv tn th • °W t0 acb*eve a form in language to give speech
American our faC ~ness ^aS °PP°se(f to the becomingness) of this
obvSv w?u?f und diverse tribal existencearchetVDal auecte
TT, e concerned with American poets as these
Hart Crane Fzra^
If1-' ?ur maj°r aspirants are Walt Whitman,
each need not be pressed ^orfS ^arlos Wilh,ams- The magnitude of
cb °f these has addressed us as an
Urdichter ftn
UP
n
m
re
singers as clos
°
° exPbcit German term). They are
p
ossess
Greek sense Their ^ .
to the classic makers of epikos, in the
poetic speech did not, indeed, subsume and define
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national being. But this t/rishness among them, this aspiration to
speak for the tribe marks each as the quester. Whitman, with broad vi
sion if little learning, would name his prototypes in the ancient makers
of saga in the Vedic lore of India; Hart Crane found his prototype in
Virgil; every reader of Pound's Cantos is acutely sensitive to his insis
tent reach toward Homer and Dante; and Williams, in all his digging
down to sources in but one American place, Paterson, New Jersey, is
near Pound as he closes Book IV of his mindful epic, Homer's
Thalassa, the sea of the voyager, and the great theatre of Dionysius.
All these wished to assume the role of the maker of epikos. If they
could, they would become singers of a new tribe, the Americans,
speaking to us in a language of a new identity. Their speech is difficult
to grasp, to understand. The audience is small. As our great
Ursangers, they are would-be spokesmen of primal being. We read
them as great poets. Yet we know the close confines, the singularities
of each would-be epic which they left us. And, if we are acute readers,
we know their frustrations.
This archetypal quest implies some notice of manifestations in other
areas of American art. We should need to study the urgency toward
epic statement in James Fenimore Cooper's The Prairie. This vast
novel, finished in Paris in 1824, seeks to relate the epic vision of the
Puritan convenant, mordant as Cooper wrote, and the vision of inex
orable Western expansion in the regulum of manifest destiny stem
ming from the Enlightenment. One should pause to consider the epic
urgency of John Dos Passos' trilogy U.S.A., the longest novelistic se
quence in American literature. We should ask questions of Eugene
O'Neill's epic intent in his plotting of a "Nonology" (incomplete at
his death) to embody the epic sweep of American history. And what
shall we say of epic vision as we encounter it in MacLeish s ConQuistador or in Benet's Western Star, though these works are essentially poetic statements of events in North American history, ta e
these widely separated expressions as evidence of a typical American
impulsion. They are, apart from any consideration of their in
dividual merits, large figurations of American experience w erein
their makers sought to specify an American uniqueness.
The archetypal thrust has alike had some grotesque manifestations.
The late Aline Bernstein Saarinen, a great historian of;Ameriman u
jtml a superior art critic of the contemporary for
e e™ ,
T'mes, named our biggest monument as one of the seven
w°nders of the modern world: Gutzon Borglum s four American
Residents carved in bas relief on a cliff face in the ac
S°uth Dakota. What on earth, she asked, could pr.omp.such a
monstrosity? Why carve the land in a quest for American epic.
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Because, she said, there is a persistent anxiety in our American being,
some curious unhappiness that we are not well defined. In thegrotesquerie of this reference, she was speaking of this same archetypal
long which I have suggested.
The surface current in the epic stream may be measured rather
quickly. Two poets are here for consideration before we turn to the
°^maj- Tflgurresii named for emphasis. Joel Barlow and Henry
VPI i W°r+
ongfellow are epic poetasters, if that term is permissible.
..'TJ argae that tbe Propulsion of each came of the source which
ane> Pound, Williams: the search for unique
Americanness ' man'
that small n °Ur 1fSt WOuld"be national poetic spokesman. He was of
Yale-bred «°h P K wntf rs on tbe ^rst national frontier, most of them
somewhat'a °t- Ca-r
name, the Connecticut Wits. He was a
France as a JemT8 int^"ational figure, as well. In 1788 he went to
la"d company. He remained abroad for
seventeen vJars rfJ J"
as we read a me ° • |S n(?stalgia for his native clime is most touching
in 1793 it is
iWnt.ten at' of a11 Places, Chambery, in Savoy,
Martha wJ2 ?'
^ ."The Hasty Pudding," dedicated to
exhibiting an epigram with a simple
recipe- "He nJ8h°n' 3
0
mush] with mousses "wJ / br<:akfast who mixes Pudding [i.e.,
grant.the wit. But we also sense the small
presence of AN A ' .
10311
ldentity beneath this mock-seriousness.
Barlow went on to^J
mC
American consul to Algiers in 1795. By
1805 he had hern
he was senttn3 COnsultant in diplomacy in Washington. H !8H
Napoleon When h Urope to negotiate a commercial treaty with
t0 Wilno in Poland for an interview with the
Emperor he died
mies from Moscow eXposure suffered in the retreat of Napoleon's arbroad poetic °tatemen7Jf C.Unously marked by his aspiration toward a
American being. It is the first such marking
in the history of Ame •
P°etry' In the year before his departure for
France 787
e
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The % on'of r nT f 5 subscriPtion a long verse narrative,
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nation which came to fi £ n°u better hegin with Columbus? The new
books. Every student
°ansb in the New World is revealed in nine
dentured state of A ° . me"can literary history is aware of the inliberated it. What mer.lcan P°etry until Emerson and Whitman
Bradstreet and Phvllk'wvJ J,°1Ce would we have had, from Ann
English masters nrm/H j fa y to tbe Connecticut Wits, had not the
sody, of course Rut' ^ ^ mode.ls? Pope is Barlow's mentor in prowas later to call it d; S1,nce parlow intended a "patriotic poem," as he
call it, disclaiming any intent to write an "epic," what bet-
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ter guide than Milton, as he planned nine books of vision? The poem
opens with imprisoned Columbus in chains, at the close of his second
voyage. An Angel-instructor comes to him to offer solace in a vision
of the New World. The hero is the counterpart of Adam in Paradise
Lost; the Angel is the counterpart of Michael sent to instruct Adam of
man's future. Much is written today of the Adamic strain in American
expression. This interview of Columbus and his angel is the longest ex
position of the American Adam to be found in American literature to
the date of Barlow's writing. In Book II "Columbus enquires the
cause of the dissimilarity of nations." What a strange and wonderful
transposition, from Milton's Adam inquiring of Raphael, his first in
structor, concerning the creation of the world and the diversity of the
creatures thereof! The angel informs Columbus that the dissimilarity
of nations is to be understood in recognition of dissimilarity of the
parts of the human body. Milton is the prototype; but in unraveling
Barlow's mind one can discover some evidence of Tom Paine s deism,
as well.
The transporting vision of Columbus, directed by the Angel, revea s
the shape of marvels to come. Succeeding books of the poem recoun
the venture of the Spaniards in Peru, the colonizing of North America
and the settlement of Canada, and the American Revolution. 1 here
follow a dissertation on the arts and commerce of the union ot tne
states and a discourse on the progress of science. Boo
Pr°P
a council of all nations, this to be, of course, inspire
^
Americans. This prediction, the first of its kind in
m
literature, strikes us as rather uncanny.
To wander through The Vision of Columbus is to feel theunstab> y
of quaking canvas. The mise en scene is most precarious y ix .
there is no more security in Barlow's revision of the poem,
his return to Washington in 1805, Barlow set to wor an^umbiad appeared in 1807. Why he should have persisted is an ^
teresting question. As a would-be singer of nationa I
'
'
doubt, felt compelled to repeat, the better to 1"scnb^fTh"^nst8ructor
not many. The Angel of the first vision is exchanged for an ^
hearing the name of Hesper, the guardian genius o
®
a , <mount
nent. The prison of Columbus is exchanged for
'ce wjth the
of vision." A new Book VII celebrates the French a l ance with the
new American states. Expansions of the succeeding
j
f.
the addition of a tenth book, which predicts "a™***®
nmon of all languages" as the general congress of nat rtain
ed. Barlow's struggle to define the nation, its thin_ past,
Present, and its claim upon the future of humankind enc^
Columbiad. What recommends him to our attention.
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definition is, of course, artificial in its end. But his poem, the original
or the revision, tells us much of a typical American craving for anti
quity, as though the new nation had somehow to justify its presence
among the old cultures from which it derived. Barlow was seeking the
weight of a deep past, the weight of history. These he attempted to im
pose, seeking the weight in the voyages of Columbus, in Spanish Peru,
in the speeding duration of the colonial era. Having exhausted these
possibilities, he had then to celebrate an American greatness of the
future, its arbitration among nations, its founding of universal peace
(very much, we must add, as though he had resurrected the Puritan
doctrine of the Covenant.)
But it is this craving for antiquity, this insistent appetite, which
most engages my attention. Wallace Stevens wrote once to a foreign
friend of Mayan art and the American search for age: "This art con
sists very largely of glyphs and sacrificial and calendar stones, all of
them completely hideous. They are found in Mexico and in the jungles
mm Cf Fa
™nCa/„ ' Many PeoPle believe that these early Indians
came from the South Pacific. We feel a special interest in things of this
sort because they give us the antiquity which the English like to deny
English insist that Americans have no background."
WhJpv
WnTL Y °nC °f ? m3y think of Mayan art- this observation of
whTh L f nt pa"lcular ^levance. The judgment of the English,
sense
77,77 Cra °f the First W°rld War and which we
AmJim- Prt°f
.y had much to do with Barlow's search for
SPfica
sciousness
^ insufficiency.
j!ons- In h'm it amounts to an American consciousness or
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present enWrf
77 Wh° °f 3" American poets
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r u1™? the widest public reception that can be
find an Iffinhv nnfv° 7 al°"gSlde Barlow will seem to you odd. I
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CanV3S
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til his resignation in 1854. Our present judgment o^T
f n hdd T
rather to center upon his contribution to Amer can h^n
7 °Ug
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educatl0n
than upon his diminishing image as a ooetFnr n
T
Harvard, accomplished in the languages of Western Europe
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overturned the rigid authority of the Greek and Latin curriculum and
thus became one of the founders of our present concept of humanistic
study. We should note, too, the breadth of his reading in the mythic
diversity of Teutonic literature, and, in the later years of his life, his
accomplishment in his translation of the Divine Comedy. But
Longfellow's record as educator and scholar is not our concern here. I
wish to emphasize his appetite for antiquity, his recognition of the
weight of European cultures in the depth of history. As a poet, he
sought to satisfy this appetite, an actual passion, in making American
statements from American materials. The satisfactions for us are
small, if even existent. What is there to note in those verse narratives,
Evangeline and Miles Standish other than a genteel pallor and emacia
tion?
Were there nothing else from Longfellow to observe, we should find
little reason to associate him with the surface current in which we en
counter Barlow. But there is another venture to note, one which has,
really, no counterpart in American poetry. It came of Longfellow s
Teutonic quest in Europe. It was published in 1855, the year, inciden
tally, of Whitman's first Leaves of Grass, and but one year beyon
Longfellow's termination of his Harvard professorship: The Song oj
Hiawatha. That the poem was intended as an American epic (however
frail we find it in its twenty-four swift books) is rather certain.
Longfellow called it an "edda." Based upon American Indian legend,
Hiawatha is cast in the mould of the Finnish Kalevala and written in
an emulating trochaic meter. (We might note here, as well, t at ar
Gustav Jung, who had studied the poem, found archetypal altuiities
between it and the Babylonian Gilgamesh epic!) Hiawatha•tells the
story of an Ojibway mythic hero. But its consequence in American
literary history must be related to the American quest for antiquity.
Wallace Stevens' notice of anxious American claims for ayan
"«ike a weight for American distinctiveness seems to have a cunou
applicability to Longfellow's effort in Hiawatha Bo,°k *
Longfellow's poem proposes for our attention Indian picture
writing, his term for pictographs. It was a mode of
the white man; it defined the cosmos of the Indian and t
f
tribe; it was, then, an epic form. Longfellow established nothing of
Atnericanness in his "edda," despite his vision ofthewhite m
'"heritor. Hiawatha is merely an evidence of an A™eri"*n ,P di
quest; its effort to claim a weight of American
^pose
"tk Ure fails. But, then, Longfellow is no more curious ini hi(purpose
Jan is Barlow who resorted to the Spaniards in Peru in his elabo
ej'gn

of a visionary Columbus.
nnefellow in this surface
have intended to suggest Barlow and Long
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current as American poets disturbed and frustrated by the expense of
American newness. Each is a public poet; and each, by his own selfelection, seeks a statement of American distinctiveness in his public
address. Barlow amuses us with his dependence upon Popean prosody
and Milton's epic. The insubstantial Longfellow rather disturbs us, so
much of his poet's life, save that period when he translated Dante and
wrote some compelling sonnets, having been devoted to attempts at
American legend and American definition. He is an anachronism:
Hiawatha in 1855 as Whitman published Leaves of Grass and
changed the course of American poetry! Whitman was the maker of
the unique American poetic voice. He remains our progenitor in this
present. We remember Emerson's exclamation when he read his copy
of Leaves: "Americans abroad may now come home. For unto us is
born a poet."
This brief tracing of Barlow and Longfellow has attempted to sug
gest the duration of an American search for antiquity, for American
uniqueness, and for American identity. We have been speaking of a
traditional regard for poetry as the primary instrument of epic state
ment; and we have noted some of the residuum of foreign models in
this American expression. In the expression of the NEW American
poetry, i.e., that of Whitman and his successors, there are evidences
of aspiration akin to the surface current, however deep their passage
in the stream. Each seeks to articulate a uniqueness of American be
ing. Each is intent upon epic statement. But the deep current which
sweeps from Whitman onward is as it is in the voyage of the SELF. I
quote, then, the most important lines in American poetry. Whitman
opens "Song of Myself": "I celebrate myself, and sing myself,/ And
what I assume you shall assume,/ For every atom belonging to me as
good belongs to you."
The consequences from Whitman are vast. The voyage of the self
perseveres into our time. The last great epic singers of the self are
Found and Williams, Pound continuing with the Pisan Cantos and the
°iir / Cantos during his years of confinement as a mental patient
m Washington, Williams ill and struggling with the last fragments of
Paterson as his death in 1963 approached. Whitman's great purpose in
the lines I have quoted from "Song of Myself" should give us pause
Here is the annunciation at the center of Leaves of Grass, that declara
tion ot independence for American poetry, set in type by Walt Whit
man s own hand and published on the Fourth of July, 1855. What is
this speech of annunciation? We know that it was inspired by Emerr * c a U t 0 a n ^ m e r i c a n n e s s o f bein8' by Emerson's celebration of
sovereignty of selfhood. An American epic of selfhood begins "I
celebrate myself, and sing myself." This new epic is to be double-
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voiced. Here the first voice praises individual being. "And what I
assume you shall assume,/ For every atom belonging to me as good
belongs to you." And here the second voice speaks. What I sing of
this American existence within my being is to be a song of your

American being, for in human flesh we are one. But this annunciation
does not comprehend the all that is to be in this epic praise. Whitman
inherits from his predecessors as the stream flows. He becomes the
seeker of antiquity. To be an American Adam upon new American
soil is not enough. He must claim for his epic of the self the weight of
history. The depth of the quest becomes strangely, marvelously the
weight of the song. All that was, before Americans, became and

became to an apotheosis in the American self. I am speaking of Whit
man's trust in the deep, the primary current. He seeks American
primal being; he seeks lyrically to define it. Thus Leaves of Grass
becomes the source book of every epic quest following Whitman. It
remains Leaves of Grass through every new and expanding edition, as
more and more poems are added. It must become an epic without end.
The passion for definition urges its onwardness, even to the threshold
°f death. And it is this same passion which we recognize in Hart
Crane, Pound, Williams, each set upon the endless voyage.
Whitman in "Song of Myself" and in.the great poetic clusters
adhering to it is the plunderer of time. "I am an acme of things ac
complished, and I an encloser of things to be." All priesthoods, all
faiths of human history become one in him; the soul in him evo ve
from the immense history of the universe; and thus it encompasses a
forces that moved to complete him. For his embryo the ne u a
cohered to an orb. This vision of genesis is accompanied throughout
Leaves of Grass by visions of a cohering of all human events in t e
df. And in the sensuousness of physial being there is t e ™arYe °
ln8s accomplished, the long, slow work of primordial life forms
"ow realized i n this h u m a n b o d y , t h e t e m p l e o f t h e self. l o b
Am«ican in this American place is to feel a culmination of these pa
tlem Processes. It is to stand free and secure among the nations ot
earth, to admit of subservience to none, to know, in
American realization as the acme. These brdhant affrrmat ons by
pitman, spoken in a language, an idiom never before encountered
readers of poetry in English, reveal the streng
Amerjcan
°ngside these, an imprisoned Columbus seeing in
Lake
or a rehearsal of Indian legend from the shores ofLake
uPerior are, indeed, timorous and hesitant, an
eve
ames his
If we must choose one part of Whitman's.epic: which names his
Jtotype as epic saying, that recognition, as e
ent in "Passage to India," his song of praise written
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memorate the opening of the Suez Canal. The poem is a supreme
revelation of the epic voyager; and nothing from Whitman's address
to us more clearly illustrates his rigorous quest for the depth of human
i!^n°r^u-^e
'n Pr^ise of modern technology, inventiveness and
skill which made the canal possible. He follows with a celebration of
great navigators, Columbus, Vasco de Gama, and with ascriptions to
the great explorers of the East. The voyage of the poet leads to India,
o quote him, "to primal thought." His soundings, again to quote,
plunge below the Sanscrit and the Vedas." Farther he goes in search
ot primal being. The poem ends with the limitless expanse beyond Inia, the source. It is a voyage without end as the poem closes: "O my
brave soul!/ O farther farther sail!/ O daring joy, but safe! are they
not all the seas of God?/O father, farther, farther sail!"
hilTv h-"1311 th" epk of the Self mus< c°ntain this weight of
JS' thls tse*rch ufor Pnmal being of which the self is the acriSment- f
?re's for our study the other part of selfhood;
whichnm
° k!ndlvldual bein8> the particularity of experience
he if Twnii ff 3 S°vereign identity, the individual to himself as
must' snffirf TSf f,0nS- um thiS Province
Whitman's expression
Paumanok'-nT^H
^co"fession °f the poem "Starting from
g °f Myself-" rt is a reflection upon the
befinninf of ,f
r
homeonI nLtfdtS' 38 the poet's Pagination returns to his
for Lone Islandf'h ' m'!beginning on Paumanok (the Indian name
in "Potion with "Out of the
Cradle Endlesf ^
3 mUrn to the beginnings of selfawa^nefs t
youthful resolve
°° •
Starting from Paumanok" reveals a
sayer The secondP°n eP1^..stature> the assumption of the role of epic
downs°™ twenty years later, fa a
Smbollc rendeiPOf^
beach the nlace of n°r -fi
awakening to the rocking sea, on the
Se"lng f0rth- "The outsetting bard," he
is called "I
?Lt Tm
tongue sans of the self f ^ tongue's use sleeping." The awakened
towns and cities of tillVT®1 °f Manhattan streets, of builders of
Itfsfnf was of 'fme '
*
°f the violence of the Civil War.
Amenca was the acme of "things accomplished." AmS^h
one life It was also the" Cmg W3S tbe immediacy> the presentness of
repoS"°ry of the total past of the race of men.
The closing Hnes of
e?pose Whitman's aspiration,
He would be the spokesman
who I am or whf f
/ «
nation. "You will hardly know
bf g°°d health to you nevertheless,/ And filter anf fibre Ut 1

qrfS

« cmfi. Few know today'. "^ C°~

76

tellectuals as an aspiring maker of American epic, and a successor to
Whitman. He had published parts of The Bridge in the late twenties.
The full text had appeared in 1930. The eight sections of this work
pose difficulties in analysis which we expect in major American
poetry, especially that appearing since the publication of Pound's
Hugh Selwyn Mauberley and Eliot's The Waste Land, at the close of
the First World War. Crane is the immediate inheritor of modernism,
as we think of it, though in his time the modernism of Whitman was
certainly for an American audience equally forbidding and arcane.
We may cite at once a line from the close of Section IV (entitled
"Cape Hatteras") of The Bridge. "Thou, Vedic Caesar, to the
greensward knelt!" One needs to know: that Whitman is the con
queror invoked, that Vedic refers to Whitman's analogy of his own
song to the primal speech of the Indian Vedas (to which we have just
referred in a notice of "Passage to India",) that the figuration of the
one who knelt on the green grass mantle of the earth refers to Whit
man's symbol of his poetry as leaves of grass, common to all men as
the earth beneath their feet. In his brief essay "Modern Poetry
Crane argued that the function of poetry remained unchanged in this
century: it should present "the most complete synthesis of human
values." But he acknowledged the inevitability of complex statement
in an age of technology and science.
what in this twentieth century is the expense of our worship oftHe
machine? It is a facturing of faith. Hence Crane in the Proem to 1 he
Bridge will seek a complete synthesis of the values of his countrymen.
He chooses Brooklyn Bridge as a symbolic instrument, the ri §e in
its arching sweep a triumph of technology. Its cables will be the strings
°fhis harp, the instrument of an epic bard. The last line o t e r°em
reads: "And of the curveship lend a myth to God." There must be a
new music, one of modern speech, one to recapture faith in the soul, a
new age of soul united, harmonized with the inexorable vigor, the jorWrdness of modern science. Who, then, will work this harm°ny.
Po«. Crane was twenty-seven when he set forth. The more astonishing

^ assumption.

•
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u
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And more astonishing even his proposal as J^°ut^ne .! ^ Pn^!!
of his poem in a letter to Otto Kahn in 1927. "The Aeneid^s no
wr'tten in two years - nor in four, and in more than one sens: [fed
justified in comparing this historic and cultural scope o
,,
totJis great work. It is . . . [to be] a symphony with an epic the
^
ARMa VIRUMOUE CANO "Arms and the man I sing • • •
«'«™KVirgU. I doubt that Cranet wasa compt,
'ent Latinist. He probably used a translation. But in
g
an ePic voice, a synthesis of values, a summation of history, a song
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of heroic voyaging. Virgil's poem is epic in pure form. It is, in no
sense, a voyage of Virgil as the celebrant of the poet-self.
Crane would give to his countrymen an epic of national being. But,
as with Whitman, and with Pound and Williams, it is an epic of the
voyaging self. The music of Crane passes through eight sections. The
first theme celebrates the voyage of Columbus; the second section is
wrought in a counterpointing of materials from American history: the
Indian and the colonial past, the advance of the Western frontier in
tricately combined with prospects of New York harbor and Manhat
tan in the poet's present; the third and fourth sections trace American
science from the era of the clipper ships to the conquests of aircraft;
the fifth and sixth turn to meditation upon the American loss of an
iconography of the soul in its relation to divinity; the seventh marks a
descent into a Hades of the dark machine, with an almost Dantescan
vision of captive humanity, modern Americans in the New York sub
way, the eighth and last is a song of resolution, a prophecy of the
American future when the promise of Columbus sailing to a New
World will be realized in a new faith, a new myth lent to God. Science
an the soul will be united; mind, with its increasing power of inven
tiveness, and beauty will become one in indissoluble marriage. As an
epigram or this final movement in his music Crane uses a sentence
rom ato. Music is then the knowledge of that which relates to love
in harmony and system."
J-!' is obvious that Crane sought a depth of history, even as Whitman
t'ie American past for Crane is actually the
evidpnrp feryie^
htm? Tn ° u Ffne S seif~exPl°ration. What of this past is vestigial in
enir mnrip^ti ° 6 °u
^r'd£e is then a long confessional cast in an
bm is th^ c ,/ne5 t'le comPlex imagery of the meditation on Columone tn aff^ "re^erence of a poet who seeks a new symbolism of being,
Wlth a new myth> one to replace the Te Deum
Laudanms
e
ips
scraners nf°w
,
Columbus. It is Crane who regards the skyvl
as m°aurnents to our technology, cathedrals
dedicateH tr, thW
his music nn thC w°rship of science, empty of any altar of the soul. If
Brooklyn Bridge was made "to lend a myth
to God "a 6 Ca??
0f
harmony affirming the significance of
American heinPTu
,_
60
nCW
myt^ eventuates for the voyaging poet,
and for him alone
writ*ng HuSh Selwyn Mauberley in 1915, when
he was fhimf
6 poen*s were published three years later. This sequence is a
weight of a„th„Tent
dismissal. Pound purposed to remove the
sion and to den" ^ stei"ming from Victorian and Edwardian expresthe mode of rm°U"Ce
allegiance which he himself had invested in
of Imagism. The yield of these poems was for Pound a
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stripping-bare. With Yeats, Joyce, Eliot, D.H. Lawrence, he became
one of the makers of modern literature in English. He intended with
them a total liberation from the preciosity which, as he judged it,
marked expression at the close of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth. Soon after Mauberley he asserted in his
Homage to Sextus Propertius (a Roman poet B.C. 50-16): ". . . long
is my life, long years . . . God am I for the time."We must emphasize
this exaltation of the poet as God. For, as this liberated American, ex
patriate though he was, set forth on the voyage of his Cantos in 1925,
he disclosed nothing of those mystic visions of a new religion which we
find in Whitman and Crane. Pound detested all religions, Eastern or
Western, all symbolisms of religious ascription. As self-elected god,
he intended to create his own world in his voyage-as-process, a voyage
never completed.
Yet it is of impressive moment that Pound, arrogantly despising the
gross materialism of Americans, and the veneers of their thin culture,
deliberately allying himself with the intellectual circles of London and
Paris, chose to acknowledge Whitman as he prepared to begin the
'°ng sequence of the Cantos. The poem is a short one, entitled "A
Pact":
I make a pact with you, Walt Whitman —
I have detested you long enough.
I come to you as a grown child
Who has had a pig-headed father;
I am old enough now to make friends.
It was you that broke the new wood,
Now is a time for carving.
We have one sap and one root —
Let there be commerce between us.

°f the voyager, the epic' singer who plundered time and dredged
istory to the encompassment of the self. "I celebrate my se , an
rnvcolf n i

_
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poses, is the whirlpool of poetic energy passing into form. Of this
energy at the center of a poet's total speech it must be said that primal
being requires form which is traditionless, uniquely of the self, depen
dent upon no other form. The display of Pound's energy in the Cantos
is all but matchless. He left 116 of these intricate poems, many of
them impervious to full critical explication. I am perhaps over-bold in
suggesting that Whitman is a direct predecessor of Pound, the vorticist. For, though Pound intended 120 Cantos modeled on Dante's
Divine Comedy, these to be divided into hell, purgatory and paradise,
and though upon this design he intended to superimpose images of the
omeric voyage, there is something peculiarly American, savagely
American in the energy displayed. Pound, after all, admits in Hugh
belwyn Mauberley that he was born in a "half savage country." What
one has from Pound's maelstrom, the vortex of energy unleashed, is a
"ge ep*?°f self" Into il he Poured all the vastness of his learning,
ail his skill in some ten languages, ancient and modern, and, for good
measure, is partial knowledge of Chinese ideograms. It is no wonder
a some would-be readers find themselves in the presence of an im
mense an wild churning, a turbulence of images crowding as though
™kagC fro™ almost countless sources. Indeed, the art of the Canu/itvwvf11 3S
*S non"rePresentational. I find in them an analogy
with the manifestoes of Cubism: Nature smashed into fragments and
£ T
according to the will of the painter becomes for
£ '
semhipH
realities of history invaded, smashed, reaswhirh ic 1 k ragm*rnts fr°m the present. It is the unique self alone
which is to be served.
th Jsettle <'r,,:r.d,'S

of a

modem Odysseus. Canto I marks

S", ^ i"
breakers, fort? „„
"7? '° 'he
enprov r>f
,, „
goaiy sea. . . The voyage memorializes the
WC
born American°r CX'
°f tbis enerSy is the passion of one,
man thTS'
fWh° acknowled8ed
sap, one root with Whit3
selfhood wWch would encompass the
Swe.nhr of th
Poimd s^reiteratinn fS ^^°f b°th paSt and present"
and nresent hpp
° ° usar^ as tke source of all human ills, past
bons of Al'cr
u5 a continuing.threshold for his emerging definishould be sai^rif a61"8* <Tanto.thirt;y"e_ight suggest the scope. What
ennobling MYTH? A country Wlth so little history and less of any
fieTn SSnJ £H^ iS t0 be read in the evidence of traf"And that year II9291" M C fmfd and plunder of the Stock Market,
dney ^ Said how useful short sellin'
was,/ We sunDose hp m
liar." This in essenpp e ,to jbe brokers/ And no one called him a
Pound's measurement of America, a
capitalistic democracy' TheT
•emocracy. I believe him to have been sane when he served
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the cause of Italian fascism, sane throughout a decade of internment
as a mental patient in a Washington hospital. Not until the atavistic
longing of old age in his last years in Venice did he wish to return to
the land of his birth, and then to the Idaho of his boyhood. Whatever
one's response to the Cantos, there lie before the reader the broadest
epic design in American literature and much of the greatest American
poetry written since Whitman. As for redemptive vision, there was
none. There was nothing save the celebration of great art as redemp
tion; and in that Pound joined his friend and fellow poet, Yeats.
My final comment is directed to William Carlos Williams, close
friend of Pound when the two were fellow students at the University
of Pennsylvania in 1904-5. Williams was preparing for medicine,
Pound for a career in teaching, which he soon abandoned. The friend
ship endured, though one can scarcely imagine two American poets
whose directions in the experience of poetic expression became so
sharply opposite. As writers, they were linked only in epic intent.
Williams came to detest expatriates, and to detest the poetry of erudi
tion so fully represented by Pound and Eliot, Americans who, as he
put it, gave poetry back to the academics. Recalling the impact o
Eliot's The Waste Land as he wrote his Autobiography, Williams
wrote: "Eliot returned us to the classroom just at the moment w en
felt that we were on the point of an escape to matters much closer o
the essence of a new art form itself — rooted in the locality whicn
should give it fruit." To my knowledge he never spoke with equal
denunciation of Pound's academic posture, of his deliberate loading
of every rift of the Cantos with the vastness of his encyclopaedic
knowledge; nor did he condemn Pound's desertion of his
place. But Pound's charge against his old friend reache
1 1
the correspondence of the two. It is preserved again for us in °
'
Section III of Williams's Paterson. Pound to Williams.
o
,
,,
b in the bloody loam, but what I'm after is the finished Pro™ct.
Pound's recognition is exact. The loam of America (
Woody" part as a mere Briticism of Pound:
this loam is the
stuff of Williams's making, that and no other, n
, G ^
Person one finds Williams's resolve: "a reply to Latin and Gree^
*lth the bare hands." He is not replying to Homer andI
g; ,
f°und. I, Williams, answer you, larding your artwdhyouracademic
'earning of the ancients, I answer you with this loam dug
American pla.ee
This insistence of Williams upon the
myself
hitman's resolve as he closes "Song of Myse
.
again look
0 ^e dirt to grow from the grass I love / If you"ant me JJjntaD*
for me under your boot-soles." If Williams had never mention
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r u/m3"' T should stl11 know from very feeling the inspiriting source
ot Williams s genius. But there are ascriptions enough to Whitman I
mention only two We learn from the Autobiography that Williams at
the University of Pennsylvania adored two models as he began to
S Cmft; KeatS and Whitman (an odd pairing indeed).
BmwS
But when it came to his notebooks, he wrote: "I reserved my Whitthoughts', a sort of purgation and confessional, to clear
my head and my heart from turgid obsessions." He went on to say:
ZraV " ased to assault me (as he still does) for my lack of educaH„n
diff rea mf' .e Y°uld say that I should become acquainted with
• • • differential calculus - like himself, or course. I'd reply that a

came^oallv Wms^lf^ 3nat°my

wouldn't at

all harm him . . ." Ezra
Whitman Bm it '
American root, the sap of
power in Whitman^5
hams who found an American purgative
beacl and b's heart from "turgid
obsessions " Keats & S3P *° H r
sought anAmS IT
, treasured, certainly. But as Williams
who encouraged him
m"! an me"can language, it was Whitman
asecrdascHolnT' " a htle esfy entitled "How to Write" there is
verse And here S™1"6 °f Whitma". the value of his model in
m^SoWe' with the

C°m™' f
statement on dep,"fnYxprSn- "i'tt i"
personality that must hp ? u j*-r
primitive profundity of the
what we d0 Ias wrii5rs'is to h<™
u."
the primal nature of Amp 3S ln ®earch °f this primitive profundity:
unique self.
"can eing and the primal sources of the

1926.Vjom\kh?sCfncIJdoiiamS'S P"tfrson
langu^e

was

Published in the Dial in

enB 0^WC
the
to clothe i°were^^wl^taking'form
f
print in 1946 and the follow,™ f
taking form- Book 1 appeared in
s at ab°ut three year intervals through 1958. Dr Willia °Ur
New Jersey. Close bv the Pa mS j^actlced medicine in Rutherford,
C°UrSe t0 NeW3rk
Bay. Upstream is the 'city of Pa^rso^^™*
beann8 a Particular identification with the river because of s
ment. Paterson is the site of an e. Jacent falJs over a high escarpfive completed books of the P1C named for the city. Through the
Williams undertook and extende^v 3nd the fraSments °f a sixth
which it encompassed was to he a h 1S voyage of the self. The history
one place and its urban adiaeer. • ° remained a" American history of
the history of one American ^?S|itheseextending to New York, and
los Williams. The poet's
choice of this urban comnW
"?
ated
to the complex life of
everyman, in the modern sense e^
3n
3S
3 dty' The voya8e is a
river passage. Thus Williams wr'nt Jo7It!
follows the course of the Passa" Dstructure of Paterson-. "[It]
the Passaic River, whose life seemed more and
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more to resemble my own: the river above the Falls, the catastrophe of
the Falls itself, the river below the Falls and the entrance at the end in
to the great sea." One should add to this statement Williams's first an
nouncement in the epigram to Paterson: "o local pride; spring, sum
mer, fall, and the sea." The voyage will, then, proceed through the
seasons of his life. His death at the union of river and sea will ter
minate it.
The difficulties for us in reading Paterson, in grasping its total
speech, come of its intricate braidings, the strands of local history en
twined with the personal history of the symbolic persona. There is a
reflection of Pound's vorticism here, a vortex of energy in which
memorials of existence, both public and private, reach us in
fragments, cohering in odd associations, passing through metamor
phoses in the work of imagination — and evidencing the nonrepresentational in art. But we must stress the utter adherence of
Paterson to American place and one American self. Stand where you
are on American ground, dig deep into the layers of American history,
however thin the deposits in comparison to European age, dig deep in
to yourself. Thus Paterson, in its great range and in its magnificent
faithfulness to American language, is an exemplum, as much as to
say: how it might be for other Americans, identifying the place where
they stand, identifying themselves. Through love, imagination, tota
involvement in the joy and the beauty of life itself they may yet be
saved from the tyranny of mechanisms — yes, even in the gaseous ex
panse of northern New Jersey.
Paterson, the epic of an American self, was left unfinished, u
may think of Williams's last poem, Asphodel, That Greeny Flower as
a coda. It is one of the great lyric meditations on love, imagination,
and beauty - even the beauty of death - in the language, English or
American. It reaches to the place of the soul, through waters dark and
de*P. to the primal being which Whitman touched in his.late se
quences, "Whispers of Heavenly Death" and "From Noon to Sta y

Night."
'twas initially contended that we have no national epic, norarewe
fe to have one Whitman, Crane, Pound, Williams
Self, each distinct from the others in the nature of his voyaging,
merican being is becoming and becoming.
t
totauy of
mergence. The singer to encompass the All o 1 ,
P
Jwian being in poetry, to record "a synthesisof.til va uetr (as
Crane aspired ro do), has yet to come. Whitman offered every
at°m of himself to his countrymen. Few Americans are ta
.
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1100 A.D.: A Crisis for Us?

F. Edward Cranz

tC> ta^e advanta8e

friendly audience, though I hope
no firm cr.i t
speculate about some problems to which I have
proWems S^S;-mdeed 1 am "0t even sure that 1 understand the
ed- mavhe tooptv,6 1SSUes are imP°rtant; the problems ought to be facThe oriein of tvf1 we,fan come a little closer to the solutions,
the West ca 11 DO lPr»
i!eS in SOme simPle intellectual history oi
an 1
trouble seems to be that we cannot do
that historv as l
8
&S
WC
remain
who we have ^en. In a way the
situation i J the o"
,
SUC
that
faCed
not so long ag0 in modern
science where it her
°i
ciently small we ea aTC ^ ar that when we deal with things suffia

.°ne' to

The —.

7

f ys
nd n0t alwa

thr.hvf,ou:affec,ing ,hemV ,he

comfortable,

tonight, and I'll get to them a?°ry °f l'00 A'D'

3re my main inter6St

shall first have to nntr
^ as soon as I can. However, it is clear that I
or we'd newrearThis,°«'
' shall no. try to 'prove' i.
tell you that manv i.,.f r°,^ m.s 1 m concerned with. It is only fair to
wrong. I have listened t "r'n
°'ars believe that my history is all
simply become m"e and moS"™" 'hiS !0r,a year or so, and I have
detail I may be euihv
, m°re.convinced that whatever errors of
1100 A.D. still holds R e ^. S1S °f a fundamental reorientation ca.
proof.
' u
course my conviction hardly ranks as
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d(fferent f°rm as a Hist0ry

I contend that toward the beginning of the twelfth century, say in
the generations of Anselm of Canterbury and of Abelard, there occuredinthe West an over-all reorientation of the categories of thought
and experience. The reorientation was so complete and so successful
that we ourselves are to a large extent the consequences of it and, as it
were, trapped within it. The event can be illustrated first from the
special categories of knowing, sensing, and making. In each case the
ancients, by whom I mean the Greeks, the Romans, and the GraecoRoman Christians, experience all three processes conjunctively
through a form of union; in knowing, for example, the knower
somehow becomes one with what he knows. With Anselm, in con
trast, each of these processes is experienced in the context of a
dichotomy: in knowing we no longer find union but rather a
dichotomy between the knower and what he knows. Behind the
reorientation of the categories of knowing, sensing, and making, lie
two more fundamental changes. In the first place, ancient experience
falls within a single realm of which the individual is in the fullest sense
^Part; with Anselm, experience is divided between two realms, one of
meanings,' and the other of 'things.' In the second place, there is a
change of structure within the realms. The ancient single realm was,
for want of better terminology, an aggregate order; the two medievalmodern realms, again for want of better terminology, are systematic
universes. 1 shall try to show that the ancient categories of thought
and experience involved conjunctive knowing, sensing, ana mjA in8
within a single aggregate order; the reorientation of ca. 1100 . • c
to disjunctive knowing, sensing, and making within two systematic
universes.
To demonstrate the reorientation I shall examine the categories of
Rnowing, sensing, and making. In each case I shall argue that there is
dear evidence of a reorientation but that we cannot do a history or
any one of them in isolation, or indeed of all three together; hence we
ate driven to expand our field of inquiry to include the change; fro>m
e single realm of ancient experience to the two realms o
n.,,:hie
°f Abelard. But here again it turns out that no history is po«We
ess we also take account of the change from aggregate order to
systematic iinivprQp^
•
me begin, then, with knowing and m t e l l e c t m n - The dominanc'ent tradition is that we have here to do wit
a urH
.
j^
0n°f the knower and the known. One could illustrate it with
•umiliar passages from Aristotle's De anima:
say once more that the soul is somehow all be
for beings are either sensible or inte igi

lngs,
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science is somehow the knowables and sense the sensibles ... 1
And,
In what is without matter, what intellects and what is
intellected are the same . . . Theoretical science and
that which is so scienced are the same . . . Science in
act is the same as the thing (to pragma).1
The Platonists hold the same position, and one might note as a last
epigrammatic summation of the tradition the remark of John the Scot
in De divisione naturae:
The knowledge of what are is what are (Cognitio
eorum que sunt, ea quae sunt est)3
But with Anselm, and even more with Abelard, we encounter fun
damentally different categories of knowing. In the ancient tradition
just noted intellection occurred as the intellect became, or was con
joined, with a being or form. In the famous 'ontological argument,'
however, Anselm assumes without question that 'in the intellect' (in
intellectu) is always distinct from 'in the thing', or really (in re).4 And
after he has analyzed thought and knowledge in terms of the internal
word, he explains in Afonologion:
For the word, in so far as it is a word or an image, is
so in relation to something else (ad alterum est), for it
is not word or image except in so far as it is the word

be meaningless (and the anc^wSeth.
meaningless). The change was so thoroughgoing that
it was invisible.

86

But one could then ask about the massive reception of Aristotle in
the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Didn't that make the reorien
tation obvious? No. By then the new categories were so firmly
established that one medievalized or modernized Aristotle not only in
the commentaries but even in the translations. One decided whether
Aristotle was talking about meanings (intentiones) or things (res), and
translated accordingly (and it might be noted that the Oxford transla
tion of Aristotle into English still does this). Thus the reorientation
was made invisible not only for knowing but also for the other
categories.
The more important point to be made is that while we now have
some date for a history of knowing we do not have any real history for
the ancient period, since there we can't make use of the data. To use
Anselmian terminology, we can, like the fool, say in our hearts
that the knower becomes one with the known, but we can't truly say it
because we cannot think it. It calls for a change not only in the content
of our thought (that we can manage) but in the categories of °or
thinking, and here our knowing seems a prisoner, willy-nilly, of the
modern categories.
I believe that one can show a comparable situation in the tradition
of sensing, notably seeing, and of making; in each case we in a
radical reorientation ca. 1100 A.D., and in each case we confront an
impossibility when we try to move beyond the reorientation.
e
multiplication of instances supplies further evidence for the reonenta
tion, but it doesn't solve the historical problem, so this evening s a
not deal specifically with sensing and making. It simply compe s us o
®ata use of wider perspectives in an attempt to move his oric
beyond Anselm and Abelard, and even to pursue risky and inade
quately based hypotheses when they seem to offer any hope o
ou' of impossibility. What follows is speculative and tentative, b
sl«ll not burden it with constant qualifications and caveat®. n
•would first suggest that as we look at the period a™unf
. • "h'
^ begin to see a reorientation on a larger scale than a
entatjon
gories of knowing, sensing, and making; this arg
ls m some sense the cause of the special changes, not they of it,
makes them understandable rather than they it.
t„t;nn is to
M
r V best guess at a general statement of this larger reorientation s to
rePeat what I said at the beginning, that the ancients somehowlived
";t.hln'be single order of the cosmos or
rd°h0wever, ex. beings; beginning with Anselm and
orders of meanfence was categorized into the two dichotomized orders
order was all-embracing, and individuals were in
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the fullest sense its parts. Texts illustrating this single order are not
easy to lind (though in a sense they are everywhere), and this is natural
enough. The best of the ancient thinkers never had the slightest suspi
cion that anything so odd as our post-Anselmian world would ever
e^e".Ce thC^ wasted no time in explaining that it was not their
hernm
ontrariwise, even in Anselm the ancient world seems to have
world°)
invisible, so he doesn't have to explain that it's not

w 'ith^ h f ^ r n n 'v
/r°m. 3 tCXt 'n Flotinus' Ennead, since he works
1 ion of conjunctive knowing which we have already seen.
ri'tihe
.,

in.tfHft is truly the beings

... and hence it
knowing and being are one and the
^. armenides) and 'Science of what are without
said

sought 1S
%Sam! as the thing' (Aristotle), and 'I
sought myself out' (Heracleitus), namely as one of
the beings. (my emphasis).6
De animcr ^ ^ l° realize

the

full import of what Aristotle says in the

ST weSa™mari.zin® what has been said about the
at the soul is somehow all beines' For th ?g31n
6
eings
are
either sensible or intelligible,
and scienrf. '
sensibTes" " S°meh°W the Scienced' and sense the

the order
among then^and if!?/!3/8
beings one finds the si
the SOUl one finds
that n somehc
includes all beings The/ ^
of the conscious self^!s a " & Smgle °rder' Unbrok^ by the existen
For evidence from a r).fSLeparate and discrete universe of meaning
connection with his arm! erent school, one might cite Chrysippus
the °ne kosmos is a rational, e
souled (empsychon) anri"1?!/
lntellectual animal: "that the kosmos is e
souled is clear from
it-"8 Or Cicero in thZ n°W" S°Ul Which is a Particle detached fro
complete (perfectust hut t^tUra deorum: "Man is not in any sen
the world or mundus) "9 18 & partlcte of that which is complete (
In
4.i_ _

as the ancients 'nfrned^hhin'^the 6 fdf h*" °f thiS Singk °rder'
with the highest elementc e u
found that the self was iden
As '"ustration one might I
* the diJSf ofthe° ' v ° °?er;
an
of 'my essence' in Themisi
Paraphrase of Aristoti^'J r>
with the factive and potential fTn0' 11 occurs in the section dea
P°tential intellects, and as usual Themistius i
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sistent that the intellect becomes what it knows. He finds that the 'I' as
individual is a composite of the two intellects, but 'my essence' derives
entirely from the factive intellect which alone is form in the strictest
sense, indeed the form of forms, and the highest point which nature
could reach.10 Themistius concludes, "Therefore, we are the factive
intellect."" He goes on to present arguments for the unicity of the ac
tive intellect; it is one in all men. The specific theses of Themistius on
the factive intellect were of course not universally accepted, but I
believe he is typical of ancient experience where as one turns within, as
one tries to 'know oneself', one finds that the movement is to a univer
sal and impersonal single order of Being. And when Neoplatonism
developed the doctrine of a One beyond being, they soon moved also
to identify the 'I' with the One or with the 'One in us."2 And thus the
ancients lived within a single order, and the self or the I was identified
whh or conjoined with the highest elements in that order.
But when we move to Anselm and Abelard in place of the single
order we find a new context of two large orders, the one of the newly
invented 'meanings', and the other of the newly invented 'Things'.
I don't believe that this reorientation from single order of ex
perience to two discrete orders requires much documentation. It ap
pears clearly, as we saw above, when Anselm sets up a sharp division
between what is 'in intellect' and what is 'in thing' or in reality. In
scholasticism, as in Thomas Aquinas, it appears typically as a contrast
etween spiritual or intentional being and natural, material, or real
e'ng. And of course we all remember Descartes' decisive formulation
® 'be distinction between 'thinking substances' on the one hand, and
extended substances' on the other. We may thus assume, at least as a
forking hypothesis, that the reorientation of categories in Anselm
and Abelard involved not only the shift from conjunctive knowing,
fusing, and making to disjunctive forms of the same but also a rn°ve' eJJ' from the ancients' single realm to the two realms of t e
mebieval-modern categories.
_ „
Have we now gone far enough in our analysis so that we can finally
a?. r historically into ancient thought? I am afraid not, for when we
.. ,mPt " we encounter a last difficulty, namely the ancient single
Jlm of intellects and beings is structured differently and reasoning
reai^ P'3Ce differently within it than in the two me 1^va
s
cJ of meanings and things to which we are accustomed. Intheanworld the structure appears primarily in the beings wi
w rffl6CtS are conjoined in knowledge; in the rnedieval-modern
se i Structure aPPears primarily in the universe of m^" "Js a"
'worn ,nly in the universe of things. For termmology to contrast th
modes, I shall use 'aggregate' for the ancient and systematic
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the medieval-modern.'3
To look at the ancients first, the order of the kosmos, or mundus, is
denMn7hate order of natures °r °f beings; there is no whole antecea? ° WhlCh the parts are functions. Human thought
anH 7 ne Pof'thS Eo? 7 PlaC£ aS the intellect is conjoined with the beings
the kosmos. Ancient reason remains within this context It rests
upon conjunction with what is, and its force and dynamic come from
EES It" ,hV""="« """joined, no?ftZS*
Herly, mSofar as 11 has beings within it).
treats reason aTaTi^d V"* °f Augustine's analyses of reason. He

5Ef i°&^^rtrmembered ,hatfor

reasoning Sf>at'S a-ViS-°? <aspectus) of the mind, while
reasomng (ratiocinatio) is the search of reason, that
be seem°VCment °f

S
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i

SUCh vision through wbat
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3

are to
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"

buKlTev^XCdd5:

any other eood:

ST•"

^faTdtTefS^

«»

S'rUC,U'e "hidl
emerges1 i^Anselm's unhmrse of mea6"'
the case of the meanings T tv , eamn8s and universe of things. In
his 'reasons' and his 'argument" with tho"
A eaS'ly by contrasting
example, adapts the Augustine
7
of Augustine. Anselm, for
but the context has chaneed m ° ^r°° of God which we just noted,
therC iS n° 'seein8'> and the
only dimension is that of savim^nr
sentences:
meaning. Here are the opening

T

whatever*(things) are laid 1° u" Wh° WiU take notice that
that in relation to one'ZQZ 7hSOmething in *uch a way
or less equally then nnt"0 77 y 3re Sat0 ke so more
the same
^\"d 'hen anoth^
lg^ ln these diverse (things),
whether it is judged m v,
16
6
m
m dually or unequally.
(my emphasis)
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The same point can be illustrated, perhaps even more clearly, in the
ontological argument of the Proslogion, where the whole basis and
motive of the proof is something meant or 'cogitated' but not seen.
Compare, for example, Anselm's cry of triumph at the end of his
responsio:
The meaning (significatio) of this expression (that than
which nothing greater can be cogitated) has so much force
of itself that that which is said, by the very fact that it is
understood or thought, is of necessity not only proved to
exist but also to be that itself which we ought to believe of
the divine substance, (my emphasis)17
Both quotations from Anselm bespeak the existence of a separate
realm of 'meanings,' but my point here is the different role of reason
or thought in Anselm, compared with Augustine's and the ancients'.
Augustine's reason and thought lay in the vision of beings. Anselm
has no such vision, but he has something which Augustine lacked. He
works with a 'systematic' coherence of 'meanings' or 'cogitations,
and this coherence is the motive of his proofs: if you say or cogitate
[his, then you must say or cogitate that. To risk an extreme statement,
in the ancients the thrust of the argument lay entirely in beings, and in
the mind only insofar as it contained beings; for Anselm, the thrust
of the argument is entirely in meanings, and in things only insofar as
they are taken into meanings. And it seems to me that this thrust in
Anselm is usefully called 'systematic.'
Anselm's main works are called meditations about the reason oj
Jf'th (de ratione fidei). I would argue that the reason involved is ac
tually systematic coherence, in which parts of the faith 'prove the
wh°le and the whole 'proves' the parts. To use the example of the onto'ogical argument again, Anselm starts from an experienced faith in
the existence of God and in his being that than which nothing greater
be cogitated. He then starts from the second alone and proves
Je first. Similarly, in the more elaborate argument of the Cur Veus
°wo, Anselm assumes all the faith but the Incarnation, an
r°m this starting point 'proves' the Incarnation.'8
As the new order of 'meanings' is a systematic order we find tha
. new order of 'things' is also systematic. In Anselm this P
est seen in the universal o r d e r w h i c h h e s o m e t i m e s caUs
Gods
^ in the Cur Deus homo. In part what needs to besaid[here ha
in 5
been said in commenting on Anselm's 'proofs
°me way the systematic whole 'proves' any YP
.
j.
? this is as true of the external and real order: of tangs as it^
"hernal and intentional order of the mind.
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that th/- °rder °f G°d's honor is an vernal order which
precedes any of its parts and which no action of men or of angels can
change. Anselm brilliantly explains this with the analogy that those

ZSXSFSSSZF
If

cod,s

—«

what are contained under the circuit (ambitu) of heaven

heaven ThVv
^
°T t0 become distant from
heaven they could nevertheless in no way exist except
under heaven nor could they in any way flee heaven For
whence and whither and however thev moved, they would
y
still be under heaven."
"
po^f™^ We

T
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search for further

categories of human th
Jthe/ncient and the mediaeval-modern
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wi,hin which ,o

S K f^tive forms of knowing, senshigaS?X?
thf'anctrexpfrience T^£aVC the beginni"gs of a 'history' of

some of

and inadequate3for1m0^Now1^^)tnr?',' admittedly in a very summary
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geometric and brother kind;^ n 8UmenL1S SUrdy going t0 lack
attemPt to group
the material around three points- l RpS°n' i"
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A.D. is impossible- 7 At
u
e,Cause of us a history of 1100 A.D. is
necessary 3 The third t <
tried avenues which mipht "h^i 3 qUeSti°n: are there any so
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S
lmPossible and necessary.
First as tn til
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now ieS tha^heTn^ f °f 'he
8
c
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of them, but in the end it tinnff Tof? ''"' '1 ollr understanding
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for the difficulties which anne
t,
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Dilthey, Croce, Collingwood and Cassirer. Its main assumption is that
understanding is possible within the human worlds of meanings and of
symbols. It places the past within this context so that it can rethink
understandable past thought and its symbols and thus 'reenact' the
past (and clearly this was a great triumph as against not being able to
'rethink' or 'reenact' the past). Further, I suspect that systematic
coherence gives such rethought symbols whatever life they have.
But from the data we have discovered it seems that we cannot apply
such a historical method in our study of the ancients. We found
ourselves confronting an ordering of experience which was not
systematic, which was not based on a dichotomy between meanings
and things, and which was, therefore, not 'understandable.' We can
without obvious trouble translate 99%, perhaps more, of the ancient
tats into post-Anselmian categories. But the remaining 1% on which
we have been concentrating are the most central and in some ways the
most important, since they are the constant context of all the rest.
Hence our historical method based on post-Anselmian categories, far
from opening up to us the ancient world, has the opposite effect of
making entry in to the ancient world impossible.
We might then take the chance on abandoning our historical
Method. Instead of changing only our 'meanings' in order to reach the
P®, let us go further and change our categories of thought and ex
perience; let us put off the Anselmian and put on the pre-Anselmian.
fortunately, however exciting such a procedure might be it
wouldn't do us any good as historians alive today, since when we
Were there we couldn't talk to those of us who were still here. When
0ne of us came back, if indeed he could come back, he would have no
Memory Of his there experience: he would suffer the fate of those with

life a J

VV1UUI1 UiC llllliLa

tli" thinking, which was good fun and games
® leave
'e us
us in
in peace.
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So the first argument is that the history of 1100 A.D. and of the
thought of the ancients is impossible for us since it would destroy not
only our old historical method but also, and more importantly, our
old selves.
But there is another argument leading to the opposite conclusion,
that since we are who we are and since we have the commitments that
we do we must do a history of 1100 A.D., and we must reach out to
» !P"C Y' As t0 what these commitments are, I suppose
InH ru t
Tre general SrouP come ultimately from the Jewish
and Christian traditions, and they persist today even if secularized.
3nd SUpport of other lives and other
civnlzatTnT^hn5 l°
civilizations however different from our own they may be even

on°y ^ thought and C1Vtlllzations of the Past this can be accomplished
Son of^hfr S m aCtl°n" Such commitments compel our renow that we havf-^
abandon our search for the ancients
Jews and The ChH dlSCOVuered huow alie" they are to us, since both the
had said <'I am a I3™
S they themselves wcre aliens. Moses
here' in an alien land" <Exodus
II 22) and beSuse th"^
phasis' on the dml,
h CWS W6r£ 'alienS' they placed ""usual emfook over the
°Td °ther dangers. The Christians
When h comes to the central
commandment of nv
r
the
Stranger and alien is the
neiTbor aTin the SH,
g°°d Samaritan. Indeed it is as the
alien (xenos) that the riS
nfians receive Christ (Matthew XXV,35).
The Marcionite here
r\es cer 1ain Christian drives to an extreme when it worships God a
save sinful men no A
' ahen °ne' who out of love chose to
CrCatIOn
It is sureW He; Th S
' Wh° WCre in turn 'aliens' to Him.
fullest sense of the word ^nTh*?• ^ hlstorical neighbors to us in the
wh° a~^~her can

not
rrmrworking in the same direcd°n d°
historians or mutatis mutant 3S persons but more specifically as
some ways un^ufamonc e r Scientlsts- Greek civilization was in
origins of our modern imehectua^d"'
* «S unicIueness lie the
historians compelled to Veer.
disciplines. We are therefore as
understanding of the Creek °Pen 'Tt0 reopen a road to the historical
1,6
tures of ourTnteU^tuaf
"""" *K S° '° SpMk ,he ^
answers to all the imrxirom l,.3' tkere |are universal, demonstrable
10"s whlch concern man, and that it
is the obligation of man to an
°* ma" IO answer the«e questions. No other civiliza94

lion, to my knowledge, ever made such a claim or asserted such an
obligation, except in dependence upon the Greeks. Modern history
and the other modern intellectual disciplines have inherited the claim
and obligation, though the context in which we believe such asking
andaswering to be possible has been severely limited by the reorienta
tion of 1100 A.D. One sees both the inheritance ajid the limitation in
Robert Nisbet's summary of what he calls the academic dogma:
"Knowledge is important. Just that."20 Such a position is, I believe,
traditional in the strictest sense, passed on to us from the Greeks.
Clearly it cannot be proven, and I do not know that there has been any
new prophetic proclamation since the Greeks.
Hence the crisis for us if we cannot reach the Greeks is far more
serious than if we cannot reach the ancient Eygptians or the modern
Balinese. In the latter cases we simply come to a stop with the realization that for the moment we have reached the end of the road for the
particular method we have been using. In the case of the Greeks,
however, we do more than reach the end of the road if we cannot
'each them historically: we also lose the method, derived from the
Creeks, by which we had progressed as far as we had. Historical
scholarship would thus be cut off from its roots and would wither
®ay; to give my gloom full sway, so would all the other theoretica
disciplines.
I suppose that 1 have made clear my conviction, though surely I
haven't proved it, that the history of 1100 A.D. is a crisis for us or, at
the very least, for me. Maybe I should stop here. However, my nature
s such that I cannot for very long enjoy basking in the existentia is
tensions of tragic contradiction, so I've continued to explore various
alternatives in the hope that at the end I might leave you, and myself
II something more comforting than an 'impossible necessi y
pessary impossibihty.' Those of you who know my intflec.t^_
J31>« will not be surprised to hear that among the van'
.
one which now seems to me most hope u is; a
tirw
^
n o f the position of Nicholas of Cusa, or Cusanus, ( 1 4 0 1 a

Possible analogue to a solution.
.
, .
en I reread Cusanus in preparation for this ta
an
Some of the problems arising for us out of
Doii!

th

hone

readhi I rUCk,me- First' 1 saw for thefirStfn00 AD
and how much
r i
n
uinrp
I'ght of the reorientation of
«'already noted, I

wa HU,nderstandable he is in this context" SeC
-Station truck me
Sighted to find that his response to th.%^onSe.
lng °f significant potential help in formu ai ing
^
Jn a
1 5
PoJ? * ' almost unique achievement, as
ti n
P0Werful fashion he made use of both the reorientation
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noo A.D.

and of the pre-Anselmian tradition; in using both he had to modify
o h. In the first place Cusanus saw clearly many of the consequences
of the reorientation of 1100 A.D., and he was very sensitive to certain
dangers in the post-Anselmian development, notably in Aristotelian
sc o as lcism. However, Cusanus had no intention of trying to reject
un,verses of meanings and of things; his purpose was rather to
e
and n^ r£Tne!S
!10? A-D- in a context where it could be fulfilling
E"
6 second Place, he seemed to have found in
the ane' *
the ancient tradition, particularly in those aspects with which have
caSorierTnd hCUreSdf°rv.the deficiencies of the new post-Anselmian
asPects in constructing a larger context
for the new
• 6 USC ^
1VerSCS
f
AnSdm
and °f Abelard"
recognized that
°
Cusanus ^
iSs or of th.n °nf cannot.intr°duce systematic universes of meantraciition where the central structures
are Beine and thVr' ° &n
hL pumose Se haSiOU
I dng- HenCC he f°Und that t0accomPlish
to work out a new metaphysic or first philisophy,
onein which
complicated^ resnr! a ™eamng> not Being, were ultimate. Out of this
of the innovatin
f'"A US.anus fashioned an answer which made use
Abelard' and which, had it prevailed wouW have lv Zi Z
C
C
ve
his successors
^
^°Pment which led to Descartes and
illustration of Cusanus' acceptance oTthTcentral felturerof^he8
In the first nlaee o!
reorientation of 1100 A.D.
creatures and the othe^on^™ W°rldS °r universes> one of things or
of human meanings and conjectures.

wornideCtcomSesCOfmetuf0rth fF°m °ur mind as the real
reason
Th^ fr0m the divine and
its conjectural
,I?an mind ls therefore the form of
form of the real'world?
And, in De beryllo:

^^ °f

G°d 'S the

natural Vorrns0^ 'S ^ Creator of real beings and of
ings aid
' S,Tma" LS the creator of rational benothing bm th/ !?Cia f°rmS; man's creations ar^
creaturi " e^he . f65865 °f his intellect' iust22as 'he
tures are the likenesses of God's intellect.
And in modification of the well ir™
anima (III, 8 43lh29t r„\
known passage in Aristotle's De
of the mind is not a real ,anus wntes: "The stone in the knowledge
8 but 3 bein8 of reason."22
In the second IZ
systematic structures of'th^USanUS glVCS precise statement to the
tructures of the universes of things and of meanings.
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The universe does not exist except contractedly in
things, and every thing which exists in act contracts
all things (universa) so that they are in act that which
it is.".
In his later writings Cusanus largely drops the notion of the 'universe'
as a system, but he continues to give a systematic definition of the
realm of reason as an explication of what is complicated in the in
tellect.
Despite this acceptance of the central categories of the reorientation
of 1100 A.D., Cusanus, as already indicated, works out a new context
within which to place them, and I find, somewhat to my surprise, that
it is possible to discuss the new context in terms of the same three
topics which we used to contrast the ancient position with that of
Anselm:
1. The ancients see knowledge as vision; Anselm finds the mind and
r®on to be defined not by vision but by understanding and com
prehension; Cusanus restores vision as the central and culminating
function of the mind.
2. The ancients see knowing as the conjunction and union o t e
newer with the known; in Anselm knower and known are separated
/a sharp dichotomy; Cusanus reestablishes for the intellect in par
tlcu'ar the identity of the knower with the known.
h In the ancients the self as it turns within finds itself conjoined or
ntrcal with the highest elements of the all; in Anselm the self tends
®0r5 and more to be limited to the level of meanings, to become^
flunking substance;' Cusanus reestablishes the self as existing
identical with thp AKcni„t»
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But Cusanus point is that the loss is characteristic only of the realm of
reason. When one rises, as one should, above reason to the intellect
there one encounters vision, experience (experimentum), and taste
(gustus). Here are a few texts.
Therefore logic and all philosophic inquisition fail to
reach vision . . . But in the region of the intellect,
the vision of the mind, without discursive reasoning
(sine discursu) attains to the coincidence of unity
and plurality, of the point and the line, and of the
center and the circle.26
And further, in De non aliud:
All things which are investigated by reason but which
adei thnf^ I thC Cye °f the mind (°culi mentis
fis
f S nf ,!' SCem 10 aPProach truth, nevercomnL •
ultimate certitude. Final certitude,
complete in every respect, is vision.27
run deep and*thaTl^3* ^ effects of the reorientation of 1100 A.D.
reason
' ^ constantly tempted to retreat from vision to
in the3 c8oinm'd^ieVTent l° fix oneself with stability
know that ^" u °PPOsites" But even though we

s- a ture an almost°Augustin!anntal phll°soPhy'' Cusanus is able to recapthe level of vision. As he re Sensle ° ai? argument which never leaves
apice theoriae, "Whatever Tmar S to
disciple in his last work, De
SCe' y°U t00' wt*en y°u have applied your
mind, will also see."29
back to the anctentTfoTmafeS h°W Cusanus has in °ne sense reached
nant post-AnseSi, ^5^n™," Which l° transform the domi"
als° Sees' however> the extent to
which he has been comne en r'
the process. The ancients hnH
transform the ancient inheritance in
Cusanus, but their vision nf .,eraP ,slzed
'vision' almost as much as
knowable beings- Cusanus' • 6 mind was a vision of articulated and
cidence of opposites and of th^011' h°wever> is a vision of the coin-

beyond the categories of T.MTD
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Therefore the power of the mind to see exceeds its
power to comprehend. Hence the simple vision of the
mind is not a comprehending vision but from com
prehension it raises itself to seeing the incomprehen
sible.30
A second phase of Cusanus' revision of the reorientation of 1100
A.D., involves the unity of knower and known. This dominant
characteristic of ancient thought disappeared with emergence of the
dichotomy between meaning and thing in Anselm and Abelard.
Cusanus accepts the dichotomy between the conjectural world of man
and the real world of God's creatures, and he fully accepts the fact
that we cannot know the creatures in themselves, but only by conjec
ture. But for the realm of intellect, the realm of vision, the ancient
unity is reestablished, almost in the words of Aristotle's De anima.
Cusanus says in De coniecturis:
You see that you cannot know any intelligible as it is
if you take your intellect to be a different thing from
the intelligible itself.31
And, further, in De filiatione:
The most pure intellect makes any intelligible to be
the intellect itself, since every intelligible in the in
tellect is the intellect itself .... Every intelligible in
the intellect itself is the intellect.32
Hence at the level of his 'mental philosophy' Cusanus has reestablishthe ancient identity of the knower and the known, and mutatis
Mutandis of the sensor and the sensed.
But here, even more obviously than in the case of vision, Cusanus
tuust effect fundamental modifications in the ancient tradition and in
the categories of Anselm in order to be able to maintain both the
dichotomy between the conjectural and the real words, and the essen
tial unity of knower and of known. I can only indicate what he does in
the broadest outline. His basic innovation in relation to the ancient
tradition is that in place of a structure centered on Being or on the One
as the Ground of Being, he substitutes a structure in which the Ab
solute is one of intention or vision or manifestation; he effects a com
parable revision of the Anselmian categories in so far as Anselm s
things' or Thomas' 'objects' disappear in favor of the 'intentions of
the Absolute.
ed

. Thus in one of his latest works, Cusanus explains how the Absolute
to the real world; he here calls the Absolute the power itself

ls related
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(posse ipsum), which is the last of the many names he uses for what is
unnameable.
Since therefore the power itself (posse ipsum), than
which nothing is more powerful, wishes to be seen,
this is the reason for everything.33
And in application of this position to the creatures Cusanus declares
that every creature is an intention of the will of the omnipotent. He
was well aware here of his departure from the ancients, since he goes
on to explain:
Neither Plato nor Aristotle knew this, for clearly
each of them believed that the creator intellect (conditorem intellectum) made all things by necessity of
nature. From this all their error followed.34
So when Cusanus asks why God led the beauty of this visible and sen
sible rose to emerge from the thorn, the only answer is:
What can one reply except that (God's) marvellous
intellect intended to manifest Himself in this his
word . . . ?35
there are two of these theses Cusanus can then go on to explain that
and hiaher °
frSr thI manifestati™s of the Absolute. The first,
&
s' which are the images of God; the second
includes all the th m
Cre
tUreS
which are only explications of God.
Both orders stn°t f'
l
orders are 'inte t- r°i™ i Absolute, and like the Absolute both
nce Cusanus can maintain the Anselmian
dichotomv h ° 100V
COnjectural
an* the real o'rders, yet both are
substantTa, andtZ
C
emS
Wlt
in
characterized bv th
' . h the order of minds intellection is
different ancient singled™ ofbttag"iU°Cti°" f°Und wilhi,"he vt,y
1100 A.D. ,s^eh°/ ^.usanu® transformation of the reorientation of
the realm of meanin^6^5 ^ ^ef'nh»°n of the self as located within
tually crystallize in8^ °r reason' the definition which will evensubstance 'Once again^ Cu^n
** ^ °f the T as a 'thinking
from the ancient inhP 't
^ reaches back to borrow and to adapt
ultimately coninineH
ancients had found that the -T was
whole of Being or with'th 'rf

hif?est

Portions of the all, with the

self is ultimatelv to he f 6 P"6' usanus similarly finds that man's
Just as Cusam. re ' Und n°Where but in the Absolute.
ogmzes and justifies the realm of reason, though
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it is not ultimate, so he recognizes a kind of self on this level, but it
must be relinquished in order to reach one's true self.36 Even in the
early De docta ignorantia, Cusanus writes that the creatures reply to
the inquirer that he can find his self only in God.
If you would know anything of us, seek it not in us
but in our reason and in our cause . . . Nor will you
find yourself anywhere but in Him .... Go on then,
says our knowing ignorance, and find yourself in
Him.37
In his later writings Cusanus develops the point in greater detail,
particularly in the language of vision. Thus he declares:
Then (O God) you raise me so that I realize how it is
that whoever sees you . . . sees himself in you, for he
receives from you what he is.38
Cusanus also goes further and identifies man's seeing of God with
God's seeing of him.
What else, O Lord, is your seeing, when you regard
me with the eye of piety, than your being seen by me
. . . Nor is your being seen anything else than that
you see him who sees you.39
In the highest action of the self, the vision of God, the self is therefore
seen as the focus where the seeing of God coincides with His cing
seen, and one might relate this to Cusanus' speaking of God^as t e
ultimate of all perfection of intuitive vision of everything.
Such, in broad outline, is Cusanus' response to the reorientation o
H00 A.D. . While the avowed purpose of my analysis was simply to
see if Cusanus could offer any suggestions to us for ways out ot our
dilemma, I am afraid I may sometimes have been carried too far by
the sheer interest in what Cusanus had to say. But I believe that
l°ng digression was worth it and that there is indeed a harvest for us
here.
As I see it, Cusanus' essential insight is that the ancient
thought and experience were in important ways more adequate
COmmon human experience than those of Anselm's reason, or of our
Human language and thought and knowledge ou^ to be
characterized by the immediacy of vision and by the conjunction o
of knower and known; the human sense o/
dlrectly related to what is ultimate. Cusanus' solution tries to achieve
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these ancient goals, though he accepts the new categories of Anselm
and of Abelard as 'our' categories.
Perhaps it is useful to speculate a little at this point about what
Cusanus would say of our present history and of our present selves in
relation to the dilemma which 1100 A.D. apparently posed for both.
I believe his general comment would be that both our history and
our selves are simply phases of the modern secular, anthropocentric
rationality which developed out of the very tradition of reason he had
attacked as incomplete in itself. More particularly, I believe he would
argue that because our history is 'rational' it inevitably excludes what
is holy or absolute from its perspective, and the method itself cannot
be grounded in what is holy or absolute. As Cusanus explains the
scope of reason:
The human mind, when it uses reason as its means of
investigation, ejects the infinite from the entire circle
of its apprehension.41
Cusanus is far from denying the validity of Anselm's reason in its own
realm, but when it is made total the consequences for the intellect are
tragic. In reason the intellect can find neither itself nor the Absolute
which is its cause. As Cusanus writes of the intellect under these condi
tions:
The intellect is an eye, but it cannot see because it is
not in the light.... And this is interminable torture,
to have an intellectual being and never to be able to
use the intellect.
CU8,aiT wi,U go further and argue that on any level the
inffniil W UuT ltuknows 11 or not. is moved and affected only by the
excluded from the realm of reason; if the inf i n i t e HiiT
n
wniiM r,nt t
' °Tre would any of the beings.43 Hence Cusanus
thev were
* ol!r history cannot reach the Greeks, since
for them
^ fC ° n° suc^ habitation. The holy and the divine were
thought L u°r 1Tlost ,°^ mankind, the most serious subjects of
thought, speech, and writing.

trie character3^1153!!115 wol!ld go on to argue that the anthropocenreason The anth°Ur
7 1S ?iso a consequence of its limitation to
Vico the fnnnrf roP°c^ntr'sm is particularly evident in Giambattista
remember^S "8^°f the tradition in which 1 «and. You will
defining the scnne^fMv nCC that
power is the decisive factor in
therefore onlv r h°
ftory' things and creatures are made by God;
y God can know them and man cannot. But 'the world of
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nations and (the) civil world' are objects of history made by man, and
therefore man can know them.44 Past human thought and actions re
main within our power to reenact in thought, and thus to know.
It is interesting that Cusanus is an early representative of part of
Vieo's argument, but in the long run the differences are more impor
tant than the similarities. Cusanus agrees that only God can know the
creatures: "Hence of all the works of God, there is no precise
knowledge except with Him who made them." Man has precise
knowledge only of mathematics, a human creation in the realm of
reason. But Cusanus quickly limits this knowledge:
Hence, if we have rightly considered, we have
nothing certain in our science except our
mathematics, and the mathematics is an enigma for
searching out the works of God.45
But man has no certain knowledge of what we encounter through
sense, and no two sense experiences are identical; he has no certain
knowledge of another's intellectual experience, and no two intellects
are identical.46
Hence from this standpoint too, Cusanus would not be surprised
that our history has its troubles with the Greeks. By limiting ourselves
to an anthropocentric rationality, he would say, we have excluded the
factors which do the most to make men human and we have surely
made ourselves anything but fit companions for the Greeks, whose
assumptions were contrary to such anthropocentrism.
^
Finally, where we were worried that we might lose our selves if we
abandoned Anselmian categories for those of the Greeks, Cusanus
would say this happened only because we recognized no self but that
of the realm of reason, and that self ought in any case be. transcended
in the ascent to a vision of our true selves in the intellect and in the Abs°lute. More important, he would argue that only when we had risen
above the realm of reason we could see that the common relation ot
men to the Absolute is precisely what makes possible the extraor
d'nary 'history' of all the philosophic and theological positions known
to him.
Admittedly, Cusanus shows little interest in history as
develonment ' hut Via
an almost unique positive appreciation
rational understandability but in a common
Thus

in the De

filiatione,

he writes:

All those who have theologized and philosophized
have tried to express only one thing, though in a
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variety of modes .... Their ways of speaking are
adverse and incompatible, but they nevertheless all
•tried to express nothing else than the one itself which
is located above all contrariety beyond our reach;
each did this in his own way, the one affirmatively,
the one negatively, and the one doubtfully .... Thus
all possible ways of speaking all try to express that
which is ineffable, and they all fall under this
theology (of the ineffable) itself.47
Cusanus accordingly believes that through his new 'mental
philosophy he can reach out to the Greeks historically, and there is no
reason why we should not extend the method to other civilizations as
well. And while in the texts with which we have been working his main
concern is to show how this can be done as the Greeks try to reach the
Absolute through the intellect which is 'above' reason, one should
note that Cusanus holds that all men, including the Greeks, also conront the Absolute at the other end of the scale, in sense which is
below' reason.
The sight of the mind and the sight of sense have only
one and the same object; the sight of the mind sees it
as it is in itself, while the sight of the sense sees it as it
is in signs. The one object of both (the mind and of
sense) is the power itself (posse ipsum), than which
nothing is more powerful.48
lms
Greeks and S
other minds

proper visi°n

°f our own selves we are able without

dIi fTf e 'r e n t b W' a lT
s ° s i rT
aila'

°f

mankind, in so far as it is given to minds to know
* *

*

reoriematfrniof H on A ^ tf'k' 1 tried to outline the history of a
demands unnn ns v.- u
suggested that the history made certain
hisTorical method
Hh reemed impossible in the light of our modern
search for^wavr»a?
r ^."^em selves. In the second part, in
emmas> I analyzed Cusanus' response
to 1100 A D and Uf ° 0li,r
1
6
rSSp°nSe COmmented
upon our oSn irs. "
°f
counter an answeH^Ci03" °nly ra'Se the 1uesti°n: do we in fact, enhelp us get nast thp • .sanus' or an analogue to answer which might
history of 1100 A D"
has ponged usV perTam T°
^
r
m
SmaU
beginnin
come other, larger, crises °
8 we might over-

104

Cusanus, speaking from the Christian standpoint, argues that
all human experience of thought and language and things is human
precisely because it is constantly bracketed by transcendence, whether
in the descent from intellect through reason to sense, or in the ascent
from sense through reason to intellect; in the light of this argument he
criticizes the Anselmian reorientation, and by implication us, for us
ing a method of reason which explicitly excludes that which makes us
human. As I think of the common human experience of thought and
of sense both the argument and the criticism seem to me persuasive,
even if we choose to detach them from the Christian context. Helen
Keller, one of the very few people to whom it was given to remember
the transition to the world of human experience through language,
was driven to the Old Testament to describe the gift and the grace that
the transition involved: "I learned a great many words that day,
words that were to make the world blossom for me, like Aaron's rod,
with flowers."4'
With such intimations of ecstatic transition and quite apart from
our relation to the Greeks, one can only regret that the modern in
tellectual disciplines, among them history, followed so completely the
Cartesian, Galilean, and Vichian traditions which in their exclusively
secular and anthropocentric rationality all led to the exclusion of what
appears to be most human in man, first in the disciplines and then in
the selves of those who use the disciplines. It might have been better to
have taken the alternate route mapped out by Cusanus, and to ave
assumed with him that what makes the human use of signs in thoug t
and language differ from that of animals and of machines is in the
final analysis human awareness of the transcendent which is eyon
the signs.
And if this is so, then I wonder whether we should not also reject
the assumption, made explicit in Descartes, that the sel as t in mg
substance lies within man's conscious thought, and instead move to
Cusanus' position, or to an analogue of his position, in w IC our
selves would be found to be based ultimately in the transcendenc
which made our thought human, not within the universes of meaning
and of things.
.
.
f
If we give up the secular, anthropocentric assumP;1°n^f
historical method, then history can enter into the categor

«•> as well as those of Anselm and Abelard^
we give up the
Cartesian' definition of the self, we can enter both the anaenPan ^
Post-Anselmian worlds without loss of our own se v^sreturn
ho both of these things, then my problems are solved and I can retu
happily to my simple and straightforward hlsto^" r dmit that
So there are some possibilities for your consideration. I admit
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they are still only possibilities, and I also grant that they are not entire
ly comfortable ones. Despite the attendant gains a loss or transcending
of an old self is involved, and this is never without danger. But the dif
ficulties out of which these possibilities emerged are, I submit, real
ones; they will not go away. And to close on a more cheerful note, the
road explored by Cusanus is a lovely road. Who knows? Perhaps if we
have the courage to follow it we shall find, like Cusanus, that we have
been given "this whole visible world and all that has been written
(totam scnpturam) and all ministering spirits"50 to help us in our
quest.
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Of Messages and Messengers

Marijan Despalatovic

Tonight I perforce stand into danger, as the naval language
describes the condition of a ship which borne by its element ap
proaches shoals and sands. For what I wish to consider I must seek
words outside of my "discipline" thus incurring danger of failure and
the scorn visited upon the pretentious ignorant. There is no other
course open because I should like to imagine intents other than my
own and the structures of thought which bear such intents and shape
their destiny.
Lest we think that this is an extraordinarily weighty endeavor, this
desire to be tentative about one's own work, let us remember Kant s
adjuration: "Do you really desire that knowledge which concerns all
men shall surpass common understanding and be revealed only
y
Philosophers?" (1933:859) Needless to say the stakes here and now are
v«ry modest, and if we wish to be tentative about our work we should
also be tentative about the results of our examination of it. So 1 expect
'hat I shall not be able to answer queries put to me by those w ose
Professional fields I have despoiled with so little proper respect. I shall
amply have to quote Pirandello: "It is so if you think it is soThemost difficult point, to my mind, where to begin thinking abo
the specialised form of thinking we call critique is, naturally, read' g,
and
reading that part which is behind the neuro-physiological
operations of the process although permanently joined to it in a sym
blotic, incestuous union. What I read is always conditioned by the acP"Per
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tivity of reading, and unless I am mindful of the fact I engage in a
scholastic game. Obviously by reading I do not mean any kind of
reading; I do not mean reading for comprehension, I do not mean
skimming, and certainly not speed-reading. I wish to consider the
reading which is attended by a special and recognisable grace.
I contend that reading always includes a perspective of total envelop
ment, and that the reader's pre-reflexive experience of a poem (or a
painting, a sculpture, a concerto, a play) has all the qualities of a
special conviction, of belief. The belief concerns the existence of the
poet's world, the reality of the "world" being the a priori of the poet's
truth. As Bachelard says somewhere: "Tell me what your world is
like, and I shall tell you whether or not you are a poet." The reader
believes that the poet is right, even if he cannot tell why he believes in
the poet's Tightness.
Here, of course, is my first difficulty. I must consider belief if I am
to consider the text in one of its innumerable and elusive permuta
tions. I must do that bearing in mind that belief does not confer any
degree of empirical reality upon the text around which it glimmers,
and that belief is not susceptible to quantifiable, perceptible change
wrought by the agency of the text. Empirically the text can be a patent
lie, yet we may be prepared to accord it a degree of reality which we
would refuse to a person purveying a lie of equal magnitude. Our will
ingness to believe the text when we no longer find it possible to believe
a friend or a parent clears a little of the confusion — belief has
nothing to do with empirical verifiability of statements, or, as Kant
says: "No objects of empirical knowledge are matters of belief"
(1800:103). Matters empirical are capable of description (and I use the
term very broadly), whereas matters of belief defy description. It is
impossible to describe either the belief or its object; the attempt is at
best an asymptotical solution which, to many, means no solution at
all.
11 BCfiV<R7 MW® °fferS a pre8nant illustration of the predicament
(1888:97-98). Let two men read the same book, according to Hume
one as a "romance" and the other as "a true history," and they will
receive the one text in two distinctly different ways although they will
have put the very same sense upon the author." The meanings they
will have found in the text will be identical, but the "testimony" of the
author will not have the same influence upon them. The believer will
have a more lively conception of the incidents." The sceptic unahle
to give "credit to the testimony of the author" will have "a more fakit
and langui
of all (these) particulars." From this follow
that belief "is something felt by the mind," but it is also "that am of
the mind which renders realities more present to us than fictions''
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(1888:629). But these realities are fictions, one may exclaim in ex
asperation. Hume offers no consolation. Poets, who are "liars by pro
fession," endeavor with more or less ingenuity to impart "an air of
truth to their fictions." The kind of truth that poets strive to construct
in their artifacts has been discussed elsewhere in this volume. Suffice it
to remember that, on Hume, ideas do not necessarily have any "man
ner of influence on the will and passions," but an air of truth and
reality is an indispensable condition for their reception. In other
words, Hume, I think, shifts the emphasis from the poem to the mind;
the poet's most difficult undertaking has to do not with ensuring that
his fictions command more obedience than facts but with preparing
the mind of the prospective reader so skillfully that it will "give
assent" (the phrase is Hume's) to what is presented to it. Hume goes
even further: "the constant repetition" of poetic ideas makes them
enter the mind "with facility" and prevail over fancy; the mind can be
conditioned to consider forms of reality which it would under or
dinary circumstances reject. The poet, then makes extraordinary con
ditions for the reception of ordinary notions. I venture to say that
what poet makes is belief, and that poem is almost a byproduct,
detritus of the more ambitious purpose. The poem can never be as
plainly and as efficiently informative about a given circumstance as an
account, or an article. It is not meant to be informative about the cir
cumstance, it is not meant to be informative at all, not unless we
remember that the word informare in Latin means "to give form to,
shape, fashion."
Belief, therefore, "consists merely in a certain feeling or sen
timent," says Hume, "in something that depends not on the will, but
must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which
we are not masters" (1888:624). Thus Hume reaches the end of his en
quiry. I do not know whether more progress has been made since his
day. Bertrand Russell admitted that belief "is the central problem in
the analysis of mind" (1921:231) and then yielded the floor.
. B almost looks as if I have set out to prove that since my first condi
tion for a critique escapes definition we should give up altogether and
Joyously immerse ourselves in "interpretation" and other forms of
Pleasant games. I think not. If the world of the poet's experience does
not coincide exactly with ours, and it never does, there is yet a significant part of that world which does coincide with ours, although the
coincidence is not of the poet's making and eludes- rigid and
categorical definitions. I have in mind the expression of the world, its
contours and shapes, and that expression in linguistic. This suggestion
owe to Wittgenstein to whom the expression of belief is just a
sentence: — and the sentence has sense only as a member of a system
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of language" (1953:42). And here the path to be followed is reason
ably clear: in relation to a linguistic act our experience is not ontologically superior, nor is it the only given we have at our disposal.
The other and more important given is the linguistic act itself in a
specific form — the language-game as Wittgenstein calls it,
Sprachspiel. And in a critique we are, or at least we ought to be, more
interested in the game than in our experience, although in the working
out of the rules of the game we rely on the rules of experience. We
should never forget that we think about language in language, and
that the personal pronoun we apply so simply and casually, the / of
the modest cogitator, represents a most serious danger. / think about
the game, and how easy is it for me to assume that the rules / know
must exist in some form in the object upon which my thought con
verges. This is one of Wittgenstein's "delusions," namely that "the
concepts of proposition, language, thought, and world stand in a line
one behind the other, each equivalent to the other" (1953:93).
If belief is a matter of language, and we desire to think about
another matter of language, the poem, then perhaps we should say a
few words about how we consider the poetic act.
To consider a poetic act critically is to think about it out of an ab
solute synchronic level of the poetic system whose concreteness pro
vides only the matter and impulse for a far-reaching metamorphosis.
On this level the poetic act in its absoluteness becomes a possibility of
change to be wrought upon the system out of which it has risen Only
on the synchronic level of a system of world literature can we ap
preciate the accuracy of Eliot's statement in "Tradition and Inrepresents an opposition to the historical posi
tion (1932:47-59). The statement is, in fact, anti-historical. The notion
of literature as a body alive and present in its synchronic multiplicity
enables us to approach particular poetic systems in the light of a
movement incepted by Mallarme, a movement which shifts the aues
tion of literature from the writer to the process of writing from in
dividual works to a system in which boundaries between works and
d"u
their forms disappear.
Even before Mall W's concept of The Book whose intended con
tent is the whole world in the pure quality of verbal presence Gusmve
Flaubert wishes fervently: "If only I could read all the one hundred
fifty-eight pages in one glance; if only I could embrace all S ,!™
with all their detail in one single thought." (1968:63) This aggress S
expressed concept of a total act of reading posits the rnniv
f

perfect synchrony: this dream of , con.ple.epSc of

presses merely the desire of a writer turned rritie

u

•

7

wort ex

present in all the elements of a work as an active con7™I™Ta£
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prehending not sequentiality but synchronous wholeness, not a sum of
elements but the system of their "activity."
Poetry, like every conceptual system hierarchical in nature, rests on
the general system of language. The notion of the poetic system of in
terest to us is simultaneously a linguistic system and a metasystem
based on a particular manner of organisation and a unique expressive
purpose of poetry. Organisational "idiosyncrasies" of a poet reveal
an essentially distinctive principle of constitution and com
municativeness of language. All these "idiosyncrasies" are firmly
founded upon the general level of linguistic concreteness, and each
one of them in its system reflects and renews this concreteness in a
slightly different, individual fashion. If we, then, apply de Saussure's
definition of the linguistic system in general to a particular poetic
system, a "world," we emphasise the elementary interdependence of
all parts of the system and its ontological supremacy over its consti
tuent elements. An approach from the position of the system directs
the analyst towards the fundamental levels of the work, toward the
concrete totality of its signifiers, precluding indulgence in clever
mechanistic "thrusts" and predetermined ideological "enquiries."
Only if we begin with this totality can we determine the topos of an in
dividual expression. "It is a grave error," says de Saussure, "to con
sider an expression as nothing but a connexion, a link between a sound
and a concept. To define it thus is to believe that one can begin with
expressions and construct the system as a sum of expressions; on the
contrary, one must begin with the firm, solid whole, and by analysis
reach down to its constituents" (1961:164). The level of the system
Places the analyst above the limitations of induction, above the con
ceptual caprices of deduction, and leads him directly to the nonintentional experience of broadest concreteness of the work and its
signifying totality. In the critique of the system, which is truly a
systematic critique, there is the whole programme of a critique which
shifts the act of reading across the linearity of writing into the concen
tric grasp of the synchronic openness of the work.
Ultimately the position of the system raises serious doubts about the
traditional notion of "critical performance." The activity of the krites
has always been far more selective than evaluative. On occasion the
latter was merely an excuse for indulgence in the former. Krites'
8 °bal judgment has always been based on an a priori choice of the
meaning of the work and a pious hope that the meaning may be read
mto" the work: the critical act was in the last analysis an attempt to
^Present the work as a book finally decoded, broken open, its meanmgs offered up for reading. The work was objectified, recast into
meanings determined by the krites: the epoch was at last given its own,
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definitive "translation" of a literary act.
The analytic of the system leads us first into the open ambiguity of
poetic texture, the text itself, where we are compelled to admit that it
is impossible to separate one fixed, self-contained meaning from the
contexts of other meanings outside of the system whence they
originate. Furthermore, the existence of the system precedes the
essence of meaning, language precedes thought, thus there can be no
meaning before there is a system because language has no substance, it
't 0r.m"
significant de Saussurian thesis inherent in the demand
that the analysis begin with the whole is based on the experience of the
inguistic system as a collection of formal relationships among
e ements o varying degrees of similarity or, on occasion, complete in
compatibility. Meanings which these elements acquire are only func
tions o their relationships with each other. Meaning is relative:
. . . the language contains only differences," says de Saussure.
ore?ver" a difference generally assumes the existence of positive
etTCen
riiffprtS1°nS
d *s interposed; but language contains only
Wlthout P°sitive expressions . . . Language contains
tual and nhnnT Tf? which antedate its system, but only concepcpn * , Phonetic differences brought into being by the system. ConenSronment^a^m^15 °' 3 ^

1CSS imp0rtant tha» its signal

about^"hf^nafS di^.erence: this revolutionary and simple discovery
of exclusive UrC ° angua8e became possible only when the tyranny
concePt_essence was brought into question,
when as Fonr^n1"8
reducible mass m SfyS' tbe lan8ua8e returned" in its mysterious, irsilence of our' h 6 anguage lhat speaks of everything we do, of every
something
^ fefuses t0 yield to
desire to "say"
1
8
language assumes " '
" 11 becomes evident that our activity in
meamng only in that total, all-embracing reality
which contains
which we may wantToemertransaction

with our world int0

certain global'rrf8"^' name' and' ultimately, to speak, is to analyse
Babylonfan schk "m8S' create. differences in the same, wreak a
may be liberated f" m °ne meanin§ so that two different meanings
thepoetic^lanluageTHltnThiS-Phen°menon » Particularly fruitful in
unarticulated m 1vW
strains toward the discovery of new, as yet
believer in conqe"e eS T* trans™tations. Gaston Bachelard, a firm
differentialitv of rf ^ etype.s an.d substantial elements perceived the
tHe °rganic Unity °f COnCr£te
and dynamic imagi^aUW^lm3*10"
ge 1S.an essence which differentiates
itself in order to ev t t
ample. A litem™ • 1S ' !terary imagination provides the clearest eximage destroys indolent perceptual images. Literary
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imagination de-imagines in order to re-imagine better" (1958:26)
e e
accepted the insubstantiality of language it is"in
Pv'?w tk
calls k In theWtmd VUld 7^ 'tS non-concePtual essence, as Martinet
calls it. In the traditional representation of a linguistic sign fixed in de
Saussure s fraction: signifier, the numerator and the denominator are
.
signified
intelSibie0 ThtS-f15 ^ °ne translates a"d renders the other
world of idel tJ!
of language is inseparable from the abstract
worm ot ideas, the sound is forever wedded to the concept. It is true
the H 3CC° ing t0 de Saussure, the link between the numerator and
arbitrary' bUt in the process of conceptual deS
SS.
equa i v o H arb"ranness °f the link makcs the unity, the mystical
equality of elements inevitable.
quSdoTdfeST58 °f thC il?dependence of language brought into
r
tativp nf th
canonical straight, linear connection represenfunc,il herCOnCeptUal functioning of the sign. The discovery of
senarltpH lln matlveness as the essence of a linguistic phenomenon
alsn hrr. anguage from Its cultural connotations to a degree, but it
er t0 our activity in language by positing the totalitv nf it?8 ]t,
l° 'tS SIfifying relationships. "The independence of language,"
r0t' "which had t0 be fought for step by step in the
lineuisti? f
«•„ c° i™lSPnMi.iS„a,n ™media'e n't™ in "><= linguistics of
Dhennml
(1968:53). Language is a communicative
of tiin u ?' 3S an Informative code "it is a signal, not an expression
shins ~ r ?968:53)- The signal informs through sets of relationothern ?? between various totalities which communicate their
dlfference — as a difference in tension, in charge, a circuit
rln«H
closed by differential meaning.
and 6 3re n°W near an explanation of why we can nevertheless think
proi C°n,c^ptuaHse in language. If a concept is not a little picture
Cacb articulated word it must obtain its totality and sense
fro
i
inte™ 3 ?' possibility. The concept is not a partial projection to be
grated with other partial projections; it is a unique sensible design,
a
the amework °f signifying behaviour. In short, it is a system in which
8 gesture
tualh?
separate poetic images acquires the conceppoedc Individuation. The projection, in its potentiality, is
not °|
Spada'' 'I Is also temporal: each poetic image always projects
the f
jts Uture °f lfs system. This is the unique flight of a poetic image in
catS nVing t0 f°und its universe and invent poetic individuality as a
egorical demand for a home of an imagination. Conceptuality is,
CQ
S6C?ently, ibat outward, global, in a word, systemic condition of a
sj
(196fht Cb ^?g'ns t0 signify °nly when it has reached it. Francois Wahl
•329) rightly places conceptuality outside of the sign, in the
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denominator of a new fraction, thus:

/ signifier\ n
sign I
— )
System =
\signified
concept

J

Concept is an imaginary design of a whole anticipated in elements, a
proximity of signification apparent as a subconscious situation rather
an as a conscious framework. However, before we base the concepsvstS th W°rd. OI? 3 defined system of mean'ng. such as a poetic
already exists in the system of language, in the
nntln^m6 T
potentiality of meanings and sounds of a whole field of close or op« Ialues lr\ relation to which it acquires its own meaning and
enters thlS semantic field in a poetic act. It retreats
from ;J •
de
Doetic iran«v i tern"nation of its topos into the system, where its
t0 °CCUr- Val^ry described it as the direct
noe c Z
"T
create
around a themat^
a
. a P°eiT1 — to move into words —
3n imPression, to call forth words caused
bv a varietv r>f 'C W°r
incerition of art-eaS]°?S ° creatc in this manner a palette, before the
come into being combinations indicative of a vafV
y
a
ties
liberated" (1961 -35) °
> and ultimately a general sense is
thought ?s0not>rThep/70em' however' are concrete in ways in which our
c°ncreteness of the poem tempts one to wonder
whether it misfit
„d',he8^°
same order- Edmund Leach encountered what annp, <- u
°
a
simila
thropology of religion" Rp
r predicament working in theanmar'<ing that a great many anthropologists
get lost in the scholar'
its "rationality " he nrnn"0"^1156 regarding the content of belief and
tion: "To ask questions
t 3 straightforward methodological soluol
content of belief which are not contained in the content nf r t f.
3
nonsense
alike are to be underst,-."^
• • • Ritual action and belief
social order" (1954- 141 °TtfS I0™.5
symbolic statement about the
tractive. If the noem is ™ a ecasiveness of Leach's approach is atf°rm °f "tU.al action'thenit must
contain the parameters ofthe ^
We have an obiect thp n
elusive, pre-reflexive state we call belief,
with all the care it merits °fm' a. ^ i°b at hand is to treat the object
of belief and that the cnntSSUfmmg •t^3t We are 'nterested in the content
tent of the poem. I am not" 'S gomg t0 ke co-extensive with the conbelief that attends my reaHin^r 1 3m n0t PrePared to accept that the
3 p.oem's identical with the belief attendant upon the reading f
representation, it is an inne my ne'g^our- Belief is not a collective
man, and even he woulH v, "n^3.!6 which can only be claimed by one
be hard put to describe it. And the object I

biSfhr «„rs,v,°h gei at be!,ief-for
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have in mind is not an ordinary object at all, therefore an objective
reading is almost a misnomer. If, however, we offer a reasonably sim
ple definition of objective maybe all is not lost. I propose that we
understand objective to mean that which is general in signification, an
articulation of elements and characteristics also known as
paradigmatic modeling; objective pertains specifically to the defini
tions of relationships between the poem and the system which contains
it.
This form of objectivity is the immanent determinant of the poem,
even though it seems to threaten its being. At least it keeps at arm's
length the intoxication of subjective empathy and every identification
of poetic structure with a private experience of life, or of an event with
the meaning of history. The structure of the system is real, actual,
and, most importantly, trans-subjective.
Under ideal circumstances objective critique would avoid equivoca
tion; one sign would denote one thing, one situation, one proposition.
It would be a precise language of structural morphology containing
signs originating in different systems and pooled in a comprehensive
semiotics of culture. If this radical unification of language were possi
ble it is difficult to imagine what the function of critique might be.
The initial situation of this ideal but undesirable critique would re
semble a dictionary of a dead language, without grammatical clues,
without phonetic rules, without a single document in which words
function as language. It would be a language outside of the dynamics
of language, reduced to signs which cannot produce significant rela
tions even when forced into proximal dependencies.
Signs, however, in their aggregate condition are one thing: when
they have entered into a system of a larger construct their structure
and properties change: they begin to signify. So the poem is a sign
emitted by a larger, infinitely complex system and that is why we willymlly use conceptual dictionaries of other parts of the originating
matrix — the culture. Such dictionaries are conveniently recognisable
transmitters (not bearers) of social and ideational epistemes, but they
also tend to circumscribe and limit the area of discourse to descrip
tions of the obvious and laborious reconstructions of isolated
dements. The poem as a sign cannot be described or reconstructed by
application of a single set of rules: that would mean that we are
Prepared to reduce all mental operations to one single type, without
regard to the ambiances that produce imaginative models. Such
cultural absolutism, as Levy-Bruhl points out (1910:20-21), assumes
the existence of one "psychological and logical mechanism," and
k'le it makes possible neat and tidy solutions it reduces, implicitly,
thePoem to the level of a thing, a tree, a chair. And a poem "about" a
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tree, or Van Gogh's painting of his chair surely tells us nothing
"about" specific objects and everything "about" virtual objects of
imagination.
The meaning of a poem cannot be identified- with the reflection of
objective reality: that meaning must be understood as model-making
activity which is by no means an empirically literal description but a
heuristic cataloguing of signs capable of producing meanings to which
we are susceptible, to which we "give assent," as Hume puts it. An at
tempt to approach and understand the poem as a unique entity of a
national as well as universal tradition by elaboration of cognitive
categories represents an insoluble problem. A good example of confu
sion and strife which inevitably ensue from such manipulations, for
that is what they are, manipulations, is to be found in the heated
debates regarding the historical and theoretical application of
periodisation concepts — realism, classicism, romanticism, etc. It
seems that Benveniste is not quite right when he asserts that "we can
say everything, and we can say it as we wish" (1966:63). If we could
we would need no poet to un-say it, as it were.
I should like to suggest that we can appropriately identify the poem
as a sign which establishes a logical connection between the signifier
and the signified in de Saussurian sense. The signifier comes from the
enormous riches of values sanctioned by a cultural tradition: the
signified is a cluster of meanings, i.e. functioning epistemes ar
ticulated topologically. We advance through concepts which serve as
bridges not of an emotional, emphatic understanding, but of an essen
tially and primarily culturological grasp of the poem as an intersection
of different knowledges, consciousnesses and perceptions, physical
and spiritual forms, an imaginative intersection of the known and the
unknown, the sacred and the profane, the significant and the insignifi
cant.
The purpose of reading is topological determination of relations
w IC obtain within structures. This form of conceptualisation has
nothing in common with mediaeval scholasticism (even in its contem
porary disguises) which insisted, categorically, that universal con
cepts, i.e. the concepts of real essence, reside from the beginning in the
min
n t e contrary, we believe, and here is that word again, that
concepts are models, schematic representations of the structure and
properties o the object or the circumstance which imagination ap6S an
C a'ms ^or
own. The hypotheses we could not put to
rprpntu? 3 *p° •I?
^use °f extraliterary influences visited upon the
anothe/whhin tv, umqueness which differentiates one poem from
e same topological system, we can test on a model.
M
a *traftly logical activity is based on the study of
analogies
>
s a istical classification of sequentiality and combina118

tions of significant core elements in a poetic structure. For instance,
E.R. Curtius' European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages,
although in appearance a continuation of the traditional philological
approach presents a whole series of characteristic thematic and
stylistic properties which constitute significant determinants of dif
ferent authorial structures. In V. Propp's Morphology of the Fairy
Tale application of statistical research shows not only the "nature" of
the miraculous in the fairy tale but offers clear ways of understanding
how identical functional distributions and arrangements govern the
flow and shape of a "literary" narrative.
Model is a means of concretisation: it and its original are not iden
tical, they are only similar. Certain dominant features of the original
must be transposed into the model. If they are not, we reject the pro
position contained in the original, we turn away from the poem. The
failure, however, is not necessarily the fault of the maker of the poem
but of the maker of the model. And, to make matters more difficult,
the model is tested against belief, which explains why it is possible to
be awed by a poem yet give not a hang for it, or, conversely, why one
occasionally "gives assent" to a trite piece of sentimental fluff. By
and large, however, there is a broad, global, tacit agreement regarding
certain "greats."
One is almost prepared to accept the notion that these general and
inexplicable agreements — why should peasants of a remote village in
Yugoslavia become so profoundly and shockingly moved by the fate
of Hamlet, for instance, or why is Shakespeare, the voice of a
"civilized" urban culture, a "hit" in the bush? — bespeak the
quality of the mind that is anterior to logical thought, the sort of thing
Levy-Bruhl must have meant by "pre-logical" mentality, namely the
capacity of the mind to sustain itself in contradiction, something we
find difficult to imagine. Is it not possible that Weber s suggestion
should be pursued as a rewarding clue: some causes can have only one
type of consequence, he claims (1963:36), but on different leve s
sociological, poetic, semantic, semiotic? I find Weber's idea attractive
because it confirms my conviction that poetry as pure su jec rvi y is
bunk. The poem is an attitude, a proposition regarding certain orders
and their constituent elements. "A proposition is a model of reality as
w imagine it," says Wittgenstein (1976:19). And while I probably
misunderstand most of Wittgenstein the last statement is, think
almost incapable of misunderstanding. A theory of a thinking whole
rests on the praxis of reading: the two processes are not to be
understood as a sum of processes external to each other but as
spatial and temporal unfolding of certain idea urn ies.
organism is a melody which sings itself," says Uexkull. The organism
119

does not necessarily know the melody, nor does it know that it is sing
ing, let alone that it is singing a unique, characteristic melody which
attests to the existence of systematic behaviour. But such an organism
is a whole and as such significant, for the consciousness that knows it,
not merely a thing-in-itself.
The cluster of attitudes, propositions of the poem is the immanent
structure of the language of the poem. Its syntax is a relationship be
tween the poem and the reader.The poem without the reader is empty,
mind-less; it is like a galvanic element drained of electrolyte. Reading
starts the poem up, as it were. The mind in the poem is a hidden mind:
it is hidden because it is not produced in the form of the mind itself; it
is a mind for the mind that comes to it; it is mind-in-itself but not
mind-for-itself. Only in reading does it become mind-for-itself. So
when we say the poem we mean the consciousness of the poem, just as
when we say life we mean the consciousness of life. The poem, then, is
the manifestation of an "interior" in the "exterior" — a duplication
of the process whereby consciousness projects onto the world a new
world. And that new world in the assent of pre-reflexive belief is
perceived as an "interiority" when we have perceived certain patterns:
in other words, on the level of perception, I think, actions dissipated
onto the world merely inform us of the vital situation of an organism;
the sudden grasping of patterns is understanding which makes the poem.
An enquiry into the activity of signs is a concrete submergence in a
game whose rules are known in part, a play we can describe as a pro
cess but whose outcome is opaque. Such an enquiry is only a partial
j* to a^stract a general system of functioning meanings attached
to fields of signification in the constitution of plot by stylistic devices.
he structuration of the fields, again, is an attempt to abstract
everything that evidently lies behind them in thp intprpct nf a com-

century Schaffhausen to the
present-day Doxa works in the same
locale.
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The phenomenon of literariness becomes more accessible by the ap
plication of extra-disciplinary procedures, even if this application is
clumsy, as mine is. At least one is forced to ask questions in a different
language, thus avoiding the strategy of fitting the question to a pre
conceived answer. This strategy is based on the assumption that
literariness, or poiesis, is a transcendental quality of the imagination,
something like a repeatable immaculate conception. The questioner
can never be wrong, only inept or inelegant. The logic of consequentiality is always upheld, never questioned. And what is never question
ed must be considered suspect. Consecutivity as a principle is easily
discredited, and it is usually discredited that a consequential logic may
be established. A journey to the significant core of the poem, for ex
ample, can easily and attractively be "reified" by the core itself. But
there must be other ways to verify the metaphor. In the process we
may discover that the core is a decoy.
When we are "informed" by the poem we are shaped from within
by a specific activity of the text. Information is not generated by
meanings deposited in signs, but by the arrangement of signs
themselves. They are the melody I mentioned earlier. A distinct piece
of information is generated when a group of signs reveal certain
choices and preferences in the use of signs, as Shannon says. Conse
quently, in the area of language information is also shaped by the pro
cedures of choice. Syntax, after all, comprises only linguistic signs,
and since Shannon's concept of information appears to be applicable
to any statistically significant group of signs there is no reason why it
should not be applied to the poem (vide Propp). The use of language is
in the final analysis a behaviour, a properly human activity which has
no intrinsic significance, only referential significance. Behaviour can
only be understood in reference to aims of life — linguistic behaviour
is a means of adaption to "unorganized mass," to life. But life^does
not have the same meaning in animality and humanity, and man s act
of speaking expresses the fact that he is severing his adhesion to en
vironment, that he recognizes the act to be co-extensive with his mind
and that the specific modality of this co-extension is knowledge. For
bought language is simultaneously a principle of slavery, since it is in
terposed between thing and thought, and a principle of liberty, since
the naming of an attitude, or a conviction, constitutes separation ot it
from the being, an increase in the transparency of the consciousness.
That in itself is an attitude, a proposition with regard to the world.
The poem, then, is an example of the systematic use o signs, y
th« I mean the use which purposefully organizes the behaviour o
reading. We do not perceive signs separately, in fact we are not
generally aware of signs as specific pieces which form a shape, any
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more than we see each single piece in a mosaic, or each stroke of the
brush in a painting. We see a mosaic, or a painting, before we know
how it is made, or we do not see them at all. We do not make in
ferences from a number of distinct elements of a whole. The whole is
apprehended, and from our apprehension of the whole its constituent
elements derive their meaning. Natasha's face is radiant, Tolstoy tells
us, but the radiance is ours. Rather, the radiance is not capable of
description, we either know what it entails or we remain at a loss as to
why it is of any particular import. The radiance of Natasha's face is
only a brush-stroke on the grand canvas of War and Peace, it is a sign
emanating from the comprehensible system of the novel. Significa
tion, the most distinct property of the system, is its ontological
essence.
This understanding of signification offers a way to deal with the
consciousness of here and now, when, specifically, such consciousness
becomes overt in a collapse of the dimensions of the poem into the
unensions o the reader. In this catastrophe the elimination of sucZ'ICOntr ttl0f of memory and intelligence reduces the initial
a ,a^
when
experience to that swift shock we experience
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sciousness. And if the vocabulary of consciousness were limited to the
juggling of experiential data, we would probably never have climbed
down from the trees.
The poem is in the conjoining of the ideal signification and true
signification. The message represents ideal signification, the recipient
of the message provides true signification. The ideal signification is
visible from the outside of the poem, the message, but this visibility
entails a corresponding visibility from within. I see myself seeing, I am
more profoundly in being, the poem and the reader are one event: the
ideal structure of signification and the true structure of recipient
signification flow so closely that signification constitutes a single
"form" and the separation between the ideal and the true is suspend
ed. It is a form of consent, a union. This union has several
recognizable features:
1. Reading is an event — by that I mean that it occurs within the
dimensions of consciousness;
2. Reading is a linguistic event — by that I mean that language is not
used instrumentally as an extension of the self in the conquest of
the world, but that language is a medium in which the world
stands before us and in us;
3. Reading is a dialectical event — by that I mean that true con
sciousness enters into a relationship with the ideal consciousness,
and that ideal consciousness, standing over and against,
permeates the true consciousness;
4. Reading is an objective event — by that I mean not only that it has
the characteristics of otherness, namely what stands before us in
the poem, in language, is not the outcome of the reflexive activity
of the mind. Rather, the mind by entering into a world it has not
shaped conforms to that world;
3- Reading is an ontological event — by that I mean that in conform
ing to the poem the mind dies and is re-born, and dying and birth
are disclosures of being.
6' Reading is an historical event — by that I mean that reading en
tails the collapse of history into the presentness of the event; thus
whether we know it or not, whether we like it or not, reading is a
genuine experience of history in the guise of its total absence,
Reading is an event of the text — by that I mean that the text is at
least as important as the reader.
Whenever language works, as Needham says, we are the locus of the
Phenomenon. Perhaps that is why we are so inept in trying to under
stand how it works and so endlessly fascinated by its working.
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